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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
In the face of the perceived bareness of the theoretical 
reflection in current architectural thinking, this study 
set out to re- affirm the function of critical analysis 
(which, it is claimed, must by necessity be historical) as 
the major source of theoretical production in 
architecture. For criticism to be able to perform this 
function, one basic condition has to be fulfilled, namely 
that a distance be re- established between critical 
language and design language. Only then can critical 
analysis serve as a technique for the unveiling of the 
mechanisms of nostalgia operating in architectural 
discourses 
For that general objective to be achieved, a two -fold task 
had to be performed. On the one hand, the deconstruction 
of the dominant discourses in architecture which would 
reveal the ideological substance of its explicit claims. 
The aim of such a deconstruction was to demonstrate that 
the manifest discourse in architecture is not the 
expression of its "natural" preoccupations, but more 
fundamentally, the result of a previous construction, an 
ideological framework which orders and regulates the 
production of knowledge. 
On the other hand, it was necessary to formulate an 
alternative method of critical analysis which would look 
at the theoretical production in design, not from within 
its ideological framework which would simply confirm its 
claims by accepting the forms of disputation that the 
latter imposes, but from the outside. In :this way, the 
immediate contents of discourse do not constitute the 
finality of analysis; they simply constitute the key to 
the passage that leads to the general framework of thought 
production which, it is claimed, is the real regulator of 
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PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
An opinion, widely spread among professionals and in most 
academic circles consists in believing that, since 
architecture is both art and technique, the object of 
architectural research is the same as the object of the 
"project"~ One could, therefore, speak only of applied 
research, or operational research: the first offering to 
define, through the project, more performing products 
(i^e^ models), or innovating technologies; the second 
aiming at improving the methodological or administrative 
procedures in the conception of the project' Research, in 
this sense, would be located within the process of 
designing, with the task of conciliating the useful and 
the beautiful, the economic and the comfortable, etc--- 
In fact, in the procedure of design, the "research" part 
is that which covers any process of production leading to 
the elaboration of the project. In architecture, it is a 
practice which proposes to organise in a coherent way a 
given amount of data imposed upon the designer by a more 
or less precise programmatic, with the help of intrinsic 
Uata forming a body of more or less conscious doctrines. 
7+ is these doctrines which constitute what can be called 
the of architecture" and which provide the 
designer with the means of operating on the raw material, 
of passing from the programmatic to architecture. One can 
understand, therefore, that before the research which 
deals with the definition of products and procedures, 
there must exist a fundamental research which is 
necessarily located outside the act of designing and which 
precedes the project- 
As a way of simplification, one would say that, in the 
field of architecture and urban design, the object of 
fundamental research is "theory". By extension, one would 
call "fundamental", any research (epistemological, 
historical, sociological,...) which, taking as its object 
architecture, contributes to forging the theoretical 
apparatus on which is founded the entire body of doctrines 
used by architects, in the elaboration of the projects. 
One must also add that any critical teaching or research 
can only be founded on the affirmation of the principle of 
distinction between theoretical level and operational 
level as a necessary, but non-sufficient, condition. 
However, it must be stressed that it is neither possible 
nor desirable to introduce a barrier between practice and 
theoretical research for the simple reason that they both 
induce each other. It is only the form of the induction 
which varies. While the movement of induction from 
research to practice is direct at the doctrinal level (the 
site of which is the school), the movement in the other 
direction occurs in an indirect way, often taking paths 
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difficult to predict a- pr-ior-i. This point helps to clarify 
the reason for the gap existing between a "theoretical" 
practice, expressed through "paper projects" in schools 
and in competitions, and an "operational" practice which, 
due to theoretical short -sightedness, is unable to 
assimilate, without a period of adaptation, the doctrinal 
answers to the problems it, itself, induced at the level 
of research. 
This brings us to the second aspect of the question, 
namely, that of the nature of the phenomenon which has 
provoked the apparition of the current architectural 
research when it had, for so long, been completely 
neglected. 
Let us say right away that research is always the result 
of a latent crisis. Political protest and ideological 
criticism, being hardly capable of resulting in a radical 
modification of the professional structures, were, 
instead, directed towards the academic institutions which 
became the site for the elaboration of a new theoretical 
knowledge destined to provide the foundation for an 
alternative practice. Therefore, research, in accordance 
with its vocation, was born as a result of a two -fold 
necessity: 
a)- The necessity to oppose a radical criticism to 
architectural obscurantism, to the structures of the 
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profession, as well as to the planning policies of the 
governing bodies. 
b)- The necessity to reconstruct a theoretical_ knowledge 
which would serve as a basis for the teaching and practice 
of design. 
To stress vigorously the necessity and urgency of 
theoretical research in architecture and urban design does 
riot, however -, means that the role of operational research 
must be minimised or reduced. But rejecting theoretical 
research means the denial that architecture can be founded 
on a knowledge; it means the renunciation to make of the 
school the privileged place where an architectural culture 
can be formed and diffused; it is forgetting that a 
healthy practice cannot develop without theoretical 
support; finally, it is to deprive ourselves of an 
authentic quality, in favour of programmatic, technical, 
and aesthetic innovations, as much mystifying as costly in 
the long term. 
This investigation of knowledge in architecture leads to 
two related questions: on the one hand, one has to look at 
the nature and intended purpose of discourses in 
architecture; on the other hand, one must look for the 
most effective way as to render this nature and purpose 
explicit, in other words, one has to define interpretative 
mechanisms to be used in the analysis of architectural 
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discursive formations. 
Architecture, as a discursive formation, owes its 
coherency and respectability to a system of social 
mythification. In other words, a given architectural 
discourse is but a form of representation which 
naturalises certain meanings and eternalises the present 
state of the world. Rather- than a representation of 
reality, our ways of speaking and writing about 
architecture must be seen as serving A 
communicative- formative function: that of "giving" or 
"lending" to already partially specified modes of human 
relations, to states of affairs, situations or 
circumstances, a further form or structure; in other 
words, discourses work to specify states of affairs in 
such a way as to satisfy, not the demands of accuracy 
exerted by an extra- linguistic reality, but communicative 
requirements (1)- 
Architectural discourse, in that sense, is totally 
transparent to ideology. Its status as ideology derives 
from the fact that it reflects the manner in which the 
agents of are architectural culture live the relations 
between architecture as production, and architecture as 
institution (institution means, here, a system of norms 
and rules which is socially sanctioned). This means that, 
in the last instance, architectural discourse as ideology 
is related to the everyday experience of production 
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systems and of institutions, without being, 
thpreby,reduced to a theory of subjective consciousness' 
Thus, architecture as ideology has a social function: to 
insert the agents of an architectural culture into 
practical and aesthetic activities that support or 
subvert, in varying degrees, the hegemonical power 
(hegemony and power are, here, used in the sense proposed 
by N. Poulantzas (2): power meaning the capacity of a 
social group to realise its specific objective interests; 
hegemony indicating that the process of realisation of 
interests need not be reduced to pure domination by force 
or violence, but, rather, comprises a function 
leadership and ideology by means of which social relations 
are founded on active consent). In that sense, 
architecture as ideology comprises, not only scattered 
elements of building knowledge and notions of design, but 
also a whole process of symbolisation, mythical 
transportation, taste, style, and fashions. Reality, 
therefore, gives to architecture a set of rules and 
productive techniques while, in turn, architecture gives 
back to reality an imaginary coherence which makes it 
appear as natural and eternal~ 
During this process, it is all too easy for architecture 
to think of itself as "depicting", "picturing", or 
"mirroring" an actual state of affairs, in its discourse. 
But if, as Joyce suggests, "the milieus of ordinary life 
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were impregnated with the authority and influence of an 
elite" (3), then we should be alive to the possibility 
that even the most "honest" renderings of reality might be 
suspect and, for example, impregnated with the concerns of 
a "theoretician-elite"- 
Critical analysis, therefore, as opposed to historiography 
(i-e- the infantile wish to find the assassin) (4), 
concerns itself exactly with the project of reconstituting 
this imaginary coherence. In studying the ways in which 
architecture, as ideology, naturalises and de-historicises 
a historically created reality, critical analysis 
confronts myth exactly where it is most successful; that 
is, precisely where "it goes withou;!.. saying"; where it 
safeguards an establish position from doubt or attack; an,-1 
where it universalises history by saying "that is the wut) 
it must óe"- Critical analysis examines the process of 
naturalisation of architectural ideology into myth: Such 
is its task' Its aim is to constitute the discourse of the 
architecture under study insofar as it is structured by 
relations invested in institutions and historically 
determinate myths. As Manfredo Tafuri expressed it 
"The systematic criticism of ideologies accompanying the 
history of capitalist deoe[opment is, therefore, hut one 
chapter of political action; indeed, today, the political 
task of ideological criticism is to do away with mpotent 
and ineffectual myths which so often serve as illusions 
and permit the suroioua of umzchrnnistic hopes in desion" 
(5)~ 
It should be stressed, here, that the project of 
constituting the discourse of the architecture under study 
does not imply the activity of a subject- Instead; it 
designates the material existence of certain rules to 
which the subject is subjected once it takes part in 
discourse. 
Now, the analysis of both power and ideology has, for the 
last few years, become widely used whenever cultural 
phenomena were looked at~ And one must be careful and pay 
attention to the many criticisms raised against the 
automatic, functionalist use of ideology as an 
instrumental concept to evaluate the state of society at 
any moment of history. These criticisms were directed 
principally at the users of the orthodox marxist 
definition of ideology, as functioning to mask the 
contradictions and conflicts within and between the forces 
and relations of production (6)^ But the same criticisms 
could be applied to more recent definitions, as that of L. 
Althusser, which concentrate more on the ideological 
aspects of the unconscious "taken-for-granted" that are 
inherent in all aspects of life (7). Along this line, one 
could mention the essays on archaelogy by Leone for whom, 
the given ideas about nature, cause, time, person, serve 
to mask inequalities in the social order (0)- In this 
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sense, ideology disguises the arbitrariness of social 
relations of production, making them appear resident in 
nature or in the past and thus, inevitable~ 
The first of these criticisms concerns whether ideologies 
are shared by all in society. In Leone's study, all 
members of society appear to view the garden of William 
Paca in the same way as to get the same sense of order out 
of it (9)- Similar comments could be made in relations to 
studies like those of Faris or Kristansen (10)- There is 
nowhere any indication, in all these studies, that the 
same material culture may have different meanings and 
different ideological effects for different social groups. 
Indeed, the extent to which people are duped by the ideas 
of the dominant class is remarkable in those studies. For 
Leone, the ordering of architecture, street plans, rows of 
trees, all disguise the arbitrariness of the social order' 
But while it may be true that the ruling believe 
their own ideology, 
members 
no evidence is provided that 
of society make these 
all 
linkages between 
architectural layout and social order. In fact, as Giddens 
points out , "u good ruse could be mode to the effect that 
only dominant class-groups hove ever been strongly 
committed to dominant ideologies" (11). One must be 
careful as not to overestimate the degree of conviction 
with which all members of society, subordinate and even 
dominant, accept symbol systems. Alternative perspectives 
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may be covert, because of the controlling power of the 
dominant forms of discourse, but they are, nevertheless, 
present. If we want to avoid a conception of social groups 
as inactive agents, totally subordinate to the dominant 
class, via the ideological discourse, then, we must allow 
for the fact that they have some ability to penetrate 
ideologies and offer alternative perspectives- That 
co-existence of competing ideologies has recently been 
brought out in studies of modern material culture, aiming 
to identify alternative ideologies and strategies of power 
(12)~ 
A second criticism concerns the tendency of orthodox 
marxism to oppose ideology and social reality, the "real" 
conditions of existence, the "real" contradictions. As we 
have seen" ideologies are described as masking 
inequalities in the social order. But "inequality"` 
itself, is a value-laden term and can certainly be 
described as ideological' The marxist conception of 
false-consciousness implies that people cannot see the 
reality of their existence because that reality is hidden 
from them. But how can one define this reality? Can it be 
described as a phenomenon outside the speaking subject 
(13)? In fact, for different subjects, social inequalities 
and contradictions assume quite different meanings and 
refer to different "realities". Ideology cannot be taken 
to mean distorted communication, but, and I would agree 
1 1 
with Althusser on this point, is functionally necessary to 
all societies; it- is the practical unconscious 
organisation of the day-to-day existence- Rather than 
opposing ideology to reality, one must relate it to 
interest, and see how symbolic systems can be mobilised to 
legitimate the sectional interests of various groups. 
Following Giddens (14), one could say that there are three 
ways in which ideologies function: a) the representation 
of sectional interests as universal; b) the denial or 
transmutation of contradictions; c} the naturalisation of 
the present, or reification' 
Different sectional interests in society develop their own 
ideologies in relation to other ideologies and interests. 
Social interests and power relations can be seen from many 
different points of view within the same socio-historical 
context' Interest and power can be defined in terms other 
than the control over the means of production, and the 
dominant ideology is continually being subverted by 
conflicting strategies. As a matter of fact, all 
ideologies that appear to "mask", in the process, 
"reveal". 
The third criticism against the unwarranted use of 
ideology concerns the application of a cross-cultural 
method which pays insufficient regard to social contexts 
and symbolic contexts' It is all too easy, for instancev 
to apply Giddens' three forms of ideology in a wide range 
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of circumstances. In the examples mentioned, prestige, 
naturalisation, masking, and so on, are applied with 
little attempt to see if the synchronic model is 
appropriate. This is why, in the recent discussions on 
ideology (15), it is more or less accepted that one cannot 
really generalise about ideological phenomena, since, 
interests, power, and symbolic systems are generated 
historically and particularly, giving little credibility 
to meta -historical theorisations on ideology, whose 
emphasis leads to the inability to account for the 
specific nature of ideological forms. This is the major 
reason why critical analysis cannot but be a historical 
criticism, dealing only with specific and historically 
well -defined situations which are very unlikely to 
re- occur in another place and/or at another time. 
The fourth limitation of orthodox marxist conception of 
ideology relates to the generation and generative role of 
ideology. Ire relation to the third criticism, the 
inability to explain the specificity of ideological forms 
is associated with the inability to explain their 
"becoming ". The problem, here, is of course, that of 
language and that of the translation of i deology into a 
specific aesthetic or into specific spatial forms. This is 
the most important point, as far as architectural 
discourses are concerned: the communicability or 
non- communicability between different linguitic phenomena. 
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The orthodox marxist view of aesthetics is hopelessly 
unable to understand the basic characteristic of artistic 
languages as, not modes of representation (in which case, 
ideology could be made, through various artistic 
mechanisms, to appear in works of art), but as specific 
formal systems (16)~ 
These limitations of the instrumental use of ideological 
phenomena lead to a series of conclusions. Ideology 
represents an aspect of symbolic systems' It refers most 
to that component of symbolic systems most closely 
involved in the negociation of power from varying points 
of interest within society. Cultural meanings and symbols 
are used within strategies of power but they also partly 
form those strategies- Ideology cannot be opposed to 
social relations of production; it cannot be explained as 
functioning in relation to some social reality, because 
that reality, as well as the analysis of the relationship 
between ideology and reality, are themselves ideological. 
Rather, ideology is the framework within which, from a 
given standpoint, resources are given value, inequalities 
are defined, and power is legitimated' 
But the most important point to realise, as far as 
architecture is concerned, is that there is no automatic 
intercommunicability between different linguistic systems 
and that, therefore, architectural forms cannot be thought 
of as the immediate representation or expression of a 
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given power structure in society, or a given ideological 
construct. This is why, in the analyis of architectural 
phenomena, one has always to face a two -fold question: on 
the one hand, there is the specifically architectural 
ordering, classification, and semiosis of formal elements; 
on the other hand, there are the mechanisms by which these 
ordering, classification, and semiosis are brought, by 
architectural discourses, to express or conform with some 
specific representation of the world. One can, therefore, 
see that there is no immediate translation of specific 
architectural forms into specific representations of the 
world. When this translation is operated, it can only be 
done through the mediation of discourse, that is, through 
the intercession that it makes between "things" and "the 
naming of things ". It is in this mediating role between 
architectural forms and representations of the world that 
architectural discourse reveals its ideological nature. 
Now, in undertaking such a project of constitution, of 
architectural discourses, one has to follow a certain 
number- of steps: firstly, one has to describe the rules of 
classification, ordering, and semiosis of the discursive 
formation one looks at; secondly, one has to ask: what is 
the internal economy of such rules and what the relative 
relations of subordination and hierarchy that organise 
such rules into a seemingly coherent aesthetic; thirdly, 
one has to ask: what is the instrumental significance of 
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such rules of design, that is, why and in what semantic 
context are they consciously or unconsciously selected in 
the first place; and conversely, why and in what semantic 
context are they allowed to be recognised as operative 
truths, that is, popular, everyday statements, enjoying a 
"natural" matter-of-factness. 
Now, it seems to me that there is a political dimension to 
critical analysis: its vcison d`etre is the constitution 
of architecture as discourse arid, in the process of such a 
constitution, the unmasking of the process of 
mythification whenever and wherever it takes place. Such 
an understanding of historical constitution as a project 
of de- mythification, however, raises two questions: 
Firstly, does critical analysis expose ideological error? 
Of course, not, for there is no ideological error, to 
start with. Ideology is not a matter of truth or error. To 
apply to architectural history the opposition between 
science and ideology, between objective truth and 
false -consciousness, is but a futile exercise in morality. 
We know - I hope - since Nietzsche, that the opposition 
between false- consciousness and objective truth is but one 
of those petrified words that we may stumble across but 
eventually remove (17)- Architectural ideology is not an 
instance of error, but, rather, an instance of rhetoric. 
It is important to grasp here the concept of architectural 
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discourse as a process of mythical structuring aimed at 
the reproduction of relations of power~ Myth is motivated 
by both the desire towards naturalisation (ï^e^ omnipotent 
power over normative behaviour), and towards ideality 
<i'e' constitution of a realm where consciousness can 
recognise itself as subject-constituting). Since 
architectural discourse is not a matter of holding the 
"right" or "wrong" view, but a matter of holding the 
"necessary" view, it is logical to assume that the aim 
criticism 
of 
is not to expose ideological errors- It simply 
describes the way by which myth assumes a naturalness, 
that is both an attitude of normative behaviour and one 
of ideality. And this is the sole task of critical 
analysis: to describe the production of structures of 
normative behaviour and of systems of subject-constituting 
consciousness. 
The second question concerns the issue of the historical 
objectivity assumed by the analyst - the issue of 
prise-de-position, of engagement. Can criticism, as a 
project of de-mythification, be free from error, so long 
as it refrains from the construction of an alternative 
point-of-view? This question seems to imply that 
de-mytbification is erroneous if it is applied from a 
particular point-nf-view° from a prise-de-position- This, 
in my opinion, touches the core of the argument~ For, if 
critical analysis - understood as an incessant project of 
17 
de- mythification - sets out to examine the process of 
naturalisation within a socially constituted architectural 
language, it is only necessary that it assumes a certain 
stance within history. lr, other words, for it to be able 
to expose any process of naturalisation, it is necessary 
that it sees architectural discourse as a process of 
structuring between architecture as production, 
architecture as institution, and architecture as ideology. 
Now, this process of structuring is not and cannot be 
objective or benevolent, for it is a process of 
r-epr-oduction, of relations of power. This is why systems of 
architectural meanings are masking: not because they are 
erroneous, but because their raison d' etre is to 
articulate the relations of power while presenting them, 
through discourse, in a natural and matter -of -fact common 
sense. And inversely, any attempt at exposing this process 
of structuring between the productive, institutional, and 
ideological levels of architecture, is not and cannot be 
benevolent- That is the only sense in which it could be 
said that criticism conducts an objective analysis: 
objective inasmuch as the critic líes outside the 
discourse which he analyses. This "lying outside" the 
discourse means that the subject lies outside the 
practical, instrumental dimension that this particular 
discourse is implicated with. He lies outside the notions, 
representations, images, modes 
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of action, gestures, 
attitudes, and practical norms which govern the discourse 
under analysis. In this sense, he stands outside this 
fictive reality, for, the function of this fictive reality 
is to naturalise historically produced relations of power, 
and the measur -e of its success is the degree to which it 
remains unknown as fictive form. 
But the project of de-mythification does not allow the 
critical analyst to be objective in a transcendental 
sense. Objectivity, here, is not a mode of achieving 
absolute truth. Absolute truth, as a historical category, 
does not refer to the objectivity of the speaking subject 
(in this case, the critic), but to the objective 
historical determinations of ideologies; a determination 
which is largely independent of individual subjects and 
accountable only in historically concrete analysis itself 
(18). 
Having said that, it must not be believed, however, that 
critical analysis is but an endless chasing of fleeting 
shadows. It is not a theory of historical relativism. As a 
project of de- mythification, critical analysis is a 
gnoseological. tool. But this gnoseological contribution 
is, of course, not similar to that of empirical science. 
The aim, here, is not to prove, not to explain, not to 
verify, not to create models which would serve for- 
prognostication and prediction. The aim of critical 
analysis is, instead, to make one see the realm of the 
"forbidden "; to see the "deafened words" and the censures 
(but also to see Utopia as a process of reification); so 
that one might achieve - even if, alas, for only a brief 
moment - a state of freedom of consciousness (that is a 
state of neither power -, nor doubt, but a state of 
understanding). 
And yet, since the project of criticism is always 
conducted from a historically concrete prise -de- position, 
its findings cannot avoid being themselves "deafened 
words " - Critical analysis is always implicated in another 
discourse from which it conducts its project of 
de- mythification. And inversely, since this project is 
anchored on the horizon of are assumed social 
naturalisation of ideology, it r-ur,s the risk of being 
interpreted as a general theory of value -free relativism 
that leads eventually to intellectual formalism. 
Perhaps, it is now clear where the danger lies in the 
analysis of architectural practices. This analysis must 
always be qualified vis -avis, not the nature and role of 
its techniques of de- mythification, but, rather, vis -a -vis 
the double illusion it nurtures: the illusion of power and 
of value- freedom. for, the moment when the critical 
analyst has unveiled the process of naturalisation of a 
par-ticul_ar - architectural discourse, he might be tempted to 
believe that he has discovered a truth which could serve 
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as a normative guide for future conduct, hence the feeling 
of power. Or, inversely, the awareness that the findings 
of critical analysis are, themselves, "deafened words" 
might lead to the empty view of an easy relativism. 
How can one prevent critical analysis from becoming the 
prisoner of this double illusion, the illusion of power 
and its paradoxical antipode, the illusion of value 
freedom? Under such qualification, it seems to me that the 
authentic problem of critical analysis, today, is how to 
practice a criticism capable of "forcing reality into 
crisis". The theoretical problem that confronts critical 
analysis, in the present circvmstances, is how to 
construct a history which, having removed the ideological 
obstacles concealing the power structure operating in 
society, can avoid the double temptation of turning, 
either into a therapy, or into value-free formalism' 
Critical analysis must, therefore, be understood as, 
neither an interested and politically engaged strategy of 
de-mythification, nor simply as a theory of rhetoric - the 
universal doubt of which incessantly recoils onto the 
critic himself. 
Instead, it must be understood as a profound struggle of 
achieving freedom of consciousness, that is, a state of 
consciousness which affords a glimpse of the articulation 
between the subject and history, and of the relation 
between the subject and that which is not yet- 
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It is to these themes that this study is dedicated and 
around which its different parts are articulated, and 
that, even to the price of running the risk of no 
immediate effectuality' 
One further point: the resulting text may appear complex 
and difficult to understand. Complexities and difficulties 
are present not only in its objects and its methods, but 
also in the way it is presented, i'e' in the mode of 
writing. It is important, however, to remember that 
clarity in language (clarity is invariably understood, in 
such cases, as simplicity) does not imply, in any way, 
clarity in thought. Such an implication would have to 
assume that language is simply a vehicle for thought, a 
mere medium of representation- Language is nothing but a 
formal system of relationships. It is not language which 
is submitted, through the text, to the logic of thought, 
but instead, it is thought which submits itself to the 
formal system of language. Therefore, the clarity and 
simplicity of everyday speech and writing cannot be an 
adequate model for this kind of study' In fact, there is 
ample evidence to suggest that most of the questionable 
arguments in design theory are due to the imprecise and 
often abusive use of language~ 
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Introduction 
In the history of human culture, our time may well, one 
day, appear as having been marked by the most dramatic and 
difficult test, namely that of the discovery and learning 
of the meaning of the simplest gestures of human 
existence: seeing, speaking, and reading; those gestures 
which put men in relation to their work. And contrary to 
all reigning appearances, it is not to psychology - which 
actually thrives and develops in the absence of their 
concepts - that we owe these discoveries, but rather to a 
few men: Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. 
It is only since Freud that people started to suspect what 
listening, and therefore, what speaking meant; and it is 
to him that we owe the discovery of the speaking 
unconscious" hidden beneath the innocence of the spoken 
word, in the depth of an altogether different discourse. 
On the other hand, it is a fact that it is only since Marx 
that people started to suspect - at least in theory - what 
reading, and therefore, what writing meant' For the young 
Marx, the Marx of the "Monuscripts of i84a" (I), the 
essence of the human historical world, 
political, aesthetic, 
uf its economic, 
and religious productions, was 
immediately present in the concrete events. To know this 
essence amounted, for the young Marx, to reading the 
presence of the abstract essence in the transparency of 
concrete existence~ In this immediate reading of the 
essence in existence, one finds expressed the religious 
model of the Hegelian absolute subject' One can understand 
better the reasons for man's constant longing for an 
open-book reading of the world, in which events and 
actions are only various expressions of an overriding 
principle of life` of an essence. In other words, for the 
world or nature to be treated as if it were an open-book, 
it is necessary to have, from the beginning, some idea 
about the mode of reading itself ("[u lecture" in french): 
this mode of reading which conceives of the written 
discourse as the immediate translation of the real, and of 
the real as the discourse of a "Logos". 
In order to track down this mode of reading - that which 
sees in discourse the immediate translation of the world - 
the recourse to history is necessary, since it is only in 
the theory of production of history that one could 
understand the religious origin of reading, as well as the 
process by which it has come to establish itself: by 
discovering that the truth of history is not contained in 
the manifest discourse on historical events, that the text 
of history is different from that of a "Logos", of the 
spoken word. 
Breaking with the religious myth of reading: this 
theoretical necessity has to take the precise form of a 
definite rupture with the Hegelian concept of the 
"expressive totality". And it is not surprising that, if 
one sets aside this specific mode of reading, one 
discovers what it was really hiding: a theory of 
expression; and one would also discover that this 
expressive totality (in which each part is "parrs total- -", 
or the immediate expression of the whole which contains it 
and which is contained in it) ( ) is the totality in which 
are assembled, in Hegel, all the complementary religious 
myths of the voice that speaks in the sequence of a 
discourse, of the truth which inhabits this discourse, and 
of that ear which listens or that eye which sees the word 
of truth contained in each individual word. 
Once the religious complicity between word and being, 
between the essence of things and its immediate 
abstraction from those very things, once the tacit pacts 
by which men protected themselves against the 
precariousness of history are broken, then, a new 
conception of knowledge becomes possible. 
If one renounces the speculative myth of the immediate 
revelation of the meaning of the world in every single 
event, then it becomes possible for an entirely new 
attitude to emerge. Philosophy, a sensible representation 
of the world, would begin from the perception of a 
multiplicity of things, events, and forms that cannot 
possibly be contained in one concept, one sign, one 
figure. And one would realise that men drew lines, 
expressed words, constructed codes, and composed figures 
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in order to defeat what, at first, looked like a dark, 
entangled, and disturbing state of disorder (3). 
This series of mythical, religious, conceptual, and 
artistic strategies that would be literally applied to the 
perceived chaos of the universe, have been devised with 
the sole objective of exorcising this disorder. However, 
it is the outcome of a linear- and cumulative conception of 
historical development (4) that some would be inclined to 
believe that one strategy, i.e. the mythical one, has 
thoroughly lost its representational powers, and has 
irreversibly given way to a philosophical and scientific 
strategy. We have to realise, once and for all, that the 
passage 
return; we have to realise that these strategies on the 
representation of the world have been alternating in the 
course of the history of mankind, and that none of them 
has been able to completely and irreversibly eradicate the 
others (5). 
But how does this preamble relate to the specific area of 
architectural knowledge? That the environmental 
disciplines find themselves undergoing a general and 
painful process of r-e- assessement of their values, 
practices, and the foundations of their discourses, needs 
hardly to be mentioned again. What needs to be examined, 
however, is the basis on which such an operation, is 
undertaken. 
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It seems to me that putting in the piare of what has been 
perceived and criticised as a global and totalitarian 
discourse, another discourse as much oppressive in its 
intentions, even if its effects do not rival those of the 
previous one, reveals the superficiality of the 
undertaking, well disguised under elaborate and 
sophisticated methods- For some r- easons that still have to 
be fully explained, architectural thinking has been unable 
to break the circle of representation /expression within 
which it presents itself not as part of reality, but only 
as an expression of it- Inside this mode of 
reaain-g/wr-iting, architectural theory would only be 
concerned with how best it could express or represent 
nature, the universe, the "Zeitgeist", the intentions of 
the artist/designer, or his state of mind. Nothing is said 
about architecture's own condition of being, about how its 
knowledge is produced, or its techniques elaborated (6). 
For as long as this stubborn will to "represent" is 
allowed to persist, architecture will remain in the same 
state of cultural backwardness in which it has been for so 
long. 
The history of the development of architecture is 
inevitably multiple: a history of the structures that form 
the environment, independently of the practice itself; a 
history of the attempts to control and direct those 
structures; a history of the intellectuals who have sought 
31 
to devise policies and methods for these attempts; a 
history of new "languages" which have striver. to delimit 
the area of their- particular- contribution. The 
intersection of these different histories will never- end 
up in unity. It is useless, to say the least, to try and 
solve the conflicts that are cropping up in the form of 
worrisome questions as to what role architecture should or 
can have. What needs to be done, instead, is to make a 
transition from a dispersed and highly speculative mode of 
analysis to a rigorous one. 
In the place of the old question as to how architectural 
language (7) can put forward hypotheses concerning 
collective destines, or how it can construe itself as an 
area of allegory and symbol, I would like to ask the 
following ones: what relationship is possible between the 
area of language and the extra -linguistic series (i.e. the 
politico- economic structures of society)? Is it within the 
capacity of the artistic modes of expression to put 
forward hypotheses concerning the destiny of society, or 
as marginal activities in the total process of production, 
are they not completely unable to offer a model for its 
future? And above all, what form of intellectual work is 
most adequate to enter into the sphere of production? 
Therefore, this study has, as its source, a refusal; a 
refusal which takes two distinct forms: 
a)- A profound scepticism towards orthodoxy, fixed 
frameworks, and "correct" 
one becomes 
often lead to' 
perspectives, especially when 
aware of the theoretical blind alleys they 
b)- In the area of "environmental practice", and as far as 
the questions above are concerned, that area is diffused 
and confused with a set of multiplicities, practices, 
disciplines, and theories, all forming a compact and 
entangled whole which renders the unravelling and 
individualizing of the different components extremely 
difficult. 
The various theories and disciplines, to which reference 
is constantly made by architects, would themselves need to 
be subjected to close scrutiny (8)^ There is no absolute 
indication that these theories possess the key for solving 
architectural problems. These acts of borrowings rely 
simply on the assumption that the source disciplines are 
more advanced, and therefore, potentially useful to 
"inferior" practices such as design. As in all direct and 
uncritical borrowings, the whole enterprise remained 
nothing more than a transfer of vocabulary. 
The result is stark theoretical naivety under elaborate 
technical detailing, second-hand social theorizing 
providing many arguments for anti-social stances, and 
pseudo-concerns covering up established modes of 
exploitative relations- All these contradictions are in 
turn isolated, institutionalised, and neutralised through 
so- called "environmental studies" (9). 
The elaboration of this study necessitated a two -fold 
approach to architectural problems: on the one hand, it 
required a review of existing trends and approaches, 
frameworks and theories in the history and theory of 
design, psychology, linguistics, aesthetics, etc- One the 
other hand, it required a look at the existing modes of 
analysis of, firstly, practical issues, and secondly, 
theoretical and discursive formations. 
In both instances, it involved a method of reading that 
was by no means apparent and definite from the beginning, 
but one which evolved and developed according to the 
material subjected to it. In this sense, analysis is both 
determining and determined: it determines the object of 
its own research, but it is also determined by the 
material it subjects to this research. 
At this stage, I would like to locate this study in the 
conjuncture within which it evolved. By location, I mean 
the spectrum of past and present fields of inquiry,the 
r -ange of theoretical as well as other forms of arguments, 
and finally, the institutional and social context of these 
inquiries. However, this is not to say that the 
conjuncture might be responsible for the possible 
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shortcomings of the study; it is simply saying that the 
questions to which this study has adressed itself can only 
be approached in relation to the problem of the definition 
of the limits of language- Such a mode of inquiry cannot 
be confined within the limits of one particular- language 
(i.e- architectural language) since what is to be 
establish is the nature of these limits. It is in this 
sense that this study is related to developments in 
philosophy, social and aesthetic theories, and 
linguistics- That the theoretical conjuncture of this work 
is constituted by non -architectural domains of inquiry is 
the reason for it being from the outside (10)- 
What has emerged in the couse of the last twenty years is 
the extraordinary efficacy of the discontinuous, 
particular, and local criticism. But together with this, 
one also discovers something that, perhaps, was not 
initially foreseen: something one might describe as the 
inhibiting effect of global, and totalitarian theories 
(11). It is not that these theories have not provided, nor 
continue to provide, in a fairly consistent fashion, 
useful tools for local research. But in each case, the 
attempt to think in terms of a totality has, in fact, 
proved to be a hindrance to research. 
Therefore, the notable point to be gleaned from the 
experiments of the last twenty year, their predominant 
feature, is the local character of criticism. This local 
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criticism is characterised by its refusal to measure 
itself against any universal model. This is not to be 
taken to mean that its qualities are those of an obtuse, 
naive, or primitive empiricism; what this essentially 
local character of criticism indicates is an autonomous, 
non-centralised kind of theoretical production, one whose 
validity is not dependent on the approval of the 
established regimes of thought. 
It is here that we touch upon another feature of these 
experiments= it seems to me that this local criticism has 
proceeded by means of what one might call "a return to 
knowledge"' What is meant by this phrase is this: in the 
course of recent times, we have witnessed something that 
can be described as an "insurrection of subjugated 
knowledges". Subjugated knowledges refer to two things: on 
the one hand, they refer to the historical contents that 
have been buried and disguised in a functionalist 
coherence or a formal systematization; contents which 
allow one to rediscover the ruptural effects of conflicts 
that the order imposed by functionalist or systematizing 
thought is designated to mask' Subjugated knowledges are, 
therefore, those blocks of historical knowledge which were 
present but disguised within the body of functionalist 
theory, and which local criticism has been able to reveal. 
On the other hand, by subjugated knowledges, one should 
understand something which, in a sense, is altogether 
different: namely, a whole set of knowledges which have 
been disqualified as inadequate to their task, or 
insufficiently elaborated; naive knowledges located down 
on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition 
or scientificity. 
What has emerged of these experiments is something one 
might call a genealogy, in the sense that Foucault 
understands it (12), or rather, a multiplicity of 
genealogical researches, a painstaking rediscovery of 
hidden struggles. And these genealogies, which are the 
combined products of are erudite knowledge and a popular - 
knowledge (the two categories of subjugated knowledges 
that are described above), were not possible and could not 
even have been attempted, except on one condition: that 
the tyranny of global discourses, with all their 
hierarchies and all their privileges of a theoretical 
avant -garde, was eliminated. 
Now, this research activity has nothing to do with an 
opposition between the abstract unity of theory and the 
concrete multiplicity of facts. It has nothing to do with 
the disqualification of the speculative dimension which 
opposes to it, in the name of science, the rigour of 
well -established knowledges. It is not, therefore, via an 
empiricism that these projects unfold. What this research 
activity does is simply to entertain the claims to 
attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, 
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illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary 
body of theory which would filter, classify and order them 
in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea 
as to what constitutes a science and its objects. These 
projects are, therefore, not returns to a more careful or 
exact form of science. They are precisely anti -sciences. 
Not that they vindicate a lyrical right to ignorance, or- 
non- knowledge. It is not that they are concerned to deny 
knowledge, or that they esteem the virtues of direct 
cognition and base their practice on immediate experience 
which escapes encapsulation in knowledge. The prime 
concern is, instead, with this "insurrection of 
knowledges" which are opposed not to the contents, 
methods, or concepts of science, but to the effects of a 
centralising power which is linked to the institution and 
functioning of an organised scientific discourse within a 
society such as that which exists in the West. 
The target of this criticism is, in this sense, not the 
specific contents of any particular branch of knowledge, 
but the ways in which this branch is turned into an 
institution: a name is given to it a group of people are 
given the monopoly over teaching it, talking and writing 
about it, as well as deciding what will and what will not 
be relevant (the "experts"); a place is allocated to this 
group, from which to exercise their monopoly (a school, an 
institute, a department, a chair, etc...). This is what I 
mean by the institutionalisation of knowledge: the "laic" 
version of the monastery with its clergy, its masses, and 
its rituals. Anything that is said outside this 
institution is either branded as irrelevant or 
"amateurish". 
What is most interesting, in this research activity, is 
the impertinence of the dissent contained in it. It is 
form that was, above all, shaken. The first victim of this 
upheaval was the man professing to knowledge, the teacher, 
ot the expert, for whom his field of competence is a 
justification of authority, and whose language is a 
monologue inasmuch as it leaves only one possibility open 
to the listener, that of dialogue - that is, of indicating 
that he has understood, and even of asking the occasional 
question, provided it was "relevant". In such a world of 
dialogue, there is nothing that cannot be questioned, on 
the condition that the correct forms are observed. In this 
way, form eludes all criticism, as does the relation of 
authority which it sustains (13)- 
What is at stake, in this revolt against the forms that 
knowledge assumes, is the status of truth. For if what is 
presented as knowledge is revealed not as true in the 
absolute, but only as true within the confines of a 
specific strategy, or a specific order (be it mythical, 
religious, scientific, or philosophical), then, historical 
development is revealed not as the gradual emergence of 
truth, until it reaches the status of the absolute (14), 
but as the expression of the constant struggle between 
various strategies over what is to be true and what is 
not; and the task of historical analysis becomes that of 
revealing that any specific period of history is not the 
expression of the state of development of society, up to 
that time, but instead, the expression of one battle in 
the constant "war of languages" over the status of truth. 
This is the form that the all -out attack against 
dialectical synthesis took, over the last two decades- The 
ideals of a new "classicism ", of an organic civilization, 
defended by Mer-leau -Ponty (15), were completely renounced. 
It is no longer believed that the task of the century was 
to integrate the irrational within an expanded reason. The 
task; now, is to deconstruct what is understood to be the 
the principle of the dominant language in the West - the 
logic of identity - and to provide a critique of history, 
to be approached henceforth as a myth, that is, an 
efficient solution (but devoid of truth) to the conflict 
between the "Same" and the "Othef " (16). This is the 
reason for the massive return to Nietzsche's critique 
which is directed at "true" science and "true "mor -al_ity. In 
his critique, Nietzsche demonstrates science as such -the 
desire for truth - originates in morality, in the ascetic 
ideal, and that morality as such, is the result of 
resentment against life. 
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In any event, no sooner do we become aware that truth is 
only the expression of a will to truth, than we must face 
the fact that this truth betrays a timid rejection of the 
world inasmuch as it is not a true world; it is just a 
fable: 
"The world has become a fable; the world as such is only a 
fable_ A fable is something which is told, having no 
existence outside the tale= The world is something which 
is told, an event which is narrated; it is therefore an 
interpretation. Religion, art, science, history, are just 
so many interpretations of the world, or rather, so many 
variants of the fatale" (17). 
In order- to get away from a historical interpretation 
which presents the world in the form of a single truth, a 
single "Logos" (in the case of Western society, the logic 
of identity), one has simply to show that this "Logos" is 
already a "Mythos ". Philosophy was constructed as a 
measure against tales and tall stories; Plato has closed 
the gates of his city to poets whom he accused of spinning 
seductive yarns, foreign to truth. It is now necessary to 
show that Plato is also something of a storyteller, that 
philosophy, too, is a seductive tale. 
Philosophers oppose the theoretical and the narrative 
discourses: the former asserts "This i-s always and 
everywhere the case, in all cases and from all time "; the 
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latter begins "Once upon u timer As long as such an 
opposition exists between the particular- and the 
universal, theory will dominate the mind, and anecdotes 
and tales will be considered as harmless entertainment- 
But if all discourses ar -e to be simply narratives, whoever 
were to claim that his discourse has the character of the 
absolute would invite mockery, for the properties of the 
narrative are as follows: 
a) It has always begun, and it is always the story of a 
previous story; the referent of a narrative is never the 
crude fact, nor the dumb event, but other narratives, 
other stories: 
"-and in fact, we are always under the influence of some 
narrative; things have always been told to us already, and 
we, ours elves, have already been told" (18) - 
b) It is never finished, for, in principle, the narrator 
adresses a listener who may, in his turn, become the 
narrator, making the narration to which he was listening 
into a fresh narration. 
As such, narratives would be very different from 
scientific theorizing, but simply the production of an 
account of a situation as a result of contemplation; that 
is, not as a result of further participation within it, 
but as a result of reviewing the situation under the 
auspices of a certain, constant interest- One can, 
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therefore, in reformulating one's own knowledge of the 
past, give it a new interpretation~ But there are two ways 
in which interpretation can be understood: 
a)- One may decide beforehand as to the nature of the 
world in which we live and interpret events as falling 
into one or another familiar category within it; that is 
determining to keep ourselves constant and interpreting 
everything as fitting how we already are. 
b)- The second sense of interpretation is concerned with 
elucidating what, in the present, is a really possible 
development for the future~ That is, not what might happen 
by chance or necessity, but what, realistically, we, 
ourselves, might attempt to do or to be, because provision 
for it exists in our present situation. 
It was Vico who, in 1744, first set out the possibility of 
this second form of existence, in his concern to look at 
the provenance of the development of our human capacities 
and abilities - where do our cultural achievements come 
from? Whereas others thought that their origin could be in 
the "blind concourse of atoms", or in a "deaf chain of 
causality", or again in the "natural order of things", he 
thought that they were mistaken: 
They ought to have studied it in the economy of civil 
institutions, in keeping with the full meaning of app-tying 
to providence the term "divinity" the power of 
divining), from divinuri, or to divine, which is to 
understand what is hidden from men - in the future - or 
what is hidden in them - their consciousness" (19)^ 
In this form of interpretation, one is not attempting to 
locate events in the shared imaginary world of space and 
time; one is attempting a practical task, to formulate 
this past as a practically conceived corpus of knowledge 
of use now! One can use it to transform both oneself and 
one's own forms of life: 
"Wet[, it is not the past, but what we make of the nust 
that shapes our future and present. But I can see that the 
two voyages share common elements of language and memory" 
<20>^ 
The reformulation of the past (both the immediate past and 
the distant past) as a practical resource appropriate to 
the present requires that it be located, not in a 
theoretical space, but relative to the activities in which 
one is currently involved~ It is the narrative account 
which provides one, not with a final, integrated, 
harmonious, and true picture of how all is and should be, 
but with the paradigms and motifs of a practical resource, 
not for predictions, but only for tentative suggestions~ 
In other words, it cannot be applied like theoretical 
knowledge; it is merely an instructive account~ 
As such, narrative accounts, 
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as opposed to theories, 
cannot be used to for the future" (i~e~ the 
making of a model of it or the formulation of 
possibilities in an imaginary place)- Because of the 
traditional domination of theory over narrative, in the 
West, this "planning for the future" has constituted one 
of the central activities of Western forms of life~ 
Narrative accounts, instead, allow only for a 
"preparation" of the future~ 
But the switch from theories to narratives requires a 
strange self-discipline, of not so much denying oneself 
use of one's own capacity of reflection, that is one's 
inclination to treat a tendency of a state of affairs 
happen 
to 
as something already existing, but of noticing, 
when one does reflect, how one does it, the method one 
seems to use The task is one of "deconstruction", of 
discovering 
"the process and attainment of imagination which are 
continuous with, but must be distinguished from the other 
observable features of the settings in which theu occur" 
<21>~ 
Therefore, the story never ends~ Or, perhaps, one story 
dues: one narrative comes to an end, the dialectical 
narrative. But several versions of this account already 
exist, several accounts of this end; several accounts of 
these accounts <22>^ The discourse on universal history 
was only a powerful myth~ But what power it must have had 
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to have hypnotised everybody for such a long time! The end 
of history is not the end of the account. The many 
accounts of this ending are preparing a future in which 
several variants of the fable of the world will reign 
again, and that, for the Nth time. 
At this point, I would like to stress that there is no 
intention, on my part, of conducting an extensive analysis 
of the theoretical developments that I have just outlined. 
however, in the course of the study, certain key concepts, 
because of their immediate relevance to architectural 
theory (e.g. "truth ", "power", "language "), will b P 
discussed in detail whenever necessary. All that I can 
say, stage, is that a series of theoretical works 
had profound effects on the understanding of social 
phenomena, that they have opened up a certain theoretical 
field (more than a framework, or a methodology), and that 
they have contributed greatly to what is widely perceived, 
in the West, as a shift in sensibility in society, and a 
new stage in the history of mankind. It is within this 
athmosphere that my own, thoughts developed, for the last 
fifteen years, and that a certain perspective began to 
emerge. For this reason, the debt owed by this study to 
this series of works is great, and yet, hardly 
describable. It is certainly not expressed in the for -m of 
a direct reference to, or the simple application of, one 
of these works to the field of architecture. It is an 
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interpretation of the state of architectural thinking 
which shares the same concern for the fundamental question 
of the limits of operability of language. 
It is my intention to demonstrate that the various 
discourses on architectur -al theory which present 
themselves as the true embodiment of the purpose and 
essence of architecture (discourses such as that on "human 
needs ", or that of architecture as a linguistic system of 
communication, or that of the expression of the 
"Zeitgeist ") are just so many stories, so many fables with 
no universal or meta -historical essence; and that they 
rely on a certain number of assumptions whose historical 
origins can be precisely located. 
It must be now apparent that there will be no attempt to 
establish yet another- alternative discourse (another 
story) to all those already existing- What I shall be 
concerned with is simply the analysis of that which 
constitutes knowledge in architecture, and that which 
allows it to present itself as knowledge. If there is an 
alternative proposed, it is at the level of the mode of 
reading itself: it is in seeing that the theoretical 
production of discourses is not different from any other 
productive process, even if its effects on the social 
structure will not be similar; it is in the opening up of 
a perspective in which it is not architecture as object 





(1) K. klar;:, "Les manuscripts de 1844", Editions klasper-o 
(Par-í.5, 194). 
(2) This is similar to the use of "synechdoche" in 
Rhetorics, that is the figure of putting the part to 
signify the whole. 
(3) "Physics and metaphysics are coming together in a 
cor-iceptior, of the world in which process, becoming, is 
taken as a primary constituent of phus-ical 
e?ristence:: =The world is far from being homogeneous" 
(pia), 
"In the world we are familiar with, equilibrium is a 
rare and precarious state" (p128), 
"-most of reality, instead of being orderly and 
equilib_,rial, is seething and bubbling with change, 
disorder, process" (pxu ), 
I. Prirogrine .Q L. Stenger, "Order out of chaos: man's 
new dialogue with nature ", Bantam Books (New York, 
1984). 
(4) It is the conception which adresses historical 
development as a gradual and continual elimination of 
errors from knowledge until the day when absolute 
knowledge is reached: that would represent the "end of 
history". It is Hegel, of course, who is responsible 
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for the propagation of this conception which will be 
discussed in the part related to history and design. 
(5) On the process of the remythicizing of the world in 
modern times, see T. Mann, "IYobilta delle spirito ", 
edited by L. Mazzucchetti, Mondadori (Milan, 1973), H. 
Blumemberg, "Study on myths", Suhrkamp (Frankfurt a/M, 
19R0), and also T-Mann & F. Jesi, "Materiali 
mitologici", Einaudi (Turin, 1979). 
(6) In the other artistic modes of expression (music, 
painting, literature, etc), the problem of 
representation was approached in an entirely new 
fashion: the attempt was to make the object refer not 
to a reading subject, but to itself and its own 
condition of being- In other words, the problem was 
that of a rigorous formulation of language. This 
rigorous formalization of the "linguistic game" was a 
common theme which could be found in the 
iron -discipline of Karl Kraus' writing=s, in the 
"classical" poetic syntax of Georg Trakl, in the 
pictural structure of Egon Schiele, as well as in the 
rythmico- serial acoustic grammar of Schoenberg and 
Anton Webern. An interpretation of this common theme 
was offered by Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus, when he 
said: "To trace a limit to thought, or rather, to the 
expression of thought: _ .the limit cannot consequently 




other side of the limit would simply be nonsense". K.L. 
Wittgenstein, "7ructutus Log-icn-Phi[osqnhicus°, 
published first in English in the International Library 
of Psychology, Philosophy, arid Science (London, 1922>, 
p189- 
The use of the word "language^, here, is only 
metaphorical. It is not intended to imply in any way 
that its structure is similar to that of the verbal 
languages (refer to the chapter on language). 
It is obviously far beyond the scope of this study 
to undertake the task of rewriting the complete history 
of the human sciences' But the key elements borrowed by 
design theorists, in the elaboration of specific 
approaches, will be analysed' 
(9) The various ways in which these social 
contradictions are neutralised are studied in relation 
to certain key concepts such as "human needs", 
"community", "imagery", etc. 
(10) To analyse a language from the outside does not 
mean to look at everything that is other than this 
particular language. It simply means to look at the 
real incidence that a language can have on the 
functioning and development of a social structure' On 
this methological point, see L. Althusser & E. Ba]ibar, 
te Cupitu/", FIN Petite Collection Maspero 
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(Paris, 1973), p35. 
(11) One example of these global theories would be the 
Marxist model of economic deter -minism within which, 
every action and ever -y event is to be interpreted in 
the light of the class -struggle over the means of 
production. Another example is that which subsumes 
every human aspect of life to the workings of the 
unconscious. But the most important model that has 
dominated Western thought for more than 150 years is 
that of the Hegelian interpretation of historical 
development as the gradual unfolding of the absolute 
subject. 
(12) M. Foucault, "Nt:etzschrjla genealogie et l'histoire 
- hommage a Jean fdy.potite", published in Seroiot-xte 
N--' (Paris, 1971). 
(13) Incidentally, these institutional "experts ", often 
and quite conveniently, "forget" the question of the 
power that they hold over deciding what is worthy of 
attention, and what is not. The possibility of a 
superior understanding to theirs, if it originates from 
a source located in a lower institutional group, is 
simply inconceivable to them- History is full of such 
cases, but perhaps the most striking one is that of 
Walter Benjamin, whose study on German tragedy, "The 
birth of the German tragic drama ", was submitted in 
C : 
1924 for the award of a Doctorate at the university of 
Frankfurt, and which was rejected on the grounds that 
it was incomprehensible. The study is regarded today, 
by literary critics, as the most complete and most 
advanced analysis of Goethe's works and German tragic 
literature ever written, up to this day. For a critical 
biography of Walter Benjamin, see the introduction by 
Hannah Arendt to W. Benjamin, "Illuminations", Fontana 
- Collins Editions (London, 1973)- 
(14) This, of course, represents the "end of history" 
the moment at which man achieves mastery over all that 
has eluded him before. 
(15) See M. Merleau- Ponty, "Phenomenology of 
perception", trans. by Colin Smith, collection 
Humanities (London, New York, 1962), and also by the 
same author, "The structure of behaviour", trans by 
Alden Fisher, Beacon Publications (Boston, 1963). 
(16) The theme of the critique of history has been taken 
by various writers in different areas, and with 
different approches, Therefore, the point of 
convergence of these various studies lies not in a 
similarity of response, but only in the formulation of 
the problem: the continual striving to find some 
answers to the crucial questions of "language " - In this 
sense, the use of a term such as "post- structuralism" 
is totally unacceptable if it is meant to infer 
anything more than a chronological sequentiaIity~ There 
is no such school of thought known as 
"post-structuralist". On this point, refer to the quote 
from Nietzsche on p54 of this study~ 
(17) F. Nietzsche, "The twilight of the idols", Penguin 
Books (1984), p43' 
(18) J^P- Lyotard, "Introductions poiennes", Galilee 
Editions (Paris, 1977), p47~ 
(19) G. Vice, "The new science of Giambattista Kico", 
edited and translated by T.G. Bergin & H.H. Firsh, 
third edition, originally published in 1744, Cornell 
University Press (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970), p59' 
R. Fraser, "In search for a past: the manor house 
Amnersfie[d, 1933-19a5°, Verso (London, 1984), quoted 
by J~ Shatter in "Accounting for place and space", 
published in Environment and Planning Space and 
Society, Vol.3 (1985), pp447-460^ 
(21) H. Garfinkel, "Studies in Ethnomethodnlogy", 
Prentice-Hall Inc. (Englewood Cliffs, N-J^, 1967)' 
(22) Refer to note (16)- 
PART ONE 
The unpoetical dwelling 
of man 
" 
Mau, if life is sheer toil, a man 
lift his eyes and say: so 
I wish to he? Yes. As long as Kindness, 
the pure, still stays with his heurt, mun 
not unhappily measures himself 
against the Godhead_ Is God unknown? 
Is he manifest like the sky? I'd sooner 
believe the latter- It is the measure of man 
Full of merit, yet poetically, man 
dwells on this Earth- But no purer 
is the shade of the starry night, 
if I might put it so, than 
man, who's culled an image of the ôndheud. 
Is there u measure on the Earth? There is none'" <1) 
I was recently struck by the fact that it is possible to 
find the entire thematic of contemporary design theory 
expressed in the light of Heideggerian criticism~ This is 
because he had long since given thought to precisely that 
which seems most worthy of analysis, in the present 
situation of architectural and urban practice~ Moreover, 
he formulated it in such a way as to render impossible, or 
inconceivable, the values and purposes on which 
contemporary design theory nourishes itself. 
Against the declared objective of contemporary 
architecture to build "homes ", i -e. places in which people 
would be at peace with themselves and their- neighbours, 
Heidegger stresses the necessity to understand the 
ambiguity of the relationship between building and 
inhabiting. He therefore asks the fundamental question as 
to whether it is at all possible for architecture to 
sustain such a claim, through the techniques of its own 
language. At stake are not the old criteria - the 
political, the sociological, or the aesthetic which, 
from time to time, are used in order to appropriate the 
name of architecture, but the name itself. Why 
architecture? 
In the tectonic sense of the world, architecture builds 
insofar as it produces, insofar as it makes something 
appear. And this something is "dwelling ". The nature of 
building is "letting dwell ". Dwelling is not the result of 
building, but it is that which building produces into 
presence. It becomes produced, made to appear, but it is 
not determined by building: 
"Only if we aye capable of dwelling, only then can we 
build." (2) 
In the sense that Heidegger gives to the word building, it 
becomes closely related to dwelling. Dwelling is the 
manner- in which mortals are on the Earth- Building, as 
dwelling, unfolds into the building that cultivates 
growing things (Coleve), and the building that erects 
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buildings <.Aed-i-ficcr.rre). 
To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace 
with the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its 
nature. The fundamental character of the tectonic aspect 
of building is this "sparing" and "preserving". It 
pervades dwelling ir, its whole range. That range reveals 
itself to us as soon as we reflect that human being 
consists in dwelling, and indeed, dwelling in the sense of 
the stay of the mortals on the Earth- By dwelling, mortals 
are in the "Ceuierrt ", in the "Fourfold" - that is, on the 
Earth and beneath the Heavens, before the Gods and in the 
community of Men. In the tectonic sense of the word, 
architecture makes the "Fourfold" happen; it makes it 
appear and preserves it. 
There has always been a tendency to read this part of 
Heidegger's criticism as a kind of philosophy of 
architecture in the manner of Spengler's work in which he 
spoke of the absence of the "house" in the World -city; the 
absence of houses where "Vesta and Janus, Laves and 
Ferrates" might be able to reside (3). The house appears 
uprooted, and man lives there only as a guest or a tenant. 
The spirit is stranger to this space whose landscape is 
systematically destroyed by mere aedificarre, mere ars 
cedif icand-i. The spirit, no longer a plant, no longer 
connected to Heaven and Earth, becomes sterile and leads 
an errant existence amidst the artificial nature of the 
metropolis. 
But this late romantic criticism of the dreaded 
"soullessness" brought about by the mechanization of the 
world (4) is not part of the intention implicit in 
Heidegger's argument- In his mind, the uprooted spirit of 
the metropolis is not sterile, but productive pay 
e-x'ceUence It is the definite rupture of the subject's 
natural being which permits it the will to power over 
nature- But there is an even more substantial difference 
with Spengler-'s criticism: the problem, for Heidegger, is 
not with the form of the building itself- What is missing, 
is not the fitness of building to spirit, in which case 
the spirit would be foreign to his home; the problem lies 
in the fact that architecture, today, can rio longer claim 
to build "homes ", as opposed to simply providing shelter, 
because the conditions for such building ar -e no longer 
present. 
There is a world of difference between man's present life, 
in the twentieth century, as a technological being for 
whom everything, including himself, becomes material for a 
process of self -assertive production, self -assertive 
imposition of human will on things, regardless of their 
own essential nature, and a life in which he would 
genuinely dwell as a human being. This time of technology 
is, for Heidegger, a destitute time - But there is no 
nostalgia behind his discourse, but rather the opposite: 
he simply emphasizes the unsurmountable distance 
separating man's condition of being today, from his lost 
condition as a "dweller- ". Therefore, he asks architects 
the crucial question: 
"You say you would build. But perhaps building is simply a 
means to dwelling? You build lodgings and yet, you assert 
that man resides in these lodgings, Your end is to make 
man reside= But how can you claim this end if you are 
unaware of the fact that to produce dwellings is 
conceivable only if dwelling is first connected to 
building? You must demonstrate to me the existence of this 
connection" (5) 
It is therefore not a matter of changing the form of the 
buildings. One must ask oneself what kind of thing the 
home (Dimora) is. The home is only if residing (0- i.morave) 
exists as a precondition of building. The problem of 
dwelling lies not in the quality of the edifice, of 
service, or of design; we should either speak of it in its 
own language, or not speak of it at all it is 
experiencing dwelling as a fundamental condition of one's 
own being, feeling oneself to be a dweller-, and that, 
regardless of the quality of architecture. In order to he 
able to build an architecture of "homes ", an architecture 
for dwellers, it is necessary to be oneself a dweller. 
And yet, Heidegger finds traces of dwelling in poetry. He 
states that in such a dark and depraved time, it is only 
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poetry that can help us see once more the possibility of a 
"true" world. This is why he considers poetry - together 
with the language and thinking that belong to it and are 
identical with it - to be an indispensable function of 
human life; it is the creative source of the humanness of 
the dwelling life of man: 
"Poetry is what really let us dwe,l'^ (7) 
Dwelling thus become grounded in poetry. To confirm that 
Heidegger refers to a late poem by Holderlin (8), in which 
he affirms that "Dichterisch Wohnet Der Mensch" - it is 
only poetically that man dwells (9)' And it is our 
intuition of poetry that enables us to experience the fact 
that, today, we live in a totally unpoetic world, that the 
essential condition of contemporary man is his unpoetic 
living. But the reversal of this condition is explicitely 
hoped for, even if he cannot see it happen' 
Nietzsche's thought, in the face of the great city, is of 
course, much harsher and more sobering, since he is no 
longer waiting for this reversal to poetic dwelling. His 
thought begins where the very silence of the wait breaks 
off, and the analysis of unpoetic dwelling takes over. So, 
what is meant by not being a dweller, not-being-at-home? 
We subjects who make nature mothemotu" who violate the 
Earth beyond its possibilities, we are the non-dwellers' 
Fo' us, subjects, what counts is the essential 
uprootedness of technique, and the will to power. Contrary 
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to what is believed and said the subject does not live in 
the home, nor does he even yearn for it, but can exist 
only in the absence of the home and in uprootedness^ Only 
there can he be potent, can he be productive. The language 
- the functions and conventions through which the subject 
expresses his will to power - is the sole and unique theme 
of Nietzschian thought. 
But what is the reason for starting from an analysis of 
the Heideggerian criticism of unpoetir dwelling? 
Against the manifold form of this "unpoetïcal dwelling 
man", architectural theory presents itself 
of 
as the 
continuous striving towards the objective of building 
"homes". What is offered as the natural purpose of 
architecture - to make man rediscover his essential 
condition of a dweller through the manipulation of spatial 
forms - is revealed, in fact, as part and parcel of the 
present crisis in architectural thinking. Onpoetical 
dwelling is the form that makes possible the critique of 
the ideology of the "home" and the ridiculous claim that 
architecture puts forth (and which are, in fact, that 
which constitutes architecture itself) regarding the 
reconciliation of man and landscape, man and city, man and 
nature, etc. 
It is very important to realise that there is no abstract 
essence of dwelling~ It is not knowable outside the 
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possibilities of its appear-ance. If contemporary man is 
unable to dwell, in the Heidegger-ian sense, it is not 
because architecture has failed to provide him with 
adequate "homes ". It is not because knowledge in 
architecture has not yet achieved a satisfactory level of 
development, that mars lives in a condition of essential 
uprootedness. It is simply beyond the possibilities of 
architectural language to try and remedy to the 
existential trauma caused by the uprooting of the values 
of the paleo -industrial city, and its transformation into 
a metropolis. This existential trauma is neither 
distributed in a homogeneous fashion through society, nor 
is it quantifiable- It cannot therefore be interpreted as 
a "lack" upon which architects and planners would he able 
to operate through their own techniques (10). This 
transformation from city to metropolis is only marginally 
a spatial transformation. Spatial transformation is a 
minor- form of the global process of restructuring of 
Western society. Therefore, acting through the language of 
space would only marginally have any effect on this 
existential problem. 
But when speaking of poetic dwelling, Heidegger does not 
at any stage mention the modern metropolis; and yet, it is 
precisely there that dwelling is really debased. The 
history of contemporary architectural and urban practice 
can quite easily be equated with the phenomenology of 
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metropolitan non- dwelling. Or it should be so, since 
contemporary design theory aims at restructuring itself as 
the recently rediscovered possibility of dwelling within 
the metropolis. The preaching of such a possibility is at 
the basis of the whole theoretical edifice upon which 
urban planning and design constituted themselves as 
disciplinary components of contemporary architecture. 
Despite the clear impossibility of achieving through its 
own language what architecture presents as its natural 
purpose (the re- introduction of the possibility of 
dwelling within the metropolis), the entire body of 
architectural theory is but the expression of the various 
ways in which it hopes to arrive at this objective. On the 
one hand, we have those studies which focus on the 
possibility of the fulfilment of man's "needs" through the 
provision of adequate facilities (adequacy refer -s, here, 
to both the range of facilities and their quality). But 
the fallacious character of these studies is soon revealed 
in the definition of those needs which refer not to 
specific individuals or identifiable groups, but to an 
ideal individual or are ideal community (the dwellers) 
which are nowhere to be seen (11). On the other hand, we 
have studies with their unrequited attachment to an 
idealised and purer past, in which men have not yet lost 
their- ability to dwell; this attachment is either 
expressed through an eclectic display of ornament, or- 
through the attempt to transform cities into "Potemkin 
villages" (12). It was Adolf Loos who, first, spoke 
against the backwardness of this intellectual attitude 
that, in his view, was typical of the architects of the 
Wiener Secession: 
"I always get the feeling that a modern Potemkin has 
wanted to create the impression in the visitor to Vienna 
that he has arrived in a city inhabited exr?usi.uety by 
ïroh =.ems " (13 ). 
The eclectic facades of the Ringstrasse - redundant with 
pseudo-cultures providing screens to hide the 
soullessness of the metropolis, and offering the urban 
crowds consolatory altars for the evocative rites of a 
spectral history. 
Two bodies of research, corresponding to two forms of 
nostalgia: the nostalgia for man the "dweller" expressed 
through the studies on needs, and the nostalgia for a 
purer and noble past expressed through frantic excavations 
of history. These two forms of nostalgia are the prime 
targets of this study: to demonstrate that they are 
nothing but ideological constructs, that they can neither 
provide a basis for their claim, nor show their logic 
be effectual; that for these reasons, they are obliged to 
turn this logic into ethical imperatives, or assert it as 
pure form within a play of reason centred on the 
composing, de- composing, and re- composing of the signs of 
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the metropolis. 
To repeat: this study is not at all concerned with the 
definition, description, or commentary on the formal 
quality of the environment. Instead, the objective is to 
show that the forms in which architectural theory presents 
its purpose are primarily ideological concerns with no 
meta -historical justification. It is the objective of this 
study to demonstrate that only a language illuminated by 
the limits of its own possibilities - avoiding in this way 
the dangerous trap of universal syntheses and totalistic 
images - is ever capable of operating as an effective 
language. 
NOTES 
(1) Holderlin, "In Liehiicher Blaue", lines 
Trans. by A. Hofstadter, published in M. Heidegger, 
"Poetry, Language, Thought ", Harper Colophon Books. (New 
York, 1975). 
(2) M. Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", 
published in "Poetry, Language, Thought", op. cit., 
p160. 
(3) D. Spengler-, "The Decline of the West ", Harper and 
Row Books (New York, 1968). 
(4) On the same theme, see also W. Rathenau, "The 
mechanization of the world ", published in "Zur critik 
der Seit ", S. Fisher, Verlag (Berlin, 1912). 
(5) M. Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", op. 
cit., p172. 
(6) "Shepherds ", says Heidegger, "dwell in the 
unconcealedrfess outside of the desert of the desolated 
earth ". They guard the hidden law of the earth against 
the violence of the technical will that drags it 
towards exhaustion, by forcing it beyond its 
possibilities. M. Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics ", 
published in "The end of Philosophy ", Harper and Row 
books (New York, 1973), p109. 
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(7) M. Heidegger, "Poetically mar, dwells", published in 
"Poetry, Language, Thought", op. cit., p219. 
(8) Holderlin, "In L-ieb -icher Blaue", op. cit. 
(9) Ibid op. cit., line 32 -33. 
(10) The only indications that we have of this trauma 
come from works of literature like J. Dos Passos' 
"Manhattan Transfer" (1925), J. Joyce's "Ulysses" 
(1922), Musil's "Man without quality" (1932), Kafka's 
"Le proces" (1927), or again Robe-Gri l let's "Topologie 
dune ville fantome" (1976); in films like Fritz Lang's 
"Metropolis" (1926) or "Berlin Alexanderrplatr" (1929), 
or Fel l ini's "Pel l irr Roma" (1966); in poetry like 
Baudelaire's "Les Fleurs du Mal ", or F. Garcia Lor-ca's 
"Poet in New York" (1955); and finally in paintings and 
collages like P. Citroen's "Metrropoli," (1927). 
(11) Refer to the discussion on empiricism and design. 
(12) Potemkin, a minister and a favourite of Catherine 
the Great of Russia, decided to erect fake villages, in 
the Ukraine, with imposing displays of facades assigned 
to obscure the unsavoury conditions of the peasants in 
this part of Russia, along the route that the Carina 
was to travel; hence the expression "Potemkin village ". 
(13) A. Loos, "The Potemkin City", published in 
"Surnii-tche SchWifterr" Vol. I, Edited by F. Gluck 
(Vienna -Munich, 1910, pp153 -156. The "Union of Austian 
Figurative Artists ", or as it was better known, the 
"Wiener Secession ", was set up in 1897 by its main 
figure, Gustav Klimt. It included as well as painters 
such as Kolo Moser, Carl Moll, and Klimt himself, the 
architects Joseph Hoffmann, Joseph Maria Olbr -ich, and 
later, even Otto Wagner. 
PART TWO 
The root of the problem 
"What they regarded as a solution, he considered but a 
problem" (1). 
In one of the ver -y few recent books which have the courage 
of describing, not the olympian results of research, but 
rather, its complex and tortuous itinerary, C. Ouinzburg 
and A. Prosperi compar -e reseach work to the solving of a 
game of solitair-e: 
"Unlike the game of solitaire", they wrote, "where all the 
pieces are within reach, and where there i_ only one 
figure to compose, so that the exactitude of the moves is 
precise and immediately visible, in research work, the 
pieces are only partially available, and the figures to be 
composed, in theory, more than one". (2) 
What this quote refers to is the labyrinthine nature of 
analytical work which progresses not along a clearly 
defined path with a visible beginning and a visible end, 
but through a maze which exposes all the dangers and 
doubts inherent in research. 
The reason for using such a quote is this: what has 
started as are inquiry into the language of design, and the 
vari ous ways in which it has been formalised, led to the 
question of the conditions under which design reveals 
itself as a kind of production (3), as well as the limits 
within which it operates as such. The broadening of the 
scope of the inquiry, or rather, its transformation became 
an unavoidable necessity after the realisation that there 
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can be no credible talk about language, unless one 
constantly bears in mind the fact that there is no longer 
such a place where the complete plenitude of language can 
be found. The patent failures of the relatively recent 
attempts at a project for a general science of signs, of a 
semiology capable of translating one linguistic system 
into another, bear witness to this fact (4)- 
So, what are the terms in which the analysis of 
ar'chitecture's theoretical production can be conducted? To 
be more specific, let us translate this question into 
historiographical terms: to what reasons must one 
attribute the general unease and sense of guilt expressed 
at all levels of the profession, after the much publicized 
"failure" of the modern movement in architecture? This 
failure is said to have taken place at two levels: on the 
one hand, the failure to provide satisfactory solutions 
for people's needs, and on the other hand, the failure to 
maintain the link with our historical heritage- It is 
around this two -fold failure of the modern movement that 
architectural theory tried to re-organize itself and 
redefine its objectives (5)- 
Sut we have also witnessed, in these last twenty years, 
the revival of another theme: that of the "autonomy of 
form", whi ch reminds one of the crisis that emerged early - 
in the twentieth century, when the division of labour 
within intellectual work, and its increasing 
specialisation, shattered the conceptual unity of the 
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architectural discipline. If we ar -e now experiencing the 
same kind of "rupture" as that experienced by the 
avant -garde movements, if we are about to enter a period 
of "post- modern" sensibility, it is necessary to start 
from a clear understanding of modernity itself; are 
understanding which will do away with all the myths that 
still surround this p'er'iod of Western history; an 
understanding that will aim at establishing the 
ontological basis of the projects of the avant- gar-des, 
rather than one which merely echoes the ideological 
polemics of their intentions- 
Too many questions, with no easy answers to be found. This 
complicated state of affair-s is made even more intricate 
by the traditional interdependence that was made to exist 
between the different aspects of architecture, 
interdependence which allows and gives credibility to the 
theme of a design discipline, incorporating, under such a 
label, different and often conflicting activities= 
Interdependence not as a fact, or as a mere accident, but 
as a cold- blooded attempt to mystify and blur the 
processes by which the urban environment is produced. 
However, one thing that seems to be implicitely or 
explicitely emerging from the theoretical deliberations on 
architecture and urban design, is the denial of any 
possibility for a unified theoretical structure- And 
indeed, what basis is there for a unified conception of 
the architectural practice, for the belief in a single 
theoretical structure when one is confronted, daily, with 
the variety and multiplicity of techniques at-,ri methods 
involved in the attempt to control the built environment? 
"We are in an era ", says Foucault, "in which the world is 
perceived as a network that simultaneously ;joins 
juxtaposed and distant points_ This space alienates the 
pious descendants of history, for whom the world was tike 
a large street which developed different meanings through 
different ages. Neither does this space resemble the 
hierarchical space of the medieval city, where the 
juxtaposition of places referred to the value of their 
respect i -ve fun =? -ions= The present -day space of the 
metropolis is made of the non- hierarchical flow of 
connecting disciplines and functions, of discrete aleatory 
currents whose movements are not teleologically 
comprehensible, but only stochastically analysable =" (6) 
With the collapse of the theoretical edifice erected by 
the pionneer--s of the early parr of the century, an edifice 
which was aimed at resolving the themes related to design 
in terms of a unity, the same unity that Nicolas Pevsner 
labelled, in 1936, as the "Modern Movement" (7), what was 
thought to be a well -defined area of inquiry, more or less 
conditioned by economic relationships and political 
strategies, now appears as an intricate mixture of 
conflicting methods and techniques= This is the meaning of 
the quote above: the complete desacr--alisation of space 
that the territorial transformations and the restructuring 
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of the capitalist productive organisms brought about. 
The concept of the modern movement, presented as a 
synthesis capable of reformulating, in a coherent way, the 
rules governing architecture and urban design, can rightly 
be seen as the last most relevant theoretical contribution 
to the debates on architectural problems- Today, this 
sector - is undergoing a profound and critical process of 
reassessement, a process rendered necessary after the 
gradual disappearance of all the myths surrounding the 
production of the modern movement. The theoretical vacuum 
that resulted from the inability to formulate a new 
"synthesis" which would take over from the modernist one, 
strenghtened the belief that we are left without the 
necessary tools to control this process of change, or 
even, not to be overcome by it. 
The various and frantic attempts, made during the last two 
decades, at recovering a conceptual unity by having 
recourse to a whole array of specific referents (0), 
constitutes, in my opinion, a further proof of the 
underlying anxiety that accompanies the profession; an 
anxiety brought about by the clear perception of an 
epistemological threshold and the instrumental inability 
to deal with it- It is from this point of view that one 
should interpret the renewed interest in the origins of 
the avant -garde movements- The careful and thorough 
examination of the theoretical climate that surrounded 
that period is seen by most architectural writers as the 
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most urgent task to which we should direct our efforts, if 
we are ever to comprehend the inner mechanisms of the 
transitional process that architectural culture is 
admittedly, undergoing in the present situation. 
This attitude, beyond the question of the results it may 
or may not produce, raises two very important theoreti cal 
problems: 
a)- In order to justify looking at the transitional 
mechanisms that were in operation at the time of the 
avant -garde movements, with a view of adopting similar 
ones, one has to assume that there exists, outside any 
historical conjuncture, a series of abstract mechanisms 
that could be put to use whenever there is a perception of 
an imminent threshold in the development of culture, a 
kind of meta -historical theory of cultural change= There 
is absolutely no evidence of such mechanisms which would 
operate again and again, through historical time= The only 
point of similarity that could be found is perhaps, that 
characteristic of the European spirit which consists in 
destroying things in order to re-assemble them on a 
completely new basis, a destruction/re-assembly process 
which represents what is called a "renaissance ", as 
Panofsky and Saxl discovered: 
"One of the main characteristic of the Eur'opean spirit 
seems to be the way in which it destroys things in order 
re-assemble them on s=- new basis, by breaking with 
tradition in order to come back to it from an altogether 
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different viewpoint; and this is exactly what brings about 
the "renaissances" in the literal sense of the word One 
could say that the problem of the phenomenon of 
renaissance is at the heart of the history of European 
culture" (9). 
But the mechanisms of this destruction/re-assembly are, 
each time, determined by the particular historical 
situation in which they are called upon to operate. 
b)- More important, perhaps, is the fact that we are, once 
again, confronted by the problem of the "origins" of the 
cycles and phenomema under scrutiny. For is it not 
precisely in the study of long -term phenomena that the 
theme of the origin appears mostly to be a myth? 
This concept of the origin is closely tied up with 
essentialist and teleological positions according to 
which, every object (whether real or theoretical) has an 
origin from which it developed, and at which, it had its 
essence constituted; this essence would they, be revealed 
in the multiplicity of phenomena- Basically, the idea of 
the origin is possible as a discursive mechanism whenever 
a theoretical analysis of the real is absent. For in a 
theoretical analysis, what determines the knowledge of the 
real is neither its origin, nor its essence, but only its 
present as a complex plurality. Neither the world, nor 
space, nor nature have a specifiable origin, and the 
knowledge of them cannot be traced back to this origin- It 
is, in fact, very easy for this concept of origin to act 
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as a substitute for analysis, especially in those areas 
which are not dominated by rigorous concepts and 
procedures. 
The fact that historical research identifies itself with 
the discovery of origins, implies one thing already 
inscribed in the positivism of the nineteenth century: by 
raising the question of the origin, one is assuming the 
discovery of a final point of observation; a place from 
which everything can be explained, and from which, one can 
make a given truth, a primordial value, emerge from the 
meeting with its original ancestor. This is why this urge 
to trace back the origin of events has a counterpart 
within the same thematic. This counterpart consists in the 
teleological conception of an "end" or a "goal ". In fact, 
a logical and inevitable consequence of the search of 
origins is that reality has an end. The difference of 
opinion would then be confined to the question of whether 
this end is a desirable one, or one that should be 
avoided. As in the case of a "harmonious" origin, the 
desirable end would be a return to this origin. 
Therefore would not it be better to speak of "beginnings" 
instead of "origins "? In such a way, one would be able to 
avoid any suggestion of linear causality, but more 
important, 
_ _sncs irtn pieces what would allow the consoling game 
of recognition" (10) . 
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Therefore, one would be right to suspect that what lies 
behind the renewed interest in the avant -garde movements, 
is the conviction, that we are experiencing, today, the 
same kind of conflicts, the fundamentals of which are as 
much present today as they ever were But what could these 
fundamentals be? why could an interpretation of the modern 
movement as a homogeneous phenomenon do more harm to 
architectural culture than allow a better understanding of 
the history of its products? 
There is a contradiction, a historical paradox, that is 
rather fascinating: as long as contemporary historiography 
was dominated by the ideology of continuity, and was 
passionately concerned with defending and drawing closer 
to the immediate past, modern architecture seemed to be 
within our grasp; it seemed to be intelligible in terms of 
its scope and values. But when historiography started to 
adopt a new attitude, with no place for emotional 
connections, the modern movement grew increasingly 
elusive, and became even more peripheral and out of step 
as the decades slipped by. The difficulty which 
architectural culture reveals today in the act of 
understanding, hearing, or merely seeing different 
meanings, is the consequence of the development of the 
progressive linear extension of the "tradition, of the 
modern" and the predominantly quantitative concern with 
it It is not at all fortuitous that the latter tendency 
is leading, nowadays, to the search for models 
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references in the configuration of the past. Understanding 
the past, including the immediate past, has nothing to do 
with creating an order. The shape of history is not 
entirely geometrical, 
labyrinthine 
since it reflect=_., rather, the 
construction of the suspected. Aret the 
emptiest manifestations of a historical order are those 
which arise from a quest for origins, from the need to 
ground any tradition on a quantitative basis. 
It is, now, a well known fact that the protagonists of the 
modern movement defined its progressive stance as much in 
opposition to the empty formulae of the academist 
tradition as with any positive vision of the "spirit -.f 
the age ". Indeed, the shining purity of machine art was 
rendered the more heroic by contrast to the ornamental ism, 
eclecticism, and pattern making of the Academy. This white 
crusade demanded a highly visible battleground and an 
identifiable enemy; it found both in the brown world of 
nineteenth century bourgeois Kitsch, surviving almost 
intact in the dogmas and practice of the Beaux-Arts 
school. Therefore, underlying the manifestoes and 
programmes of the 1920's, is a continuous and implicit 
attack on the School. Ornament, already characterised by 
Loos as being decadent (1i), is similarly pronounced 
redundant with the final triumph of ster-eometric geometry. 
This anti- academist discourse, however necessary it may be 
to sustain the polemic of modernism, encourages the 
formation of a myth around the production of nineteenth 
century architecture. This myth, which reduces all the 
work of that period to a stylistic eclecticism, has tended 
to obscure all consequent attempts to analyse not only 
that production, but also the production of the modern 
movement itself which has been pr- esented, since, with its 
image of a liberator from the tyranny of styles- This 
retrospective and apologetic history of modernism has only 
seen the struggle for the emancipation of geometry fr -or, 
ornament, new technology from old, and the struggle for a 
new functionalist ethics against academist formalism. The 
social basis of this new movement was similarly traced 
back to single currents of social utopianism: 
technological utopia from Saint -Simon, and social utopia 
from Fourier's Phalanstery- As for the rest, and despite 
some serious attempts, no method, which would do justice 
to the diversity and conflicting differences that existed 
in the architectural production of the early part of the 
twentieth century, was offered. This "modernist" 
sensibility has so profoundly engaged and pervaded our 
standards of criticism and modes of perception that it has 
rendered all but impossible to view the nineteeth century 
with any clarity- The removal of ornament which appears as 
a "definite" conquest of modern civilisation, represents, 
in reality, a passing phase in the development of taste. 
So one cannot talk about an elimination of ornament, but 
simply about a negation, of ornament dictated by a poetics 
based on the principle of rationality. This negation of 
ornament is, above all, a question of style= only 
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s_per-ficially is it linked to the problem of functional 
coherence between the form of objects and their intended 
poetic purpose. In its true essence, the anti- ornamental 
attitude of the advocates of modernism tends to become a 
search for a syntax, and, as such, a specific problem of 
language; a problem which is of not incidental concern to 
large areas of artistic work in those years "on the 
threshold of a new era" (12 
Yet, the contemporary attempts to counter modernism by 
resurrecting its longstanding opponent, is simply 
repeating, or at least, being blinded by the same 
historical mystification. Indeed, to accept the 
mythological status of the Beaux -Arts school as the 
supreme enemy of modernism which had to be eliminated at 
all costs, amounts, in effect, to a confirmation of the 
ideological basis of the modernist school by accepting its 
own terms of reference- It amounts to remaining firmly 
within what can be called the "tradition of the new ". 
A truly critical analysis of the modern period must surely 
aim for more than such a neat reversal- What has become 
increasingly clear is that to accept the ideological_ 
rupture, which the advocates of the modern movement offer 
as the origin of the emergence of modernism in 
architecture, amounts to no more than a deliberate 
obscuring of the circumstances of its happening and 
the 
variety of its production. What is important is to 
realise 
the necessity to reject the lines that are 
traditionally 
82 
proposed as essential to the modern movement; an 
undertaking which implies the interpretation of the modern 
period as a whole, a total condition of culture which, in 
response to the profound industrial, political, and social 
changes of the late nineteenth century, resulted in a 
radical transformation of the concept of man in relation 
to the metropolis. 
And just when one would have thought that this great 
modern movement has definitively entered the dark realm of 
past history, it comes back, against all adversity, 
claiming some faithful followers who endlessly celebrate 
the rituals of the founding fathers, transforming the 
vigorous and rigorous interrogations of the avant-gardes 
into stereotyped answers and the inventive substance of 
their- experiments into a sterile game of rhetorical 
figures. What is more, the preachers of modernist 
abstraction, industrial progress, and of the "Athens 
Charter" (13), who think of themselves as the sole 
legitimists worthy of keeping the heritage of the masters, 
arrogate themselves the right to excommuniate the heretic. 
But their discourse is not new, and their reference 
slightly stale; it is simply change in continuity. 
On the other hand, one has witnessed the late, but 
spectacular revenge of an american culture, victorious 
once again after being momentarily troubled by the 
crisis 
which followed the collapse of the "International 
Style ". 
This so- called "post -modern" trend offers 
this ingenious 
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and ingenuous mixture of doctrinal inconsistency, 
ideological confusion, and mercantile opportunism, typical 
of all american products which never fail to surprise 
Europe with their performance and commercial efficiency. 
And contrary to what its detractors claim, one must say 
that this post- modern fashion, far from being a regression 
into the past totally inadapted to the contemporary world, 
represents, in fact, the most adapted answer that 
architecture can ever produce; in any case, it remains the 
perfect one to a twilight world of permissiveness, to one 
that is vowed to the irresponsible consumption of values 
and goods, energies and people. 
The fast diffusion of post -modernism in Europe and its 
eventual triumph in Venice, thanks to the ingenuity of 
Paolo Porthoghesi (14), represents, in my opinion, a 
serious setback for European culture and thought. All the 
issues raised during the 1970's, regarding the fundamental 
relationships between city, architecture, and history, 
those dealing with the nature of the architectural 
discipline, of the conditions of its practice, and the 
social status of the profession, all those issues were 
suddenly reduced to the dimension of charming works of 
art, futile and egocentric- The city became the stage set 
for the artists to perform the carnival -like spectacle of 
their phantasms; a gracious and entertaining spectacle for 
the benefit of a public tired of the mass consumption 
nature of the architectural production; 
a mundane and 
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cynical spectacle which clearly points, for those who do 
not already know it, to the new market for an elitist 
architecture; a nostalgic spectacle of an art condemned to 
the frantic consumption of the monumental signs which, 
once, made its greatness. 
One can, therefore, under -stand better the essentially 
spectacular - nature of the pseudo-polemics between 
neo -modernists and post -modernists, polemics which benefit 
more the various architectural magazines, than 
architecture itself. but as soon as one looks more 
carefully at their respective arguments, one begins to 
perceive a series of strangely common features between 
positions which, 
ir-recoricil fable. 
we are ceaselessly told, are totally 
Beyond the different stylistic means and techniques used 
by each trend, there emerges an identical conception of 
the architectural and urban practice, the basis of which 
is the isolated object, a monumental unit erected against 
the city and against history, while mimicking at the same 
time, a communication rendered impossible by its position 
outside the city and history. Despite all appearances, the 
historical references of post -modernist ideology, in its 
most per'ver'ted form, are as much against history as the 
most orthodox modernism. The language used, in both cases, 
is but a succession of abstract signs that have no direct 
or indirect relation with the material culture that was 
responsible for their emergence in the first place. 
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This so- called feud between the "historicists" and those 
who still believe in the cathartic nature of modern 
purity, when reduced to the superficial question of styles 
and facades, only serves to mask the absence of a real 
debate on the fundamental questions that architecture 
should be adressing. What this dispersion of energy simply 
does, is to allow architects to forget, for a brief 
moment, their progressive marginalisation from the 
circuits of production, and prevent them from posing the 
vital questions upon which, the survival of the discipline 
of architecture depends. 
This highly condensed description of the phenomenon of 
modernism in architecture and of the interpretations that 
were made of its legacy, does hint, however, at the futile 
nature of the various attempts to find ready- made formulae 
which could be brought back to use in the context of 
contemporary society. Because the political context, the 
specific agents, and the terms in which the problems ar -e 
formulated, are now completely different from those That 
existed in the early part of our century, the only level 
at which a comparison could be made is that of ari imminent 
break in the epistemological continuity of the cultural 
space of aesthetics- And while the changes for the 
evolution of a typological and/or anthropological culture 
of built form are now, perhaps, greater than ever before - 
that is, while the theoretical conditions of an 
architectural 
production 
culture i n 
is matched to 
which the "encoding" of 
a certain degree by the 
"decoding" of its reception, are now better known - the 
fact remains that the short -circuiting strategy of today 
simplistic historicism has a much better chance of 
producing results, if by results, one has in mind are 
immediate social gratification arid control. But in the 
last analysis, it simply substitutes one kind of reduction 
for another. 
The revival of this theme of the "autonomy of form" is not 
simply the result of an internal debate on representation 
and expression within architecture, but more importantly, 
the outcome of the inevitable decline of the ideological 
r-ole of design in offering positive visions of the future. 
Desillusioned as to the socially utopian promises that it 
made, discarded by the very forces of production it sought 
to control, architecture is, now, turning inwards and 
investigating its own specific practice. Removed from the 
progressivist currents of social utopianism, as much by 
the force of a general cultural shift as by the action of 
its own critics, it has now engaged in a profound 
re- evaluation of its status. This will to return to an 
ivory tower seems to indicate that the pendulum is 
swinging back from the desire to reform the world to the 
desire to start making art again. It is not too difficult 
to understand that this shift in interest is not the 
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result of a simple drying out of commitment on the part of 
designers who can no longer be thrilled by the potential 
power in their hands, and therefor -e, retreat into a fetish 
world of creativity- This shift has, in ft:ct, very strong 
historical motives: the evermore declining role of 
architecture in the total process of social production, 
and its retreat into the most superstructural margins of 
production; the increasingly clear threat, felt by 
designers, to see their professional powers slowly 
disappearing and dissolving into a multitude of techniques 
which are, more and more, taken beyond the control of 
architecture- 
This is why, today, are elite of intellectuals, each 
perched on his own tree, are inclined to defend an 
enlightened position with respect to the difficult 
relationship between mental labour and the institutions - 
They try to separate their work from all structural 
conditioning (i.e. the economic structure) by embarking 
into strictly internal polemics. This situation would not 
even be conceivable, except for one thing: Western 
countries, having more or less achieved a high level of 
global integration in the determining sectors of 
production, made the definition of a specifically cultural 
production, which would have the task of entertaining a 
selected audience, much easier, as long as this "pure 
game" does not compromise the efficiency of the vital 
SR 
sectors. Architecture can, 
freedom, provided, 
now, be given a discreet 
of course, that its products are 
strictly sine pecunia - that is, irrelevancies to the 
working of the system. In this way, new circuits of 
production and consumption are created: architecture is 
exhibited in its own experimental theatre (15). It has 
neither the hope, nor the desire to influence the 
structures or the relations of production. No reformist 
hypotheses can find shelter in these new "temples" where 
patient priests retranslate and comment upon the codes of 
the modern tradition of design. This found freedom allows 
the opening up of ineffable spaces where to narrate one's 
own nostagia= the nostalgia of the sign in search of its 
referent; the nostalgia of the places of discourse where 
architecture cannot go without losing its presence in the 
real world; the nostalgia of a reassuring relationship 
between norm and transgression, capable of making appear -, 
from a circularity of speech, a specific plenitude. For 
that, emergency exits are created, and made available to 
anyone who wishes to accept the essential premise: the 
reversal of architecture onto itself which legitimizes the 
engagement into an uncertain path of formal autonomy; an 
attitude which= 
"-indicates the moment when having reached its limits, 
language erupts out of itself, explodes, and radically 
contests itself in laughter=, teats, in the horror of- 
sacrifice, and stays, in this way, in the timit of 
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emptiness, speaking about itself in a second language in 
which the absence of a sovereign subject i ì i.ust r=ates its 
essential vacuity, and relentlessly breaks the unity of 
discourse" (16). 
The interpretation of the modern movement in terms of a 
homogeneous phenomenon, evenly spread throughout the body 
architecture in the early part of our century, can only 
be explained, in the end, through the role that criticism 
was called upon to play, in architecture. This criticism 
managed, and still does to a ver -y large extent, to stay in 
very close contact with theory and design, and thereby, 
avoiding any reading of architecture that is not a mere 
justification of its own products- Criticism, design, and 
theory have always maintained a high degree of 
interdependence, insuring, in this way, a total 
impermeability to the increasingly specialised function; of 
criticism- It is this interdependence which seeks to 
reinforce, against all odds, the stabilizing ties between 
the act of understanding and the act of thinking, which 
might, in the last resort, be the very reason of the 
backwardness of architectural culture. 
However, if this state of affairs is particularly visible 
in the architectural field, it is by no means exclusive to 
it. Indeed, for a very long time, the history of ideas 
suffered from the same predicament, in that it credits the 
discourse that it analyses with an a- priori coherence. 
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This law of coherence is a heuristic law, a procedural 
obligation, and almost a moral constraint: not to multiply 
contradictions uselessly; not to be taken in by small 
differences; not to give much weight to changes, 
disavowals, returns to the past, or polemics; not to 
suppose that men's discourse is perpetually undermined 
from within by the contradictions of their desires, the 
influences that they have been subjected to, or the 
conditions in which they live; but to admit that if they 
speak, and if they speak among themselves, it is rather to 
over -come these contradictions, and to find out the point 
from which they will be able to be mastered- Coherence, as 
well as being the prerequisite for research, is also its 
end result. 
Therefore, it becomes clear that in all the forms in which 
a coherence is discovered, it always plays the same role= 
it shows that immediately visible contradictions are 
merely surface reflections; contradiction, instead of 
being taken for a fact, becomes the illusion behind which 
a coherent unity hides itself or is hidden- In any case, 
under such a heuristic law, analysis must suppress 
contradiction at all costs, in order to allow the hidden 
unity to emerge- At the end of such an analysis, only 
residual contradictions remain- accidents, defects, or- 
mistakes. 
It is precisely to this role that criticism in 
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architecture has devoted itself, in the sanctified trinity 
of Criticism-Design-Theory. Whenever an architectural work 
is analysed, it is the role of criticism to show that it 
either- corresponds to the intentions of the 
subjectidesigner-, or represents the expression of a 
certain theoretical attitude, and that the contradictions 
within the work are simple imperfections which are bound 
to disappear with a greater- experience- The consequences 
of using criticism for this purpose are far reaching, as 
far as the evaluation of contemporary design is concerned= 
"The complete interdependence of design and criticism has 
meant that it has been impossible to identify any 
autonomous appearance by which to measure the history of 
contemporary architectural production; all the images we 
possess of its development, rather than clarifying its 
processes, end up by simply representing already 
determined values" (17), these values being themselves 
determined by the creative and designing will of the 
individual architect. 
This criticism has often been used as a theoretical weapon 
against decadence, helping to separate architecture from 
history by confining its products to the private domain of 
creative games. Walter Benjamin has lucidly identified 
this feature which, he says, characterises the European 
who does not know how to relate his life to the 
development of technology, because he keeps faith in the 
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belief of a fetish creative life: 
"We have too often put the emphasis on cmetic -i-ty. In this 
way, would be creative only that who avoids assuming any 
function, and avoids submitting himself to any control" 
(18)- 
The law of coherence becomes, when applied to 
architectural criticism, the instrument used to fight the 
decline of the profession, and its progressive dissolution 
into a plurality of techniques; it becomes the refuge 
against the historical destiny of its own products. In 
this way, secure behind its walls, criticism becomes 
revivals and "isms ". 
Nietzsche has already raised his voice against this will 
to reconstruct a lost plenitude, to find an absolute 
coherence in the interaction of the techniques of 
domination, and stressed the necessity to assume the 
complete dissociation of reality. It is doubtless that, 
for Nietzsche, theoretical language must be understood as 
a plurality: a plurality of the subject, a plurality of 
science and of the institutions. It is only by accepting 
this reality in its plural character that one would be 
able to break the fetish which forms around a word, or a 
name: 
"Whenever the primitives established a word, they believed 
that they had made a discovery when they have just met a 
problem; and in the illusion that they had solved it, they 
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had only created a further obstacle for its solution: 
Today, for every bit of knowledge, one has to stumble 
across words, as petrified and as solid as stories_ and one 
will break one leg on them instead of the word" (19). 
It is with such words that criticism, and not only 
architectural criticism, has often constructed 
impenetrable "monuments ", the Nietzschian "stones "; those 
petrified words are piled up; their multiplicity is 
concealed by these monuments which pretend to give birth 
to an imaginary "library ". 
The problem, then, is to re- establish a distance between 
design and criticism; the problem is to recognise the 
specificity of the critical undertaking by breaking those 
magical alliances that were cemented in the "age of 
manifestoes" (C0). Critical lucidity must start from the 
indictment of the complicity between criticism and design, 
which has succeeded in making the limits of architecture 
the same as those of criticism. This implies a re- thinking 
of the specific languages of design and criticism; both 
languges require a specialization that leads to their 
"incommunicability ". Only such a specialization of 
critical language can clearly place contemporary 
architecture before its responsibilities. The development 
of a different critical attitude would, therefore, 
primarily serve to unveil the mechanisms of nostalgia. 
Nothing would be further from the attitudes of those 
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critics who assemble new "catalogues" (the imaginary 
library, I spoke of earlier) to fix the consoling image of 
structural continuity. Nor is there any longer- a place for - 
new "isms ". With the knots that bind criticism to design 
finally untied, the route taken by architecture will 
certainly look very different; less reassuring, perhaps, 
but certainly richer in implications. Only then, could one 
confront effectively the problem of intellectual work in 
the social division of labour, or that which arises from 
the relationship between a "disinterested" and 
"scientific" research, on the one hand, and the 
involvement in the struggle for social change, in the 
other-. 
For these reasons, an investigation ii-to the institutional 
role of design seems to me, despite the many difficulties 
facing such an enterprise, more than ever- necessary, 
today, if the forms through which nostalgia operates in 
architectural discourses are to be revealed for what they 
are- The crisis of "identity ", through which architecture 
is going, certainly entitles one to question the 
legitimacy of the linear frameworks by which the totality 
of the themes related to the production of the built 
environment are simplified and reduced to the level of 
pure representation. But despite the urgency of the task, 
one cannot ignore the lingering doubts as to the 
practicability of such an endeavour. 
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For, is it still possible to come to terms with such a 
situation, with a view of eventually overturning it? While 
one certainly hopes that this is still possible, it must 
be said, nevertheless, that it has become a task with 
extremely daunting difficulties. Criticism and history 
seem to have conspired to create a situation completely 
hostile to such an attempt. Yet, it remains a very 
worthwhile undertaking, especially if it were to begin 
with modest, localised, and limited studies which reject 
the temptation of the "big picture " - One can understand, 
therefore, that in this sense, this study is not concerned 
with the construction of a complete genealogy of 
contemporary design products; nor will it be attempting to 
provide, in the end, a holistic picture which, too often, 
leads analysis to blunt its own theoretical instruments. 
In the description that I intend to carry out, there can 
be no question of interpreting architecturai discourse 
with a view of writing the history of the referent; I am 
not trying to find out, or reconstruct, what architecture 
might have been, in the form in which it presented itself 
to some primitive or scarcely articulated experience, and 
the form in which it was later organised in discourse. In 
other words, I am not trying to rediscover what its 
essence might be. What this study is concerned with, is 
not to neutralise discourse, to make it a sign of 
something else, but on the contrary, to make it emerge in 
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its own complexity. 
A reflection on the development of a particular branch of 
knowledge can no longer be content with simply following 
the development of that body in a temporal sequence. Such 
a body of knowledge is not, in fact, a phenomenon of 
heredity and tradition; and one does not explain how it 
came about by simply describing the state of the knowledge 
that preceded it and what it has promised by ways of 
"original" contributions- The history of knowledge in 
architecture can only be written on the basis of what is 
contemporaneous with it; certainly not in terms of 
reciprocal influences, but in terms of conditions and 
a- pr-ioris established in time. 
Therefore, the most revealing aspect in the analysis of 
the structure of knowledge in architecture lies not in the 
celebrated controversies, which would be used as the 
guidelines and articulations for such a project. One must 
reconstitute the general system of thought whose network 
renders the interplay of simultaneous, and apparently 
contradictory, opinions possible- It is this network that 
defines the conditions which make a controversy, or a 
problem possible, and that bears the historicity of 
knowledge. 
The positive field, within which the architectural 
discipline defines itself, has always been accepted as an 
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a- pr- ior-i, and never- reflected upon. From this acceptance, 
different schools of thought, holding different opinions, 
are allowed to emerge within this assumed positivity, 
reaffirming, in ever -y step, its existence - My pr-obim is, 
therefore, not a matter- of taking par -t in the debates on 
the "environmental issues ", and taking a position in 
favour of such or such alter-native as to what is the best 
way of reaching the objective of building "homes ", in the 
sense that Heidegger- gave to the word. It is, rather, a 
matter of questioning the ver-y terms on which such a 
positivity is established (i.e. is it, really, the purpose 
of architecture to build "homes "?>. It is a matter of 
establishing the boundaries within which such alternatives 
find the same home. Father than trying to reduce some of 
them to silence, by rejecting their claim as worthless, I 
would like to describe a certain site, a certain domain 
that we call architecture. 
But how can one be sure that the method proposed, here, in 
order to arrive at a precise delimitation of architectural 
language, would differ, in any aspect, from any other 
misguided attempt at a recovery of what is called "the 
autonomous character" of the discipline? Is it not going 
to be just another one, perhaps even more disguised and 
confusing, under the claim of analytical rigour? To these 
questions, I shall answer in the following three points: 
a)- This study tries to define not the 
thoughts, 
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representations, images, themes, or preoccupations that 
may be concealed or revealed in the discourse on the 
environment. The sole objective of this study is to 
describe this ver-y discourse. It does not treat it as a 
document, as a sign of something else, or as an element 
that ought to be transparent, but whose unfortunate 
opacity must often be pierced, if one wants to reach, at 
last, the depth of the essential in the place in which it 
is kept in reserve for us to uncover. This study is 
concerned with the discourse in its own volume; it is not 
an interpretative process; it does not seek to uncover any 
other better hidden discourse. 
b)- I am not trying to rediscover- the point at which the 
social and the individual are inverted into one another. 
It is neither a psychology, a sociology, nor, more 
generally, an anthropology of creation. The oeuvre is not, 
in this sense, a relevant division, ever. if it is a matter 
of replacing it in its total context, or in the network of 
causality that supports it. The authority of the creative 
subject, as the raison d'etre of an oeuvre and the 
principle of its unity, are quite alien to the method that 
I am trying to portray. All that will be done is the 
definition of the types of rules according to which, one 
is allowed to speak about architecture, and of the 
metropolis; it is the rules of formation of that 
articulated space that are the object of this study. 
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c:)- Finally, this method does not aim at restoring what 
has been thought, wished, sought for, experienced, or 
desired by men at the very moment in which they expressed 
it in their- discourse; it does not try to repeat what has 
been said by reaching it in its very essence; it wishes to 
be nothing but a rewriting. It is not a return to the 
innermost secret of the origin. It is the systematic 
description of discourse as an object. 
But there is a great deal of negative work to be done: 
negative, in the sense that it is a matter of doing away 
with certain notions, certain concepts around which, the 
bulk of the theoretical patrimony of architecture and 
urban design is articulated. It is a matter of untying the 
Gor-gian knot that links criticism and design, as well as 
that of revealing the mechanisms by which the themes of 
linear-, continuous, and homogeneous development of 
architectural knowledge are allowed to be perpetuated- But 
to do so, one has, of course, to take as one's starting 
point, whatever unities are already there. One has to 
assume that there is a space, within the universe of 
knowledge, a certain domain of positivity that we call 
design. However, one will not place oneself inside this 
unity, in order to study its internal configurations, or 
its secret contradictions. One will make use of it just 
long enough to ask oneself what kind of unity it forms, 
by 
what right it can claim a field that specifies 
it in 
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space, and a continuity that individualises it in time; 
just long enough to ask what are the laws, according to 
which it has been formed, against the background of which 
other events it stands out; and finally, whether it is 
not, in its accepted and institutionalised individuality, 
ultimately the surface effects of more firmly grounded 
unities- 
The groupings, that history hands out, will be accepted 
only to be subjected, at once, to relentless 
interrogation; to be broken up, and then, to see whether 
they can legitimately be reformed, or whether other 
groupings should emerge; to re -place them in a more 
general space which, while dissipating their apparent 
familiarity, makes it possible to construct a theory of 
them. Therefore, a provisional division must be adopted as 
an initial approximation; a kind of initial region which 
analysis must, consequently, demolish in order to 
re- organize, if necessary- 
This is why we have no other option but to start from the 
examination of the dominant theoretical attitudes in the 
architectural field, and the way in which they are 
articulated to problems of language, history, ideology, 
power, and so forth. I must insist that it is not the 
nature of these relationships and their validity or 
non- validity which is of interest, here; of interest 
to 
this study are the processes by which these 
relationships 
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are br -ought to existence. But in spite of the greater 
promises that this type of study seems to hold, there is a 
full awareness of the dangers that it might contain, not 
the least being the possibility of mistaking ideological 
assumptions for actual facts. But to render a theoretical 
instrumentality explicit, from the conception of a theory 
to its methodological procedures, is of major importance 
in analysis, and the more so at the juncture when it 
enters the public realm, in order to avoid the ideological 
effects of such a discourse. 
One further point that needs clarification is that the 
selection that had to be operated, regarding the different 
theoretical stances taken in architecture, is not directed 
as to present the variety and particularity of each 
approach under a global and unitary whole; furthermore, 
one might even contest the relevance of the examples that 
are chosen in order- to illustrate the issues that I intend 
to tackle. Inasmuch as it is my programme to introduce the 
reader to what is spoken about, in a given territory and 
at a given time, or, when is all said and done, to retain 
only that which created the biggest stir among the widest 
possible audience, this clamorous approach is necessarily 
unjust, in that it leaves aside whatever - though, 
sometimes, worthy of attention - has gone ignored by the 
public, or has not received attention to a sufficient 
degree. It must be said, therefore, that one 
can in no 
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circumstances claim that the selection of texts reflects 
the most interesting ones in the absolute. In any 
analysis, a battle is fought between the inevitable 
subjectivity and the uncontainable desire for objectivity. 
The element of subjectivity is confined to the basic 
assumption, that is to say, to the initial choice of 
series- This "sectarian" choice of a definite line of 
research, of the "rules of the game ", is made necessary 
not in 'spite of its arbitrary nature, but because of it. 
In order to avoid the risk of getting lost, the journey 
into history can only be undertaken after the few starting 
steps have been clearly marked out. But one the choice of 
series is made, the development of the thematic must then 
be dictated by inflexible criteria. 
Finally, it might look to some as if this study is 
following a chronological sequence, infer -ring therefore a 
kind of positivistic conception of architectural 
knowledge. I do certainly not associate myself with any 
linear- sequentiality for the simple reason that, in 
numerous cases, different studies, following entirely 
different paths and using different sets of theoretical 
instruments, were developing simultaneously. The necessary 
sequential character of writing is are intrinsic limit of 
this mode of expression, and not the result of an external 
and a-priori conception on the part of the writing 
subject. 
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The issue of the crisis in architecture was, first, raised 
by critics who, like Zevi, Giedion, and Banham, saw in 
historical criticism a potentiality for guidance in actual 
practice (21). This kind of criticism which blamed the 
modern movement for its total rejection of historical 
concern, conceived of the latter- as a natural force which 
could be beneficial for the practice of architecture and 
urban design, if not hindered by a deliberate 
consciousness of the past. In this case, what is offered 
as a natural force suggests a historical development in 
which the present becomes the result of a smooth and 
continuous process of gradual transformation and 
evolution. 
In parallel to this approach, or rather, in opposition to 
it, although still remaining within the tradition of what 
we may call historical criticism, there is yet another 
school which called upon history to legitimise its own 
peculiar kind of modernity. This line of thought was 
represented by scholars like l;tuar-oni and Rodgers ( 2 ) who 
engaged into a process of r-e- assessement, tainted with 
disbelief and heterodoxy with respect to the principal 
tenets of the modern movement- While denying any 
possibility of a smooth continuity with the production of 
the modern movement, this school looked deliberately into 
the past for a renewed definition of the boundaries of 
architecture. The definition of this "terrri-torr-i-o dell 
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architettura ", to borrow the very successful expression by 
Vittorio Gr-egotti (23), is believed to be the necessary 
pr -e- requisite for validating any new creative move- 
Beside this renewed interest in history, research in the 
field of architecture followed another course, mainly in 
the English- speaking parts of the world. The fact that it 
was predominantly an anglo -saxon enterprise is probably 
due to the philosophical climate that prevailed, and still 
does to a large extent, in those countries: the very 
strong and dominating ascendency of empiricist ideology on 
English- speaking scholars which pervaded their modes of 
thinking since the late seventeenth century. In this case, 
attention was fixed, first, on the conception and 
development of design methods, envisaged as practical 
problem- solving devices. This concept of design methods 
should not, however, be confused with the "Methodolog-ia 
delta pro,iettazione" which emerged in Italy at about the 
same period, but with very different aims and techniques 
(24). "Design methods" theorists attempted, by using 
scientific methods borrowed from cybernetics, system 
analysis, and computer programming, to find ways of 
maximising efficiency during the design process- In this 
sense, design became a complex, quasi -scientific mode of 
functional experimentation. Moreover, the final product 
was to be considered as completely independent 
from the 
process that generated it. It is obvious that 
what these 
105 
attempts were directed at, was the global integration of 
production, and the elimination of all possible obstacles 
that might arise from ignoring the specificities of the 
different sectors of production. This position was clearly 
expressed by L. Bruce Archer- in his intervention during a 
symposium on design methods in the 1960's: 
"no attempt is made here to distinguish between 
architectural, engineering, or industrial design. It is an 
essential element of the philosophy underlying this thesis 
that the logical nature of the act of designing is largely 
independent of the character of the thing designed." (25) 
As soon as this gross impoverishment of the complex nature 
of the built environment, reduced to the status of pure 
object, was realised to be, not only short of the 
expectations that this theoretical activity had aroused at 
that time, but also totally inadequate in its response to 
the strong humanistic concerns of the great majority of 
designers, still firmly entranched in their belief in the 
cathartic nature of architecture, all the efforts were 
shifted once again, this time, towards the apparently more 
promising area of human perception. 
But if the concepts, instruments, and area of interest 
have changed, the general objectives remained, 
nevertheless, exactly the same, in that it was still a 
question of establishing sets of rules that could be used 
as practical guidelines by the practising designer. It 
was 
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by no means a matter of re- questioning the purpose, or 
nature of architecture; it was simply a matter of 
continuing the search for the elusive method which would 
allow the attainment of this purpose- Assistance is sought 
from a whole ar -ray of extra- disciplinary fields ranging 
from biology to psychology and anthropology, and more 
generally from that obscure area of knowledge that we call 
the human sciences- The justification for those borrowings 
was the perceived necessity to erect a comprehensive 
theoretical structure of the knowledge of man, which these 
disciplines are thought to possess, in or -der for 
architecture to fulfill the objectives it set itself: the 
creation of a "humane" environment, fit for "dwellers" - 
Man became the prime object of research, and the 
satisfaction of his needs in terms of sensorial comfort 
and delight, its par-amount objective. Finding in the white 
severity of the "inter-national style" the ideal starting 
point for their rhetoric, the advocates of this 
man- oriented conception of architecture and urban design 
were very swift in pointing out to the univalent natur-e of 
the modern metropolis and its inhuman character, to the 
crisis of meaning resulting from the neglect of cultural 
values, and to the "oceans of emptiness" that the 
environment was turned into- The natural result of this 
criticism becomes revealed in the new direction taken by 
architectural thinking towards the imagery of the urban 
environment. 
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These are the terms, in my opinion, around which the 
cultural debate on architectural issues took place during 
the last two decades, and which provided it with its 
theoretical directions- On the one hand, we have those who 
dream about a problematic unity, driven by an irresistible 
tide of humanism founded on the ideology of an 
anthropology of creation, which perpetuates the idea of 
architecture as a mere object of consumption: this is 
expressed either in the form of a quest for adequate 
solutions to a series of arbitrarily established "needs ", 
or through an archeological excavation of the past in 
search for perennial human values. On the other hand, one 
has the relatively younger phenomenon of a will to return 
to the absolute autonomy of form. This phenomenon is 
represented by a corpus of intellectuals, strongly 
influenced by the European tradition of "negative 
thought ", who have been attempting, even in their realised 
projects, to bring architecture back to the level of pure 
ar-t If one can easily sense another level of nostalgia 
among these intellectuals, the nostalgia for the "lost 
aura" of the work of art, one must also recognise that 
they have, at least, r-ejected all the attempts at 
perpetuating the dangerous and anachronistic notion of the 
avant- garde. With the inevitable decline of the bourgeois 
myth of the "cathartic apocalypse ", the only acceptable 
alternative that they saw left to them was to hold a firm 
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grip on their personal lifebuoy: their pencils- 
Except for this latter- tendency, which remains in any case 
fairly marginal within the structure of the profession, 
the humanist ideology dominates so effectively the present 
debates in architecture that one feels almost compelled to 
choose one's own position within one of the two for -ms in 
which it emerges - either to follow the path of the 
research into perception, or to look for the inalienable 
meaning of things as inscribed in history. 
But are really these two forms so different that a 
declaration in favour of one necessarily means a stance 
against the other? If one takes the trouble of looking a 
little deeper than the level at which their 
instrumentality operates, does one not find a layer common 
to both? Are they both not simply superficial forms of a 
deeper and common agreement on the right of architecture 
for protection against its dissolution within strategies 
and techniques of domination' And beyond their- respective 
rhetor-ics, does one not feel the desperate nature of their 
effort to re-impose the presence of man - both as the 
object and subject of knowledge - in the face of an 
already accomplished integration 
strategies and techniques-' 
within specific 
The themes of this complex thematic, as it emerges today, 
are, by no means, new ones, even if the present situation 
109 
requires specific answers. One has just to remember how 
this thematic was stated by Kr-oha, in the early twentieth 
century (26): 
a)- Is architecture as a science, or as a praxis, or as an 
object, to be rationally determined as an autonomous 
discipline with its own laws and procedures which, when 
fully determined, may embrace function as well as form in 
a single unitary method? 
b)- Or is it merely an instrument- reflex that can only 
reflect the for -m -force of the empirical demands that cause 
it to come in the first place? 
c)- And if it is neither of these two mutually exclusive 
alternatives, how does this, in and of itself, affect the 
emotional and psychological reception at the hand of the 
populace? 
To repeat: it is my intention to arrive at the definition 
of the common ground on which architectural theory 
establishes its positivity- Therefore, it is not in terms 
of the dangerous and mystificatory question of what 
architecture corresponds to the present -day modes and 
relations of production, question which would send us 
right back to the problem of the referent and of 
expression. The problem which needs to be tackled is this: 
in opposition to what is offered as the "natural" purpose 
of architecture, I would like to examine the role that it 
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can play within circumstances determined by existing and 
specific power relations; to show that this "natural" 
purpose is, in fact, very much the result of a historical 
configuration of knowledge which has, since, gone through 
a series of profound epistemological mutations, resulting 
in the revelation of the hidden ideological framework 
which defines and regulates the nature and scope of the 
preoccupations of architecture in the present situation - 
What the dominant discourses in architecture present as 
their natural objects of inquiry, critical analysis must 
replace within the network of relationships that link 
these objects to the general configuration of knowledge- 
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NOTES 
(1) F. Engels in the foreword to Marx's "Capital ". 
(2) G. Guinzburg& A. Prosperi, "Giochi di pazienza - un 
seminari - o sui benefico del cristo" (Torino, 1975), p84. 
(3) The term "production "r -efers, here, not only to the 
restricted world of physical objects, but also to the 
production of rules, nor -ms and regulations, 
institutional reforms, elaboration of theories, 
projects, etc. 
(4) For the experiments in semiology, refer to the 
chapter on design and language. 
The themes of "needs" and history are discussed in 
detail, later in this study. 
(6) M. Foucault, "Des Espaces Autres ", published in 
Cercles d'etudes architecturales N.3 (1967), p16. 
(7) N. Pevsner, "Dictionary of Architecture ", expanded 
edition, Allen Lane (London, 1975). As to the modern 
movement, it is probably the most written about period 
of architectural history, and the bibliography on the 
subject is enormous. However, I would recommend M. 
Tafuri & F. Dal Co, "Modern Architecture ", Harry N. 
Abrams, Inc. Publishers (New York, 1979) and also K. 
Frampton, "Modern architecture. A critical history ", 
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Thames & Hudson (London, 1980) . 
(S) Those referents being the various disciplines to 
which architecture turned in search for a solution to 
its crisis. 
(9) E. Parnofsky & F. Saxl, "Classical mythology in 
medieval art ", published in Metropoiitar. Museum Studies 
N -2 (1933), pp228 -280. 
(10) M. Foucault, "Nietzsche, la genealogie, et 
l'histoire - hommage a Jean Nyppolite ", published in 
Semiotexte N -3 (Par-is, 1971). 
(11) A. Loos, "Ornament und Verbrechen ", published in 
"Samtfiche Schriften" Vol.I, Edited by F. Gluck 
(Vienna -Munich, 1962). 
(12) See note (6) in p28. 
(13) Le Corbusier, "La Charte d'Athenes ", La Librairie 
Plon (Par-is, 1943). 
(14) Paolo Porthoghesi was the head of the organizing 
committee of the 1980 Venice Biennale which served as 
the landing base for American architectural ideas in 
their- conquest of Europe. 
(15) Indicative of that is the "floating theatre" 
designed and built by Aldo Rossi and exhibited at the 
1980 Venice Biennale. 
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(16) M. Foucault, "Preface a la transgression ", 
published in Critique N.195-6 (Paris, 1963). 
(17) F. Dal Co, "Criticism and Design", published in 
Oppositions N -13 (1978), p3. 
(18) W. Benjamin, "The work of art in the age of 
mechanical reproduction ", published in "Illuminations ", 
Editions Fontana -Collins (London, 1973), p225. 
(19) F. Niersche, "Aurora ", published in Opere Volume V, 
p4'29. 
(20) We are referring, of course, to the period of the 
avant -garde movements. 
(21) On that matter, see B. Zevi, "Storia deli 
architettura moderna", Editions Einaudi (Torino, 1975); 
S. Giedion, "Space, Time, and Architecture ", MIT Press 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1967); R. Banham, "The age of the 
masters, a personal view on modern architecture ", 
Architectural Press (London, 1975). 
(22) On the work of Quar-oni and Rodgers, see M. Tafuri & 
F. Dal Co, "Modern Architecture ", op. cit. 
(23) V. Gregotti, "II territorio dell' architettura 
Editions Feltrinelli (Milan, 1966)- 




a)- While the Italians kept mainly to the field of 
architecture, in the restricted sense of the word, 
design methods were concerned with the broader field of 
the built environment. 
b)- For design methods, the key word was "fit ", whereas 
for the "Methodologia delta pr-o ,jettazio-ne ", the design 
process was approached in the light of cultural 
creativity. 
c)- The paradigm that the Italians had in mind for the 
actual practice was the individual architect; the 
was implicitely the 
multi- disciplinary approach of the supra- individual 
organisation. 
d)- Finally, for their doctrinal content, design 
methods adr-ess themselves to managerial sciences, while 
the "Methodologia" draws its content from history. 
(25) See the report on the symposium published in 
"Design methods irr architecture" by G. Broadbent & A. 
Ward, Lund Humphries (London, 1969). 
(26) A. Kroha, "Sovestkcx Architecctorricka Avcar+gcxrda_", 
Editions Moscow (Moscow, 1973). 
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PART THREE 
Design discourse and practice 
1. THE APPARITION OF MAN IN THE SPACE OF KNOWLEDGE 
The most important purpose of discourse in architecture is 
that of presenting the various techniques involved in the 
making of the built environment in a coherent, synthetic, 
and unified form, smoothing, in the process, over the 
conflicts emerging from the juxtaposition of those 
techniques. Therefore, it is only logical that an analysis 
of discourse in architecture should start by unravelling 
the web of relationships between the different aspects of 
the practice, aspects which correspond to as many 
possibilities, as many histories. 
a)- Firstly, there is the professional aspect of this 
pr- actice; this aspect, perhaps the most immediate one, is 
revealed at the level which consists in the manipulation 
of behavioural patterns, or in the organisation of a locus 
of productive activities (i -e- the programmes and the 
spatial transcriptions of a diagram), or in the 
distribution of activities, or in the final designation of 
forms. 
b)- Secondly, architecture can also be viewed as a form of 
material production which includes the drawing of plans, 
the making of models, the elaboration of theories, the 
production of essays and monographs, etc - -- It is not 
for instance, the discussions on supr-ising to see, 
architecture and the city becoming themselves a form of 
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production in the strict sense of the word: it has formed 
its own rules, its own market, and has effectively 
established itself as an alternative to the scarcity of 
building commissions. There is also in it the tendency to 
offer itself as a kind of entertainment, as opposed to a 
systematic exploration and dissemination of critical or 
scientific concepts. As entertainment, it intensifies 
whatever tragic or comic elements it manages to find in 
realised or unrealised projects; the sublime and the 
pathetic have the power to attract attention, while the 
production lacking any semantic value in terms of 
stimulation and excitement, the greyer area of 
communication, is systematically excluded. Like all kinds 
of pr- oductions, it stimulates and arouses, in its wake, 
other productive activities: plans, drawings, and comments 
are prepared for this specific branch of the architectural 
practice which, following its own laws, contributes to an 
acceleration of the production and consumption of 
fashions. However, it would be a great mistake to 
underrate this phenomenon, or dismiss it out of hand, at 
the very moment when it has shown that it is not limited 
to recording the state of the building sector, but that it 
is also capable of autonomously creating the reasons which 
sustain a specific function of its own. There has never 
been such a yawning gap between the actual realiy 
of the 
built environment and the virtual reality 
represented 
through the various publications specialising 
in 
118 
architectural issues; this gap is the visible result of 
two distinct systems of power, with their own specific 
channels, super- imposed on each other- and, very often, 
conflicting with each other. The case of architectural 
competitions, as an example of a system that officially 
denies any fundamental link between architecture and 
construction, is very revealing. Since the real city 
marginalises any use value, it is only a natural 
consequence to see the strenghtening of the academic and 
publishing power in the area of architectural and urban 
issues. Indeed, insofar as design appears rather through 
autonomous theorisations on works destined to publication 
than through concrete realisations, the relationship 
between architecture and urban history becomes more and 
more fragile, which allows the operative criticism to 
perform more easily abstract and distorting manipulations 
on discourses about architecture- There are even those who 
echo the famous saying by Victor Hugo by asserting that 
the age of printing cannot be the same as the age of 
architecture; "Ceci tuera cela" (1) would, now, appear as 
a threat on the part of the printed production of 
architecture to take over, in the face of the appaling 
decay of the "ars aedificandi ", the art of building. 
c)- Finally, there is the third aspect 
of the 
architectural practice which relates to a precise 
sector 
of the economic activity: that of the buildig 
industry and 
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land speculation. If this aspect does not constitute a 
determining factor- in the formal characterisation of the 
metropolis, it has, nevertheless, played, ii-. many 
instances, a very important part in the final shaping and 
structuring of the urban space. 
One further difficulty, this time of a methodological 
nature, is that the content to be analysed is itself 
two -fold: as raw material, there is, on the one hand, a 
written discourse on architecture in the form of essays, 
critical reviews, theoretical propositions, methodological 
approaches, etc, as well as particular projects or 
programmes; on the other hand, one is dealing with 
architecture, first, in the form of a representational 
apparatus, and after that, in the form of a finished work, 
that is, its material reality. Now, the necessary 
separation of critical language from design language means 
that one cannot speak of this two -fold content in the same 
way. While design language deals with it only as a 
representational apparatus, through the elaboration of 
methods of regulating the manipulation of formal elements, 
critical language has the task of evaluating the 
relationship between the virtual reality of design as a 
representational apparatus and the concrete reality of the 
metropolis as the site of power struggles. What 
is 
presented by design language as a synthetic unity 
(=i.e. a 
finished project, a particular theory, or 
a defined 
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methodology), critical language must deconstruct, and 
reveal the conflicting nature of the various techniques 
used in the process of bringing this project into the 
reality of the metropolis. Therefore, the sole purpose of 
critical language is that of revealing the nature of the 
relationship between the area of language (i.e. design 
language) and the extra- linguistic series (the concrete 
reality of the power struggle in the metropolis). 
The analysis of such theories, of the logic peculiar to 
each of them, is the way by which it becomes possible to 
identify the conceptual instruments structuring design 
language. But these "texts" must not be regarded as a 
collection of statements to be analysed in terms of syntax 
or grammar. Instead, the most important thing is to reveal 
the universe to which they refer (the virtual reality of 
discourse) and contrast it to the concrete plurality of 
the metropolis- In such an analysis, there are no theories 
to refute; truth and falsity have equal worth as 
indicators within a given text: 
"Within its own limits, every discipline recognises true 
arid false propositions, but it repulses a whole teratology 
of learning. The exterior of a science is more, or less 
populated than one may think - -- Perhaps there are no errors 
in the strict sense of the word, for errors can only be 
identified and emerge within a well defined process" (2). 
Therefore, one cannot talk about true or false theories in 
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the absolute, but simply about the extent to which they 
adhere to the structure of power relations. Within what 
the Frankfurt school called the "total system" (3), 
expressing the sense of the increasingly closed 
organisation of the world into a seamless web of media 
technology, multinational corporations, and international 
bureaucratic control, it is a matter of defining the place 
left to the traditional modes of expression. The attempt 
to return to the traditional means and attitudes of the 
avant -gar-des, as a reaction against the new limits imposed 
by the administrative bodies in charge of the various 
sectorial plans, is but a sign of the widespread 
opposition to bureaucracy in general. But it is very 
difficult to go along with this desire for a return to the 
classical age of high modernism itself, as the prototype 
of the most genuine anti -establishment protest- For what 
is ultimately fatal to this revival of the progressive 
ideology of modernism is precisely the fate of modernism 
in consumer society as we know it today- What was, once, 
an oppositional, anti- social phenomenon in the early years 
of the twentieth century has, now, become the dominant 
style of commodity production and an indispensable 
component in the machinery of the latter's even more rapid 
and demanding reproduction of itself. Therefore, the 
legitimate desire to induce changes in the social 
structure cannot be realised through a direct political 
involvement of art (expressing, through its media, 
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political views), but only through the recognition that, 
outside the self -critical examination of its modes of 
working, there is only the ideological smoke of a mannered 
modernism, smoke which is bound to be given off at any 
change in fashion: 
This is no time for political art, but politics has 
migrated into autonomous art, and nowhere more than where 
it seems to be politically dead" (4). 
Instead of the constant re- invoquing of the past glory of 
architecture as a powerful force in the planning of future 
developments of society, one would be better advised to 
concentrate on the pressing demands for the definition of 
its theoretical instruments and the limits of their 
operability- The vast amount of studies produced to that 
effect can help us to identify certain criteria for a 
critical look at architectural thinking: 
a)- There is, first, the confirmation of the loss of 
public meaning on the part of designers, loss felt 
particularly strongly at the level of linguistic 
communication. 
b)- There is also the need to check the meanings that 
underly the transformations - whether planned or not - in 
the physical environment, which has produced studies such 
as those of Lynch, Rossi and Gregotti on the form of the 
city, the territory, and which one can use in the 
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structuration of the urban plan (5). 
c) - Finally, there is the need to substitute for the 
vanished linguistic unity an objective, logical, and 
analytical method of checking planning. At this point, the 
research divides into two on the one hand, studies such 
as those of Christopher Alexander- and of many amer-ican 
theorists (6), based on mathematical methods of 
examination, selection, and assembly of data, with the 
intention of reaching a kind of architectura ex machina; 
on the other hand, studies such as those of Grassi and 
Rossi (7) which are based on rational criteria of 
description, classification, and manipulation of the 
constant laws of forms, in order- to establish logical and 
unified methods of analysis and planning. 
A very substantial problem remains, however, namely, that 
no middle ground was envisaged between the various efforts 
to apprehend and control the dynamic phenomena of 
urbanisation and the concrete administrative measures. 
Instead, the entire polemic against the experiments of 
modernism in architecture was conducted on the basis of 
purely formal terms- It would not be an exaggeration to 
say that the dominant forces in architectural theory were 
rendered totally ineffectual by their own assumption that 
the environment could be made more pleasant, or more 
habitable, if inspired by an image of the ideal city in 
which ideal men would be organised into ideal communities; 
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this ineffectuality is the direct result of the reluctance 
to start from a lucid appraisal of the existing structure 
of power which is the real generator of urban processes. 
One must recognise that our aesthetics is still, to a 
large extent, based on the same philosophical principles 
that Alberti and all the Renaissance architects have 
outlined; we have made the same social contract, that of 
voicing the ideology of the establishment . To those who 
still hold on to the belief that it is still possible to 
make man "dwell" in the metropolis, it is important to 
recall the warning given by Heidegger that the problem of 
dwelling lies, not in the quality of the buildings, of 
services, or of design; one should speak of it in its own 
language or not speak of it at all (8). 
It is also important to remember that this situation stems 
from a difficulty pertaining to our time; it seems that 
there is, as yet, only one possible choice, and that this 
choice can bear only on two equally extreme methods: 
either to posit a reality which is entirely permeable to 
history and ideologise it, or, conversely, to posit a 
reality which is impenetrable and irreducible and, in this 
case, one can only poetise - that is, 
inalienable meanings of things 
and reality, description and 
knowledge. This choice has 
externally by some overriding 
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forcibly submit; as a matter of fact, the structure of 
architectural knowledge owes very little to the reality of 
the objective world which intervenes only in the process 
of institutionalisation of this knowledge. the structuring 
of architectural knowledge is predominantly the result of 
internal factors which are responsible for the emergence 
of specific discourses centered around the concept of man. 
The fact that architectural discourses are articulated 
around man as both the subject and object of knowledge is 
not, as it might first appear, simply the result of a 
natural and benevolent tendency to look for the betterment 
of man's conditions of life; it is the result of a precise 
configuration of the space of knowledge (9). Briefly, in 
so- called human sciences, man has been adopted as the 
object of study only quite recently, in historical terms. 
The free, rational, and economic man is a concept which 
emerged only as late as the eighteenth century, and around 
which, a specific knowledge was built and constituted into 
so many sciences- Before that, there was no 
epistemological consciousness of man as such, and 
knowledge was articulated along lines which, in no way, 
isolate a domain proper to man (10)- 
It is very difficult to account for the fact that, within 
the space of a few years, a certain culture ceases 
to 
think what it has been thinking up to then, and 
begins to 
think in a new way- It is not easy to deter-mine 
what had 
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caused such changes. Questions like these, however 
legitimate, are highly embarrassing because there is no 
definite methodological principle on which to base such an 
analysis. Moreover, the traditional explanations of the 
"spirit of the age ", of technological changes, of 
influences of all kinds, inventiveness or genius, while 
they have a limited role to play, strike one as being more 
magical than effective. 
So where does this unexpected mobility of epistemological 
structures come from? How is it that thought detaches 
itself from the squares it inhabited before, and allows 
what has been held as true before to topple down into 
error, into the realm of fantasy, into non- knowledge? What 
laws do these mutations obey, laws which, with no apparent 
reason, decide that things are no longer to be perceived 
and known in the same way? 
It would be superficial to seek the causes of these 
re-configurations in some progress made in rationality, Or- 
in the discovery of a new cultural theme. All that one can 
say, now, is that these profound breaches in the expanse 
of continuities cannot be summarized in a single word. It 
is a radical event which seems to be distributed across 
the entire sphere of knowledge. This is the reason why the 
emergence of man as object /subject is so difficult to 
grasp. However-, it must not be supposed that man suddenly 
appeared on the horizon in a manner so eruptive as to be 
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baffling to our reflection; but there is no doubt that, at 
the level of appearances, modernity began when man, as a 
human being, was given a privileged site from which to 
speak and be spoken about. 
Once this new configuration has taken place, it became 
only a question of revealing the conditions of this new 
structure of knowledge on the basis of the empirical 
contents given to it. It is precisely in those empirical 
contents that one finds the two alternatives taken by 
architectural discourses (11): 
a)- There are those who operate within the space of the 
body itself, and by studying perception, sensorial 
mechanisms, and the articulation common to things and the 
organism, function as a sort of transcendental aesthetic; 
these studies stem from the conception that knowledge is 
formed gradually within the structure of the human body, 
that it may have a privileged place within it, but that 
its forms cannot be dissociated from its peculiar- 
functioning; in short, that there is a nature of human 
knowledge which determines its forms and which can, at the 
same time, be manifest to it in its empirical contents. 
b-)- There are also those analyses which, by studying 
humanity's more or less vanquished illusions, function as 
a kind of transcendental dialectic; by this means, it was 
shown that knowledge had historical, social, or economic 
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conditions, that it was formed within the relations that 
are woven between men, and that it is not independent from 
the particular- forms that they might have taken here or 
there; in short, that there was a history of human 
knowledge which could be given to empirical knowledge and 
prescribe its forms. 
One can see, now, that what architecture offer-s as its 
"natural" purpose - i -e- to build for "dwellers" - and 
expresses it either through discourses on "needs" based on 
are idealised notion of mari, or through the excavation of 
history in search for the "lost paradise", is revealed, 
not as natural, but as the result of a historical 
re-structuring of the space of knowledge which allowed mars 
to emerge as the centre and focus of all possible 
knowledge- What is presented by architectural discourse as 
its essential nature is revealed as but a historically 
determined configuration with no meta- historical values. 
These two alternatives corresponding to two bodies of 
research will constitute the object of the following 
discussions on empiricism, language, and history. 
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. EMPIRICISM AND DESIGN 
Two aspects need to be examined in relation to the first 
alternative of the division of thought that I have just 
described: firstly, one has to describe the mechanisms of 
empiricist epistemology; secondly, one must show how this 
alternative has been taken up in architectural thinking 
and reflected in specific methods and techniques. 
This empiricist conception of knowledge appear-s very much 
like the profane transcription of the religious mode of 
reading described early in the introduction. For, the 
empiricist perspective involves a process between a given 
subject and a given object. It does not matter, at this 
stage, what the status of the subject is (whether 
psychological, historical,. - -), or what that of the object 
is (continuous or discontinuous, fixed or mobile,...)- As 
such, these given subject and object are anterior to the 
process of production of knowledge itself- If they already 
define a certain theoretical field, this field cannot, 
however, be described as empiricist, at this stage. What 
will define it as such is the nature of the process of 
acquisition of knowledge. 
The declared purpose of empiricist processes is that of 
the attainment, or acquisition of knowledge; this process 
can be outlined as follows: what the empiricist calls the 
attainment of knowledge is, in fact, a matter 
of 
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abstracting, from the real object (i.e. the world, 
society, events,...), its essence. This abstraction, or- 
extraction of the essence is the result of experiencing 
the world by a subject. The status of this subject is, in 
turn, firmly based on a humanistic perspective (12) which 
idealises man and transforms him into an image of God: 
--and _an man, whose image the god is, is not the real man, 
but likewise, the quintessence of the numerous real men, 
man in the abstract, therefore himself against a mental 
image" (13). 
This humanistic philosophy relies entirely on two 
postulates: firstly, that there is a universal essence of 
man; secondly, that this essence is the attribute of each 
single individual who is its real subject. These 
postulates, themselves, rely on the empiricist 
perspective: 
a)- The empiricism of the subject: if the essence of man 
is to be a universal attribute, it is essential that 
concrete individuals exist as absolute givens. 
b)- The idealism of the essence: if these empirical 
individuals are to be men, it is essential that each 
carries in himself the whole of human essence, at least, 
in principle (14)- 
As I have already mentioned, in the empiricist 
theory of 
knowledge, subject and object are given at the outset; 
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they pre-date the process of acquisition of knowledge. 
Knowledge is, then, extracted from that object to be known 
(which is assumed to contain this knowledge). This process 
of abstraction, which extracts from the real given object 
its essence, is a real abstraction of a real essence. 
Abstraction in the real sense means that it is a process 
similar to that of extracting gold, for instance; it is a 
process of separating the essence from the dirt, from all 
the impurities. As such, this process of separation 
imposes on us a specific representation of the real, as 
well as of the knowledge of it. 
In this representation of the real, the latter is said to 
be constituted of two parts: the essential part, and the 
inessential part, which leads to a first conclusion, 
namely, that knowledge is contained in the real object as 
one of its two parts, the essential part. The process of 
acquisition of knowledge would only have the function of 
separating the two parts constituting the real, of 
isolating and eventually eliminating the inessential part, 
leaving only the essential part to the knowing subject. A 
second conclusion is that this process of abstraction, 
being only a means of purifying the real, leaves no trace 
in the essential part. This process ceases, therefore, to 
exist along with the inessential part that it removes, 
precisely because the sole and unique reason for 
its 
existence was the removal of this inessential part. 
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Furthermore, the two parts of the real are located in a 
specific way, in relation to each other: the inessential 
part, all the impurities, occupies all the exterior of the 
object to be known, constituting its visible part, whereas 
the essential part, that which contains the knowledge of 
the object, occupies the invisible inside. The process of 
knowing would, then, be to uncover the essential by 
removing the inessential part, exactly in the same way as 
one would remove the skin of a banana or unveil a statue. 
What all this means is that the knowledge of an object 
becomes a real part of this object, its inside, or that 
which is not immediately visible. The structure of the 
object becomes the ver-y possibility of its knowledge, 
present in its essence as well as in the operation of 
distinction between the two parts of the real object. This 
investment of knowledge as the real part of a real object 
is what constitutes the specific characteristic of the 
empiricist ideology. This ideology claims that the object 
of knowledge is not identical with the real object, being 
only one of its parts, while, at the same time, it 
implicitely rejects what it has been saying out -loud by 
reducing the difference between the two objects - the 
object of knowledge and the real object - to a mere 
distinction between the parts of one single object: the 
real object. 
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Let us explain further. In the explicit claim, one has two 
distinct objects: the real object which exists outside the 
subject, and independently of the process of acquisition 
of knowledge; secondly, the object of knowledge which is 
distinct from the first, being only its essential part. 
But the same statement contains its own denial since it 
refers to only one object, the real object. This paradox 
cannot be solved within the confines of an empiricist 
outlook, especially when the distinction between real 
object and object of knowledge is so confused and ignored. 
In fact, in this way, knowledge becomes simply impossible. 
There is an even more serious objection to empiricism as a 
process of attainment of knowledge. This objection derives 
from the opposition of "de facto and "de jure" which 
constitutes the foundation of philosophy. A fact can prove 
nothing with regard to essence, to the question of right; 
the confusion of the two is the philosophical fault parr 
excellence; and this fault is known as empiricism- The 
empiricist does not believe in the distinction between 
truths of fact and truths of reason (as Liebnitz would 
have said). The alleged truths of reason are, for the 
empiricist, finally truths of fact for, the ultimate 
reason of a truth of reason is, and must always be, a 
primitive fact- He, therefore, maintains that there can 
be 
no pure reason. The founding of truths of reason 
resides, 
not in its capacity for a- priori language, 
but in its 
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relationship to this primitive and ultimate fact, i.e. the 
experience that reason has of it. In other- words, the 
founding principle is not an identity of the kind "I =I ", 
but a difference, since it is the relationship to 
something else. Empiricism, as Der-r-ida put it 
"___is the dream of a thought which is purely 
heterological at the source_ Pure thought of a pure 
difference_ We say dream because it fades with the coming 
of the day, the dawn of language" (15). 
What is heterology guilty of? Heterology is guilty of the 
same crime as that which Aristotle was found guilty of for 
having said "we must stop " - The very notion of a primitive 
fact is philosophically irresponsible, since the 
empiricist cannot answer for this fact, that is, measure 
it against a still more primitive fact- In this way, the 
empiricist is revealed as a kind of barbarian who thinks 
that strength creates right. 
As soon as one is clear about the fundamental structure of 
empiricism, the evaluation of the forms of this ideology, 
forms which present themselves under the innocent guise of 
a theory of models, becomes possible. Against the 
confusion between the concrete object and the object of 
knowledge, it is important to stress their distinct 
nature- What is more, the distinction is not limited only 
to their nature, but it also concerns the processes 
by 
which they are, each, produced. 
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While the process of production of real objects, or of a 
concrete /real totality, happens entirely in the real and 
according to the real sequence of a real genesis (that is, 
the temporal succession of a historical process), the 
process of production of objects of knowledge takes place 
entirely in knowledge and according to are altogether 
different kind of sequence in which the categories do not 
occupy the same place as in the first case- 
This point needs further clarification: when it is said 
that the process of production of knowledge and of its 
objects happens entirely in the "head" or in thought, one 
is not trying to re-introduce, through a backdoor, an 
idealism of consciousness or of the mind; the thought that 
one is referring to, here, is not the faculty of a 
transcendental subject, or that of an absolute 
consciousness, set in opposition to the real world 
considered as inert matter-- Nor is this thought the 
faculty attributed to a psychological subject, even if it 
is the case that the individual human being serves as its 
agent- 
The thought one is talking about, here, refers to the 
constituted historical system of are apparatus founded and 
articulated upon the social and natural reality. It is 
defined by the system of the real conditions which makes 
of it a determined mode of production of knowledge. As 
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such, it is constituted by a structure which contains and 
combines the objects on which it operates (the raw 
material), the means of theoretical production which are 
at its disposal (its theory, methods, and various 
techniques) and ,finally, the historical relations to 
which it is subjected (theoretical, ideological, economic, 
social,...) (16). It is this precise system of the 
conditions of all theoretical production, this combining 
structure, which assigns to such and such thinking 
subjects their place and function in the general process 
of production of knowledge. 
In this sense, any system of theoretical practice founded 
and articulated on non -discursive practices providing it, 
directly or indirectly, with most of its raw material, 
possesses a determined objective reality; it is this 
determined objective reality which defines the roles and 
functions of the thought of the individual subject who 
cannot "think" but the problems already posed, or only 
those which can be posed according to a specific system. 
Therefore, far from being an essence to be extracted from 
the material world, the faculty of a transcendental 
subject, or that of an absolute consciousness, thought is 
a real system in the strict sense of the word; it is a 
system founded and articulated on the real world, and a 
specific historical conjuncture; a system with a set of 
specific relationships with the natural world; a system 
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defined by a type of combination between its raw material, 
its means of production, and its relationship with the 
other productive structures of society. 
By way of an analogy, one could say that the production of 
discourses, characteristic of theoretical practice, 
constitutes a process which happens entirely in "thought ", 
in the same way as one could say, mutacti-s rutlndi-s, that 
the process of economic production happens entirely in the 
economy- This is what gives theoretical practice its 
fundamental characteristic as production, that is, the 
transformation of intuition and representation into 
concepts which are, then, offered as such to society 
through pre-established institutional channels. 
These many serious limitations of empiricism, as a process 
of acquisition of knowledge, have not, however, detracted 
architectural theorists from producing a steady flow of 
papers and communications on so- called "environmental 
issues ", suggesting that no serious notice was taker, of 
these objections- Instead, this outlook has regularly been 
serving as a basis for analyses on the relationships 
between man and the environment. 
Faithful to the empiricist ideology, these studies present 
man as both the essence of man and the empirical 
individual which necessarily possesses this essence. 
Similarly, the environment stands for a homogeneous field, 
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a given phenomenon, as well as for the set of all the 
physical objects which are defined by their relationship 
to an organism. Consequently, man/environment relations 
are conceived of as ideal relations in which the human 
nature and the homogeneous field of the environment are 
realised together in two different ways: one the one hand, 
as the empirical interaction between men, and on the other 
hand, as the interaction between these men and the 
physical objects that surround them- The theme of 
man /environment interaction depends on the conception of 
the environment as, not only surrounding man, but also as 
being itself viewed, known, perceived, and acted upon by 
man- As such, man becomes the central figure in 
conceptual, verbal, and graphical modes of representation, 
as a result of a particular- configuration of the structure 
of knowledge. Within this configuration, the problem of 
the relationship between man and the environment emerges 
as one of the definition of "needs" and the degree to 
which the environment conditions their fulfilment; a theme 
which immediately brings to mind that old Vitruvian 
trilogy of "building well, on the dimension of commodity, 
firmness, and delight" (17)- 
The interest in the definition of needs, which follows 
quite naturally from the negative rhetoric against the 
modern movement, is the answer of architecture to the 
urgent problem of direct communication with the general 
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public and of social behaviour towards the images and 
structures of urban areas. It is in the form of three 
specific directives aimed at improving the visual 
character of the city that the expression of these 
concerns was given: 
a)- To give the city dweller the opportunity to comprehend 
and orient himself in the city as part of his daily life. 
b)- To provide a visual emphasis which is socially, 
culturally, and economically important. 
c)- To stimulate civic consciousness and pride. 
These directives are, by no means, new; they can, in fact, 
be traced as far- back as the eighteenth century realm of 
reason, that of the Abbe Laugier and the Abbe Hor-elly. The 
revolution in science, the development of knowledge from 
Newton to Bacon meant that nothing could, any longer, be 
beyond the bounds of human control, and, therefore, of 
institution. The power of the environment over the mind, 
its effects on the body and soul, constituted, in the 
minds of eighteenth century thinkers, the basic forming 
and tranforming force for mars and society. This 
sensationalist philosophy, the ancestral form of 
behaviourism, functioned on the belief that the 
surroundings of life were the first determining factors of 
character; surroundings composed of: 
"an infinity of objects which foyr. in each individual, 
what we call his state of mind" (18) . 
From this postulate, it was an easy reversal to suggest 
that any morphological changes in the structure of the 
environment would inevitably lead to alterations in the 
state of mind of the inhabitants. Architects, princes, 
philosophers were not slow to seize the delightful 
implications of such a discourse. What a wondrous 
invention for those who sensed the intractable qualities 
of the existing society, and grew impatient at its 
stubborn refusal to see its true path! 
The form of the external world, over which, complete 
material control was heralded as imminent, was to become 
the agent of redemption. Through environmental 
reconstruction and rehabilitation, catharsis will, at 
last, be achieved; the improvement of the urban 
environment becomes the necessary and sufficient premise 
for moral regeneration and social happiness. The old dream 
of the Enlightenment model state is given new impetus; 
once again, one sees a return to the attempt at joining 
design and mores, the form of the street to the form of 
the social activities for which it is the support. The 
ideological implications of this theme are, by now, so 
apparent that no more time should be spent discussing 
them. What is worth looking at are the problems that 
Williams' directives raise, and the obstacles that the 
attempts to follow them must overcome. 
In an architectural practice understood as a process of 
responding to physiological, social, and aesthetic needs 
through the manipulation of formal elements, the first 
obstacle to be overcome is that of the definition, 
categorisation and classification of those needs. 
Indeed, architectural theory has taken possession of this 
concept and has repeatedly used it to approach its 
subject-matter; a concept which has proven of great 
rhetorical significance in justifying whatever products it 
wishes to promote. Clearly, to engage into a definition of 
human needs, a definition which goes beyond the obvious 
and limited enumeration of the purely physiological ones, 
is engaging into an endless rhetorical discourse on human 
desires, values, and preferences, which would render 
futile any hope for "scientific" objectivity and rigour-, 
the very argument given to promote this kind of research. 
It seems to me that the only viable way to study this 
concept of "needs" is to look at it from a linguistic 
viewpoint, that is, to question the very possibility of 
speaking about needs as natural or as given at the outset. 
The language of needs starts off from one axiom: that the 
contemporary city is not what it should be, that it 
suffers from a lack. The fact that the concept of the 
modern metropolis is far more complex than its immediately 
given physical apearance becomes irrelevant when it comes 
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to the "urbanistic city ", that which planner -s and 
architects speak of. In fact, for them to be able to speak 
at all about the metropolis, it is necessary that its 
plurality is r-educed to its physical and formal 
characteristics; it is necessary that the "existential 
trauma ", of which I spoke earlier- (19), is translated 
into the ambiguous notion of lack. By a veritable 
conjuring act, things become very simple: the city of the 
architect and planner is turned into a cluster of concrete 
objects and of individuals defined by their attitudes and 
general behaviour which are reported to the norm; in this 
language, the individual exists only as a normalised 
individual (i -e- the universal essence of man, the 
"dweller- "), and the city exists only in quantifiable 
terms- the notion of lack, itself, can be interpreted in 
many different ways: 
a)- Lack in the sense of a shortage of houses, and social 
amenities of all kinds, which would constitute the 
fundamental deficiency of the modern metropolis. As such, 
lack signifies all that is left to do before achieving the 
total "urbanistic city ". 
b)- Lack in the city can also refer to all those who still 
live on the fringe of society, or outside it and the 
socially accepted norms (20)- 
c;>- The other possible interpretation of lack is that 
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which the "ur-banistic city" excludes by definition. 
Lack in the sense of a quantitative and qualitative 
insufficiency is directly related to the language of 
needs. But one must realise that what is called "need" is 
a social product which has gone through a process of 
naturalisation and de- histor-icization by discourse. 
Through all the material constraints, themselves the 
products of society, through all the representations that 
are articulated to language, a need is only one way among 
others for the subject to actualise his desires, a means 
for " is parole uvase ", as Lacan put it (21)- One has also 
to make a distinction between the needs that are created 
by a specific production system and those which come from 
architectural discourses, the latter being used in the 
search for ideal models through methods whose 
arbitrariness is revealed by the contradictory results 
drawn from similar- premises (22). 
However-, the maire problem is elsewhere. For planners and 
architects, a need has to be the attribute of man as a 
universal entity. Marxist theoreticians would object to 
the idea of universal needs, and oppose to it that of the 
historical needs of the working classes: the social needs 
which they conquered and which the contradictions of the 
capitalist system of economic relations would not allow to 
be fulfilled- The major point is to realise that one must 
not think that social needs are necessarily those which 
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one believes them to be. The needs to which architects and 
planners refer, whether- social or universal, ar -e not those 
that a particular- individual has, but those that he should 
have, according to a prescribed set of social rules: a 
need is first and foremost a norm- It is in the name of 
"needs" that, for instance, throughout the nineteenth 
century, the lower classes have been undergoing a process 
of progressive integration, and that, today, we 
relentlessly tr -y to recuperate those who still live 
outside the commonly held norms, supposedly universal. We 
demarginalise, or, at least, we try very hard. By the same 
token, we try to contain "desire" which, ignoring the 
nor-m, explodes in all directions: the "desiring machine ", 
one should say along with Deleuze and Gattari from whom is 
borrowed the image of desire which flees, transgressing 
permanently the limits we assign to it (23)- But speaking 
in terms of desire leaking from everywhere or in terms of 
marginal groups amounts to the same thing from the 
planner's point of view: in a way, it is to recuperate a 
residue which the "ur-bariistic city" lacks, and which, as 
such, is frightening and threatening to the rest of 
society. As with desire, it always escapes, coming back 
each time in different forms, forcing a constant 
redefinition of needs. 
Therefore, the need, and through it, the ur-banistic city, 
are but instruments for normalisation, for discipline: 
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needs for-bid and preclude, even if this fact is less 
apparent because their origin is buried ir, history (24). 
But needs and norms have simultaneously positive effects, 
those to which Foucault was referring ir. his analysis of 
power-: 
"We must stop ", he tells us, "always describing its 
effects.._ir, negative terms: power precludes, represses, 
inhibits, censures, abstracts, masks, and hides. In fact 
power produces; it produces the real; it produces fields 
of objects and rituals of truth" (25). 
This notion of norm and normalisation requires a series of 
clarifications: 
a)- Firstly, to talk about normalisation seems to suggest 
that a society could function quite normally without the 
help of one single norm; a notion which, in all evidence, 
is absurd. 
b)- In a normalised society, the norm is unique, or 
supposedly so, because this society, in which "men would 
have nothing to envy bees for..." (26), would have its 
queens with their privileged quarters and distractions. 
But for the rest of us, the norm is really unique: it is 
that by which we are measured, classified, and assigned. 
c)- The norm does not know but that which is perceptible 
and quantifiable: gestures, performances, the way of 
speaking, etc. It objectifies the subject, quantifies him 
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and renders him quantifiable, at the same time. 
d)- The normalised individual is the reified norm in its 
positive dimension. However- infantile and reductionist the 
norm might be, it is only through it that one can 
apprehend the lack, from which this discussion started, 
and which, in a sense, is the negative dimension of the 
norm, or everything that has no place in it, everything 
that is excluded by definition, or, rather, by 
construction; by construction, because the normalised 
individual is, as we have seen, not a given entity, but a 
constructed ore. The norm excludes all the processes which 
are at the origin of social relations, or which are their 
products. It also excludes all the processes by which it 
has become reality- The fact that the object we buy for a 
price is the place of invested desire, that through the 
logic of difference, it expresses social relations, the 
norm cannot but ignore it. Preclusion which takes many 
different forms, each reinforcing the norm itself which we 
can, then, believe that it is natural, and, as such, 
universal. This universalisation can only exist through 
the exclusion of the "Other'", of all that is not made to 
represent and reinforce the norm; this "Othe><" which is 
ignored, reduced, and eventually annihilated. 
e)- An enumeration of the various forms of exclusion 
cannot but be confused and unclear, since that which is 
excluded is part of what can be called the "magma of 
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significations", which is opposed to the ensemblist and 
undifferentiating logic and language in which the norm is 
located. Confused magma, not because it lacks a structure, 
but because it cannot be translated into the language of 
the norm. It is also the case that, through this language, 
nothing of real relevance can be said about society or 
about the metropolis, even if this language is vital to 
their functioning. The lack that the modern metropolis 
suffers from is original: it is a constructed lack. 
However-, Two questions still remain unanswered; questions 
which cannot be ignored even if they fall largely outside 
the scope of this particular study: one is the question of 
the nature of the relationship between the norm and the 
experience of the subject; the second question is that of 
the nature of the mechanisms by which the same subject 
becomes, or-, at least, tends to become the normalised 
individual that society tries so hard to turn him into. 
That the norm acts like a kind of straight jacket is 
undeniable; that it is less visible and can escape 
consciousness when it is better, or longer, inter-iorised 
is equally undeniable. On the other hand, recent studies 
(27) have suggested that the norm is less a matter of 
imposed behaviour than that of the mode of affective 
relations as, for instance, those between parents and 
children, leading to the "Oedipus complex" which is 
presented as universal, but which, in fact, is the 
construct of a rationalised and normalised society; as a 
consequence, and in a somehow paradoxical way, the norm is 
said to shape the unconscious which it precisely excludes 
from its language through a deliberate omission. 
Psychoanalysis would, ir. this case, act as a security 
valve which enables the Western family to deal with its 
misfits. 
f)- Finally, the norm, as negation of the "Other ", and by 
imposing cer -tain types of relations and a certain mode of 
being to the individual, is necessarily violence. To speak 
of the metropolis as a lack cannot but lead to violence, 
as is violence the rationality which founds the notion of 
lack, whatever sense of the word one chooses- But the 
process of normalisation is anything but linear-. Even in 
the most integrated individuals, those who are located the 
closest to the norm, there always remains a residue which 
accounts for the divergence between the norm and lived 
experience. Therefor -e, one can say that the norm is never 
completely efficient, although it has its own efficacy. 
Trying to establish a non- idealistic definition of 
communal needs is a task of equal difficulty. As in the 
case of individual needs, the temptation is to try and 
figure an ideal community of aspiring men and women, 
joining together- to express common needs and hopes 
regarding their environment. However, as one well knows, 
in contemporary society, social groups are formed, not in 
view of fulfilling some kind of shared aspirations, but, 
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instead, in view of defending sectorial interests which, 
in many cases, are antithetical to those of other- groups. 
The only alternative left to designer -s is to try and 
formulate thei.r - own model of this ideal community, with 
all the problems that the reliance on arbitrarily 
conceived classifications carry with them. 
At this stage, I would like to mention that this 
discussion on the language of needs was not intended as a 
validation of a metaphysics of desire in the manner- of 
Deleuze and Gattari, for instance- The issue, here, was 
simply to reveal the process of naturalisation, through 
the language of needs, of historically produced normalised 
attitudes, and to show the mystificator-y power that this 
language has in transforming its ideology into a natural 
and universal discourse. 
This language of needs serves two very useful purposes, as 
far as empiricist theory in architecture is concerned: on 
the one hand, it serves to consolidate the position of mars 
as the subject and object of knowledge; on the other hand, 
by being presented as a way of objectifying the process of 
design through identifiable and quantifiable needs, it 
also serves as a guise for highly subjective and 
idealistic stances- 
This is why the bulk of the research relying on the 
empiricist outlook found, in perception, a very favorable 
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terrain of experimentation on which to establish itself. 
Beyond the specifics of each individual approach, there is 
the understanding that perception, as an area of inquiry, 
is vital, since it remains the only source of information 
about the environment, and that it is ultimately related 
to the adaptive functioning of the organism- The question 
always raised by those studies is that of the definition 
of the function of sensory perception in the total 
behaviour of the human organism. Now the answer to this 
question is of vital importance, since it determines to a 
large extent the manner in which perception, as a 
conceptual tool, is used in architectural discourses. 
Per-ception is conceived both as a phenomenal experience 
and as a directive for action. Because general explanatory 
principles for perception have not been found, it seems to 
me that both the magnitude of the complexity of perceptive 
phenomena and the nature of the complexity have still to 
be grasped. Studies 
process 
on mental mapping as a cognitive 
of experiencing the environment, the 
identification of the salient characteristics contributing 
to one's awareness of the environment, and the analysis of 
the meanings attributed to specific contexts, are all 
constitutive forms of discourse in contemporary 
architecture. The objective of these various studies is 
the identification of possible strategies which could be 
used to conceptualise the environment, so that a 
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comprehensive theor -y of the acquisition and utilisation of 
information about environmental systems can be developed. 
One of these strategies which had a great impact on design 
theory, despite the fact that it had long since been 
totally discredited, is that which uses the biological 
notion of evolution. This evolutionist approach overcomes 
the problems associated with hierarchical classifications 
by postulating that "needs" ought to be based on the 
physiological, psychological, sociological, and 
anthropological aspects of human behaviour. From ther -e, 
those needs are translated into levels of sensory 
perception, according to the category to which they 
belong. 
For the evolutionist, the lower level is largely limited 
to the avoidance of noxious situations and to the approach 
to the nurtur-ant ones. As organisms grow more complex, 
sensory perception enters into many other aspects. 
distance perception, identification, communication, sexual 
attraction, and ever. more complex social relationships. In 
man, this trend is accentuated, and perception, in 
addition to all the previous function, acquires relevance 
to many other processes far removed from the adaptive 
significance observed at the lower levels - language and 
aesthetic experience, for instance. In line with this 
conceptual framework, Abraham Maslow offered, in 1954, a 
classificatory table which was going to have a great 
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success; a table in which, all human motivations and 
aspirations were to find a place at corresponding levels 
(28)- He suggested that human needs could be arranged in a 
hierarchical order, the higher levels taking precedence 
over the lower ones. His hierarchy in ascending order is 
as follows: 
1) Physiological needs such as thirst, hunger, cold,... 
2) Safety needs such as security and protection against 
physical and /or- psychological harm 
Belonging or love needs which concern the relationship 
of responsive, affectionate, and authoritative needs 
4) Esteem needs, or those of an individual to be held in 
esteem by others 
Actualisation needs representing the desire to fulfill 
one's own total capacities 
6) Finally, cognitive and aesthetic needs, representing 
the thirst for knowledge and the desire for beauty for its 
own sake- 
According to Maslow, we have structured our whole 
environment in such a way as to meet as many aspects of 
those requirements as possible- It is easy to understand 
the attractiveness of such a thesis, in that it seems to 
provide a "rational" basis, a much needed "scientific" 
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grounding for the practice of design- But this attitude 
might, as easily, result in deterministic stances which 
have plagued architectural thinking for such a long time 
(29). The problem with such a hierarchical order of 
classification is that it seems to suggest that the 
process of production of the built environment is, itself, 
one of a hierarchical type; that it would be left to the 
individual to determine the level up to which his design 
must correspond, according to his own beliefs and 
philosophy- Indeed, a restricted reading of the modem 
movement has been made, following this order of 
classification: the earlier conferences of the CIAh1 being 
seen as concerned with the impact of the environment on 
the lowest order- needs, while the later meetings - like 
that of Otter-loo, in 1959 - as concerned with the higher 
order of cognitive and aesthetic needs (30")- 
Within the same perspective, but with a totally different 
approach, we also have studies based, this time, on a 
cultural model of society, such as that of Rapoport, for 
instance, who considers cultural factors as the major - 
contributors to the shaping of the environment. By 
referring to anthropological studies on "primitive" 
communities, he was able to refute the deterministic 
argument and draw some principles of organisation of space 
which, according to him, are as much present in today's 
metropolises as they ever were (31)- With Rapoport, it is 
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the symbolic, rather than the utilitarian, which takes 
precedence. Lewis Mumford had already started the argument 
when he claimed that: "Man was a symbol -making animal 
before he was a tool -making animal" (32), that he reached 
specialisation in myth, religion, and rituals, befor -e he 
did ir. the material aspect of culture, and that ritual 
exactitude came before exactitude in work. 
This argument contradicts in every point the evolutionary 
model offered by Maslow's classification, since man's 
achievements are said to have resulted more from the use 
of his internal resources than from the need to control 
the external environment or to secure more food for - 
himself. In the cultural model, it is, therefore, the 
primacy of the mythic and poetic function of symbols which 
matters, rather than their rational and practical 
function. 
The same contrasting views have been expressed by, 
Redfield on the one hand, and Childe on the other (33)- 
While Childe was strongly ir. favour- of a materialistic 
approach, Redfield opposed him and stressed the primacy of 
what he called the "moral order" over the "technical 
order" in primitive societies. Early societies, says 
Redfield, were, to a great extent, ethical and, their 
moral order is stronger and more articulated than their 
technical order. 
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This cultural model pr- esents, nevertheless, a substantial 
problem: one has to accept that the supremacy of the 
symbolic order is still valid in contemporary society; one 
has to accept the leap from the study of early societies 
to that of the modern ones, from the early ways of 
organising communal and private space to the infinitely 
more complex urban communities. This leap can be performed 
only on the basis of a belief in constant, 
meta -historical, and universal characteristics of human 
nature- This problem was foreseen by Rapoport who warned 
that his analysis should only be taken as a partial 
contribution to the debate on environmental issues, and 
that, as such, it offers no complete model of organisation 
of space; nor does it have, he said, any immediate 
practical purposes. 
However, if it is right to point to the limits of 
relevance of a particular study, one cannot agree with the 
arbitrary fixing of those limits, motivated only by the 
particular- interests of the author-. It is not right to 
acknowledge the complexity of a problem and, then, reduce 
it to a level which suits one's own interests or- 
capacities- Analysing the development of urban for -ms with 
the help of some perr-enial patterns which are supposed to 
permeate through the entire body of human and social 
behaviour is, certainly, a very attractive proposition; it 
allows the formulation of a synthetic view as to how the 
physical environment is produced and how forms emerge; but 
no explanation for this belief in per-r-enial patterns is 
provided; a belief which remains firmly within the 
humanist ideology, scarcely hidden behind a claimed 
scientifism free from any ideological connotation. 
It will never be said enough that a uni- dimensional 
reading of the urban dynamics (in this case, a cultural 
reading) cannot but give a very distorted interpretation 
of this dynamics. Moreover, the argument that the 
combination of a series of one -sided readings will 
provide,in the end, a satisfactory picture is fallacious, 
since it fails to recognise the uniquely phenomenological 
character of the metropolis- The return to a concern with 
the symbolic imagery of the city is not negative in 
itself; what is negative is the split that such a return 
might provoque between utopia and reality, between a lucid 
structural reading and are evasion into a world of 
uncontrolled images. 
This discontinuity is most explicit in the studies of 
urban forms carried out by Kevin Lynch who, in many 
people's mind, rightly emerges as the only scholar whose 
concerns are the nearest to the problem of urban cognition 
and communication- His much publicised work is one of 
great interest insofar as he kept thinking about the city 
in the same terms as the consciousness which perceives it; 
in other words, he was concerned with it as it appears to 
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the mind of the perceiver-. His work remains, nevertheless, 
within the thematic of providing adequate answers to human 
"needs ", through the manipulation of urban forms as he 
explicitely recognised: 
"In Western culture, general and accepted goals would 
probably cluster around the individual human being, around 
the idea of man as the measure" (34). 
The axiom of man as the measure leads Lynch to establish, 
on the one hand, a hierarchical classification of those 
"needs ", and on the other hand, a categorisation of urban 
forms. However, he stopped short from establishing a 
direct correspondance between the two tables, avoiding in 
this way the accusation of a simplistic determinism. He 
even dismisses any thought of a direct correspondance by 
saying that: 
"Regardless of any influence it may or may not have, 
physical form is not the key variable whose manipulation 
would induce change" (35). 
Instead, he describes the relationship between the 
categories of goals and forms as invitational, or as based 
upon prior- experience: 
"...it involves running through the list of descriptive 
categories of city forms and choosing, by intuition or 
prior experience, those general objectives that seem most 
relevant to that aspect of form" (36)- 
The work of Lynch is, in reality, extremely ambiguous - 
From the semantic point of view, there is a whole 
vocabulary of meaning in his language when, for instance, 
he gives great importance to the readability of the city; 
and in good philologist, he has the sense of the discrete 
units- He tried to uncover, in urban space, the 
discontinuous elements which would resemble the phonemes 
and semantemes found in linguitics; these discontinuous 
elements - which he called paths, edges, districts, nodes, 
and landmarks could quite easily become semantic 
categories- On the other hand, his conception of the city 
remains more Gestaltist than structural; and the operation 
of abstraction which he performs on the urban structure, 
described as the spatial distribution of the social 
network of activities, renders his apparently 
sophisticated analytical apparatus meaningless from the 
point of view of the process of development itself. By 
integrating elementary studies of urban sociology with the 
tradition of Gestalt psychology, he produced a model of 
structural organisation which aspires to introduce total 
form to the city, to make it a place where the individual 
and the group can be refamiliarised with the metropolis, 
dense with significant places, designed and used with 
social purposes ir. mind. It is the same old utopia, except 
that in this case, the spectre of anonymity is no longer 
dispelled with the nostalgic recourse to the "community ", 
but with the equally nostalgic appeal to images which 
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derive from the common deter- minator- of a hypothetical 
"collective will" for images and for -ms. What Lynch's work 
offer-s is, in substance, the same ideas of a r-essucitated 
Camillo Sitte on a much larger scale (37) which, in the 
last analysis, might be the ver-y reason for Lynch's 
short -lived and mostly mundane success. 
The list of models, devised during the last two decades, 
which rely on a combination of humanist and empiricist 
perspectives is endless. However, from the few examples 
that I have chosen, here, to illustrate the way in which 
the affirmation of man as the subject and object of all 
possible knowledge has taken place in design discourses, 
one can see the problems that the empiricist outlook 
raises. That they failed to arouse any lasting enthusiasm 
was a predictable result. The failure to account for the 
necessity of a direct linkage between hypotheses of new 
models of production and institutional reforms and to take 
notice of the new division of labour, which has left 
architecture in the most superstructural margins of 
production, results from the reluctance of architects to 
re-assess the values and purposes of design; reluctance 
which meant that all those models are obliged to take 
refuge in pseudo -neutral anthropological or psychological 
arguments in order to protect outdated humanistic beliefs 
and an already shattered conceptual unity. 
Ire the absence of any clear- understanding of the process 
of production of discourses, these models have no other - 
recourse but to analogy and metaphors. It is not that 
analogical thinking constitutes a risk per se- Where the 
danger lies is in the fact that analogies have a sneaky 
way of taking over our perception to the point where we 
begin to forget the differences between the two halves of 
the analogy, and start to take one for the other. It is 
this over-extension of the useful function of analogy 
which shows most clearly the absence of a coherent and 
lucid apprehension of architectural discourses as 
ideological mechanisms- Expressions such as "machine- like" 
or "organic structure ", once carried beyond the level of 
pure metaphor to which they belong, cannot but generate 
doubt as to the seriousness of the theoretical enterprises 
in which they are used. 
In the more recent years, structuralism and semiology 
appeared on the agenda of architectural schools. One can 
immediately see the positive contributions that they have 
made, not the least being the provision of an elusive 
scientific basis. Properly speaking, there is no definable 
structuralist philosophy which could, for instance, be 
opposed to the phenomenological school. It is, after all, 
only the name of a scientific method which had, 
nonetheless, are incontestable effect upon philosophical 
discourse- Structuralism can be called the common 
denominator- of a number of contemporary systems of 
explanations of the patterns of human behaviour, in terms 
of cultural structures consciously or unconsciously 
adhered to, and which manifest themselves in diverse 
spheres of behaviour-. What structuralism is ultimately 
concerned with is the establishment of the facts that are 
"true" to the human mind, rather than those about the 
organisation of any particular society, or groups of 
societies- The individual or existential subject does not, 
in fact, have a role in structuralism, but the epistemic 
subject does. The epistemic subject is that cognitive 
nucleus which is common to all subjects at a certain level 
of abstraction- The main appeal of structuralist methods 
is due to the longing for an approach to human affairs 
which could be grounded in social and cultural realities, 
after- centuries of idealism, as well as for an approach 
which would be synthetic, after generations of positivist 
epistemology which reduced history to a tally of names and 
dates, and the production of the environment to a 
mechanistic process. 
However, the greatest impact that structuralist methods 
have had in philosophical discourse is that it had brought 
about a completely new attitude towards "man ". It is 
Francois Furet who, first, noted this change of attitude 
which resulted from the precedence given to the epitemic 
subject over the existential subject. In one of his 
articles, he said that the fascination felt by the French 
intelligetsia for the structuralist method devised by 
Levy -Strauss was due to the fact that : 
- _simply and progressively, the structuralist method of 
description of a roan -object has taken the place of a 
description in terms of a man -god" (38). 
Structuralism, therefore, helped to cause the first breach 
in the hitherto complete supremacy of man in the sphere of 
knowledge- With the advent of structuralist methods, the 
reference point is no longer man, but the structure within 
which man, as only an element, is dependent on the whole - 
Man relinquishes his position as creator and giver of 
significance to the totality of things. Structuralism 
affirms that it is not man who has created the humanities; 
it is the unconscious collective awareness of our time 
which has constituted man as a subject. The discovery of 
the "it is" replaces the "I "; the world began without man 
and will certainly end without him, too- 
The notion of structure as a displacement of the subject 
in historical analysis has come, in the most recent times, 
under strong criticism for what is seen as its 
deterministic and functionalist connotations- Anderson, 
for instance, demonstrates that the attack on the subject, 
by putting the linguistic notion of structure at the 
centre of historical analysis, ultimately destroyed any 
coherent definition of structure by rendering it 
completely arbitrary: 
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"What Derr -ida had seer,, acutely, was that the supposition 
of any stable structure had always been dependent on the 
silent postulation of a centre that was not entirely 
"subject" to it; in other words, of a subject distinct 
from it- His decisive move was to liquidate the last 
vestige of such autonomy_ The result, however, was not to 
achieve a higher- order, now entirely purified structure, 
but the very opposite: the effect was a radically 
destructuring one For, once structures were freed from 
any subject at all, delivered totally over to their own 
play, they would lose what defines them as structure - 
that is, any objective coordinates of organisation at all" 
(7;9)- 
These remarks led Anderson to conclude that the "other 
side" of structuralism was a randomization of history. As 
a result, one has seen, during the last five years, a 
renewed emphasis on the role that human action plays in 
creating history and in generating the structures within 
which the actions of others are taken. Structures are, 
now, said to be a result contingent upon and modified by 
human agency; and the question that has taken priority is 
how can the notion of structure be reconciled with the 
empirical variety found in concrete societies and which is 
apparently the result of human agency (40). 
Ir, response to this question, one author, Giddens, 
advances the notion of "system" as a way of re- introducing 
agency, openness, and diversity in history, in opposition 
to the deterministic str-ctur-alism which assigns to the 
object a position prior- to that of the subject. However, 
Giddens remains sympathetic to the notion that social 
action is structured, since there are vast realms of 
individual actions which cannot be explained by their- 
authors discursively, and so much of history seems to be 
intended by no ore. His problem, then, is how social 
theory can be ordered but not determined, and individual 
action be free but not random. His solution was to propose 
a kind of "unintentionally intentional" action based on 
practical, or nor- discursive knowledge (41). The knowledge 
of this type of action is 
--not -no usual i y known to those actors in expF- t-c-í-tely 
codified forms; the practical character of such knowledge 
conforms to the W-i-ttgenste-in-i-an formulation of knowing 
mute_ -." (42). 
Giddens introduces the notion of systems as ensembles of 
social practices that are both medium to and outcomes of 
social structures because they are composed of embbeded 
social practices. Normally, systems routinize action, but 
they do not prevent the exercise of agency or the 
unintended effects of purposive actions from generating 
system and structure changes. He asserts that structures 
are not objective independent social forces , but simply 
the transformation rules among sets of concrete social 
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practices- As such, str-ctures have only a "virtual" 
existence because they exist as moments recursively 
involved in the production and reproduction of these 
systems of social pr- actices; in other words, they ar-e 
merely instantiated in action. 
Most actions are tracked into systems of routinized social 
practices. Individuals embody are implicit and practical 
know -how (savoir-faire, in french), which enables them to 
carry out these routines: they ar-e "knowing actors ". 
systems change because the purposive actions of 
individuals often have unintended effects, notwithstanding 
the fact that actors are knowledgeable; in turn, changes 
in situated social practices determine the survival of 
structures- The reproduction of systems is accomplished by 
the same knowing actors; their choices to act, or not to 
act, mean that structures are reproduced only in the 
instant, in action. Structures exercise no fuctional 
control over individuals; they cannot provide a basis for 
a historical teleology, not even of a probabilistic 
character-. 
Here, Giddens explicitely compares structure, system, and 
action with Saussur-ian linguistics in which language (ta 
tangue,in french), or generative grammar- and syntax, is 
opposed to speech (ta pcirote), or the use of grammar and 
syntax in individual action. Iridividuals, for Gilden=_-, 
create social practices in using grammar and syntax, and, 
in fact, determine the evolution of grammar and syntax 
itself. 
As one can see, the r- einstalment of human agency is felt, 
by contemporary social theory, as necessary in order to 
counter the fuctionalist and deterministic explanations 
based on the reification of structure which depreciates 
the role of active agency by poeple. The over-extension of 
the usefulness of structural methods of analysis to all 
aspects of social action was bound to end up ire 
reductionist explanations which people, like Giddens, 
strongly oppose. This is why a clear definition and 
delimitation of the usefulness of the notion of structure 
is of prime importance. 
In fact, the only acceptable definition of structure is, 
in my opinion, that used by mathematicians (43). An 
analysis of the structural type is so only when it 
presents a given content as a model; in other words, 
structural analysis begins with the structure, i -e- with 
the relations that, defined in a purely formal way by 
certain properties, characterize a set of elements, the 
nature of which is not specified; it does not begin with a 
specific content- From the basis of the structure thus 
established, the analysis can, then, proceed to 
demonstrate whether a certain content (social, political, 
cultural,...) is or is not a model of that structure, or a 
representation of it: 
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"Meaning is no longer the given, whose obscure language 
must be deciphered, but on the contrary, what we give to 
the structure in order to constitute a model" (44)- 
This is the aspect that the over -enthusiastic uses of 
structural analysis, including those in architectural 
theory as we shall soon see, have not taken note of. 
Structure is not an overriding principle of organisation 
to which all kind of practices must submit; it is only a 
set of formal relationships which have no material 
existence. There is a world of difference between a formal 
construct (i.e. a model) and the concreteness of social 
practices; and the complete submission of these practices 
to the model cannot but lead to reductionism, as Gidden_- 
rightly suggests. 
When structuralism is spoken of, one does not, as a rule, 
think of the method of structural analysis as such, but 
rather of its application to sign systems- Ire theory, 
nothing predisposes structuralism to any privileged 
position in the science of signs; nor does anything oblige 
this science to be exclusively structuralist- There is, 
nonetheless, an affinity between the method and the field 
of research. Communication is the notion by means of which 
the two - sign systems and analysis in terms of structure 
are brought together- Here are the three canons of the 
structural analysis of communication systems, or, as it is 
better known, semiology= 
a)- The signifier- precedes the signified: language is not 
a medium, and the message is not the expression of are 
experience. Rather, it expresses the possibilities and 
limitations of the code employed, when compared to 
experience; hence the difficulty of articulating the 
unforeseen. 
b)- Meaning arises out of non -meaning: the only way for 
the speaker to generate meaning is to produce a message 
bereft of meaning, a message that the code has not 
foreseen (a message which might be called poetic)) - 
Non -meaning is, therefore, the repository on which one can 
draw in order to produce meaning (the "floating 
signifiers" used by Levy -Strauss, or Lacan's "signifying 
metaphors "); as such, meaning is the effect of 
non-meaning. 
c)- The subject submits to the law of the signifier: the 
code and not the emitter decides what will and what will 
not be permitted. Speech is not a gesture which renders 
the meaning of the experience still dumb into verbal 
expression, for, dumb experience has no meaning by itself. 
Meaning appears with the signifier, or with the first 
opposition between yes and no, between something and 
nothing. The meaning of the message is not the meaning of 
the experience; nor is it the meaning that experience 
would have, prior to all expression. 
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Lacan has, in many occasions, insisted on the 
heterogeneity of language and experience. Man's obligation 
to express his needs, in the form of a request made to 
another, subjugates him to the signifier-. This submission 
induces an effect of aberration in him: desire. Man 
desires insofar as he is a "subject ", which no longer - 
means the absolute origin of meaning, but literally 
"subjected" to the signifier (45). 
The affinity between structural analysis and the science 
of signs, joined in the analysis of communication systems, 
is what provided the basis for the application of 
semiology in architecture - For, if architecture and the 
metropolis came to be seen as systems of communication, it 
would, then, be possible to analyse their products in 
terms of elements of these systems which have to be 
deconstructed- Architecture as a linguistic system of 
communication is the theme analysed in the following par-t- 
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_,. 1 ANGUAGE AND DESIGN 
if I had to create a-r,ew Robinson, it would not be on a 
desert island, but in city of twelve million people 
where he would be unable to understand the language, This, 
I believe, would constitute the modern form of myth" 
R. Barthes 
The emergence within design culture of the language 
problem is a precise answer to the crisis of contemporary 
architecture and to the demand for a rigorous theorisation 
of design problems. The proliferation of studies on 
semantics and semiology applied to the built environment 
cannot, therefore, be simply due to the snobbish tendency 
to keep u p with the linguistic vogue, as it has been 
sometimes suggested (46). The attempt to bring all the 
sciences of man under the unifying sign of linguistics is 
the result of the perception of the dissemination of life 
and meaning into a multiplicity of techniques which makes 
it very difficult for man to realise his desire to englobe 
the totality of the world into one single "Logos ". 
Moreover, the realisation that we are moving among signs, 
conventions, and myths which offer us, through innocent 
images, artificial processes as being natural, is where 
semiology's search for the underlying meanings comes from. 
It is hoped that the study of architecture as a sign: 
system would bridge the gap between the trivialities of 
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behaviouristic sociology (which were examined in the 
previous part) and formalism which seems to be its only 
alternative. However, depending on the use made of its 
instruments, linguistic analysis could become a formidable 
instrument for de- mythification, or just another- transient 
fashion. As are instrument for de- mythification, it could 
serve to reveal what has become of the role of 
architecture: a reduction to dangerous persuasion 
techniques, or, in the best cases, to the broadcasting to 
superfluous and rhetorical messages. 
For this reason, those who keep warning us against the new 
studies on language, saying that they hide the complexity 
of the architectural practice, its ambiguous relationship 
with society, and its struggle for institutional, 
legislative, and educational reforms, are right so far- as 
the explicitely evasive research goes; but they are not 
right about the research which recognises all those 
problems 
itself. 
as being constitutive elements of the language 
The attempts at assimilating design processes to language 
have a two -fold purpose: to the socio- professional crisis 
of identity, they come as a reaction against the 
progressive erosion of the field of competence of 
architecture. It is worth remembering that the same 
interest in linguistic processes was shown after the 
creation of the "Ecole Polytechnique ", in the eighteenth 
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century, which severely reduced the monopoly that 
architecture exercised over all aspects of building. The 
same concern re- emerged in the last twenty years when the 
crisis in the doctrinal content, the teaching, and the 
practice of design has developed in successive waves- Ire 
this unstable course of development, the linguistic 
analogy in architecture seems to serve two contradictory 
goals: the assertion that architecture can be assimilated 
to language helps to shore up the image of the 
artist /designer; it, thereby, prolongs the effects that 
had formerly been sought by literate designers who knew 
how to clothe their art with the dignity accorded to the 
humanities. Under this guise, the survival of the type is 
assured as much as it can be, in the name of its poetic 
capacity. On the other hand, by persistently claiming for 
architecture a linguistic competence, architects are able 
to present it in the form of "pure" science; this 
pseudo- specialisation maintains the hope for preserving a 
place for themselves in the technological structure of 
society as experts in social communication. 
Having said that, the power of professional interest is 
not, in itself, a sufficient explanation for the 
extraordinary success of the semiological studies in 
architecture. For, the fact that it is to language that 
architectural thinking turned, when it was troubled, 
remains to be explain. While the external pressures might 
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have given impetus to this epistemological phenomenon, 
they cannot have prescribed the forms that it took or the 
routes it followed. One has to assume that there must be a 
linguistic substance, internal to architecture, which 
resulted in all those studies. No doubt that this type of 
experimental research has helped to restore substance to 
the debate over the nature of the relationship between the 
two Saussurian parts of the sign (the signifier and the 
signified); a relationship which was rendered rather 
obscure and ambiguous by the experiments of the historical 
avant- gar-des (47). The search for signifiers, as well as 
the investigations into the ability of a given form to 
transmit clear messages, soon became generalised in a 
systematic application of semantics to architecture from 
scholars like Umberto Eco, Renato de Fusco, and Charles 
Jencks- It was Eco who, first, declared his conviction 
that symbolic systems belong to the order of language and, 
therefore, that the possibility of history must also 
reside in language; he saw architectural language as 
"an authentic linguistic system, obeying the same rule= 
which govern the articulation of natural languages" (48). 
Following Eco, Alberto Silipo tried to apply the 
conventional definition of grammatical structure, as it 
exists in natural languages, to design. According to him, 
grammatical analysis stands as a universally valid 
critical instrument at the disposal of architects and 
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critics. In his "Grammatica", he says that: 
"Considering the architectural activitu to be a set of 
operations designed to establish cognitive relationships 
by means of spatial realities, and considering that the 
architectonic organism aç a structure, an instrument f 
communication and knowledge, grammatical analysis becomes 
the principal instrument at the disposal of whoever seeks, 
not only to grasp the entire range of signification of a 
particular spatial structure, but also to h- i-storicise it 
by going back to the methodological matrices that have 
the this structure, a :rra by grasping 
relationships that exist among the figurative, the 
technological, and the functional elements which make up 
the structuveand the more general historical, social and 
artistic context to which it refers" (49) . 
Warnings against the unr-eflected use of linguistic methods 
of analysis started soon to appear -; caution against a 
complete reliance on those methods was recommended. Take 
Paolo Porthogesi, for example, who remarked that: 
"The analogies between design and language have often been 
advanced as have those between architectural civilisation 
and language; and attempts have often been made even to 
transfer linguistic terminology to criticism in 
architecture. The most authoritative conclusions of these 
experiments have been, however, ambiguous and limited" 
{ o0). 
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One could also mention Bruno Zevi's scepticism towards the 
over-- enthusiastic espousal of linguistic themes; a 
scepticism which stems from the relative poverty of 
conclusive results, in comparison to the amount of efforts 
invested. He attributes this poverty to the fact that, in 
his opinion, scholars have been more concerned with 
finding in architecture the same ingredients and laws as 
those of verbal languages, than with architecture itself: 
"Despite the popularity enjoyed by these studies, they 
haue, nevertheless, not been marked by any resounding 
effect, since they have not ploughed the specific f -ietd of 
architectural language" (51). 
Semiology, the general science of signs, as foretold by 
Ferdinand de Saussure, pr-opuonds a notion of meaning which 
assimilates language, gestures, art, and which offers to 
unravel every human phenomenon by bringing it into the 
sphere of an all inclusive theory of significance (52). 
The intellectual foundation of this claim depends on two 
straightfor'war'd conditions: 
a)- that all human behaviour can be seen as expressive, as 
revealing thoughts, feelings, intentions, etc. -- Often, as 
in dreams, behaviour may reveal feelings which are not 
immediately accessible to the subject; this is a point 
likely to please the advocates of architectural semiology, 
since it nurtures the belief that the meanings revealed by 
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semiological analysis may be something which has yet to be 
recognised by those who actually use and observe the 
signs. 
b)- that the modes of human expression may be thought of 
as having a certain structure, a structure which is also 
exhibited in natural languages. 
The leap from language to architecture is made with the 
help of the doctrine of analogy which, as a discursive 
mechanism, can be traced back to the Renaissance world 
where it played a vital role in structuring the entire 
knowledge of that period of European history. This 
doctrine, linking artistic production to knowledge, first 
appeared in France, in the writings of men of letters who 
sought to subsume all the arts within a universal theory 
of expression (53). Each time it appeared, however, 
analogy was used for no other purpose than that of 
validating competing morphological structures by grafting 
them onto the prestige of literary production; it was 
simply concerned with making explicit the process of 
combination, the constituent of every project, by relating 
it to a fundamental and commonly held knowledge. This mode 
of didactic commentary corresponds to a desire to 
legitimize the poetic of formal compositions by relating 
it to a more established mode of expression (i.e. 
literature). This kind of comparison was unable to sustain 
any marked theoretical development because of its 
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unscientific and exclusively analogical character; in 
other words, the recourse to linguistic analogies, as it 
appeared first, served only at the level of example, and 
riot in terms of a consistent model. There was no 
theoretical framework which could have provided the 
individual linguistic translation with a firm basis, the 
reason being that linguistics, as are articulated 
discipline, has not seen birth yet. The development of 
linguistics itself was an indispensable condition if 
language were ever to be used as a model for other modes 
of expression. On the other hand, the primitive and 
somehow crude attempts by the Renaissance writers to make 
a language out of architecture and their subsequent 
failures must not lead one to believe that the more 
sophisticated forms of linguistic theory, which appeared 
afterwards, are in any way more capable of legitimising 
the use of analogical thinking. Since we are still lacking 
any viable model, one can only go as far as saying that 
each attempt made to assimilate the processes of 
architectural production and consumption to those of 
natural languages must be judged solely according to the 
extent to which it manages to show its usefulness in the 
actual practice of those who claim its efficacy. 
The realisation that the city has become deprived of 
meaning, that its buildings have lost their symbolic 
value, and that perception has become an absent- minded one 
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(54) led to two choices: either- to accept the loss of the 
semantic dimension and assume this loss as the programme 
for a technological utopia, or to address semiotics as 
something capable of making pure signs speak and signify. 
These two tendencies were expressed in two distinct bodies 
of semiological research: 
a)- A semiotics as mathematics of the sign, borrowed from 
the studies of Pierce and Morris (55)- This tendency is 
typified in the work of Max Bense and the Stuttgart 
" Technischen Hochschule" who do not give any a- prior -i 
method of analysis, but who indicate, instead, the 
reciprocal information between architecture semiotics, 
and design in general (56). Bense's semiotics, which works 
at a highly advanced level of theory, aims at integrating 
itself in the development and at forecasting the future 
stages of the production of industrial objects. As such, 
it opens the way to a global technology capable of 
quantifying , in terms of infor-matior, theory and aesthetic 
theory, everything that relates to meaning. By using this 
approach, Bense was able to show that an efficient 
semiotic system could be used instrumentally in 
explication of its own potential, thereby reducing the 
issue of the signified contained in the sign to the level 
of quantum of information- What Bense's semiotics 
indicates most clearly is that a purely structural 
analysis cannot "explain" the sense of a work; it can do 
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no more than "describe ", since the only logic at its 
disposal is that based on yes-no, correct -incorrect, 
precisely analogous to the mathematical logic of computer 
language (57). This semiotics, as a formalising science, 
stems, then, from the realisation of the "death of the 
semantic" which, characterising the most advanced 
aesthetic, has marked the technological aspect of modern 
art, of which architecture was a significant component 
(58). And as a quantitative evaluation which ignores the 
signified, Etense's project requires that semiotics be only 
under- stood as pr- ogrammation and cycles. With the help of 
mathematics, this science of signs would, according to 
him, be able to extend its field of application to all the 
anthropological thematics: a project for the 
mathematisation of the world which represents the logical 
outcome of the utopia of the complete integration of 
social structures into a seamless web of communication. 
channels. Since Eser.se believes that architecture is not 
structured ir. such a way as to produce signs in the 
linguistic sense of the word, what his theory offers is 
not a recipe for design; as a meta -method, it intervenes 
only as a precision instrument in the elaboration of 
particular theories. 
b)- A semiotics which would like to serve theory, history, 
or the project but which has not been able to go beyond a 
description of architecture ir. terms of the Saussur-iar. 
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opposition (signifier- /signified), or those of Martinet 
(the double articulation of the sign.) (59 ). By ignoring 
Bense's warning as to the different nature of signs in 
architecture, this tendency, which relies on a direct 
analogy between architecture and language, requires more 
attention because of the immediate use it makes of the 
linguistic sign in architectural discourses. So, how does 
one found a science which would assimilate two languages? 
Firstly, there must be the assumption that an exact 
similarity of structure and function exists between 
environmental signs and linguistic signs. The main 
difficulty in substantiating this belief would be that of 
agreeing on the nature of the environmental signs and in 
composing an appropriate connection of them; a connection 
which would not simply coincide with a group of trivial 
descriptive terms- This somehow ambiguous proposition 
constitutes an untenable position: architecture is sign, 
as everything is; but this truth could not, in itself, 
justify the application of a method founded upon the 
linguistic sign. - in its two components of a signifier and 
a signified - which has the character of abstraction. 
Before trying to apply the linguistic method to 
architecture, it is only wise that one should understand 
what this method really is, and whether it could lend 
itself to such applications- This is the message that 
Emilio Garroni, one of the most respected italian 
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semiologists, was putting forward in his "Projetto di 
semiotica" which contains a detailed analysis of 
Hjemslev's semiotics (60). By insisting on the formal 
character of language, Garroni questioned the relevance of 
applying scientific methods of research as those used in 
linguistics to other modes of expression such as 
architecture, cinema, and so forth. His main argument is 
that, in the latter type of communication systems, one of 
the factors essential to language, namely the double 
articulation of the sign, is missing. The same observation 
was made by G. Mor-pugo Tags iabue when he wrote, as early 
as 1968, that: 
"What the pretended architectural language lacks in order 
for it to be a language is precisely the primary factor- of 
semiology: the heterogeneity 
signified" (6 1) - 
between signifier and 
And more than twenty years ago, G.B. Granger- also rejected 
the possibility of identification of language and art, on 
the ground that the latter is in no way "-aimed at 
constructing discrete linear sequences carrying 
information" (42). This objection is even more valid, in 
my opinion, in the case of the physical environment: it is 
very difficult to see how to construct a repertory of 
formal elements which would carry a semic value and which 
would function in the same way as the classic units of 
linguistics. Besides, the syntax of natural languages is 
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powerless to model the syntactic relationships between the 
environmental signs which are, in any case, perceived in a 
very different manner- from those of speech. I am 
referring, here, to the classic distinction, made by 
Lessing, between narrative and presentative modes of 
expression. Ire his "Lacoon" of 1776, Lessing 
differentiated between a poetic or narrative mode which, 
he says, is progressive in its manifestation - that is, 
its elements appear in sequence - and a visual or- 
presentative mode, the elements of which are 
simultaneously juxtaposed in space (43). 
In theory, it should be possible to construct codes of 
forms which classifiable in 
paradigmatic series, and which would take into account the 
necessity of discontinuity in the process of establishing 
meaning. If these formal characteristics are, then, linked 
to other characteristics such as function, economy, or 
ritual, they obviously would generate meaning in such a 
way as to allow the cultivated beholder, moving in are 
environment belonging to his 
come 
own cultural heritage, to 
close to grasping the original intentions that were 
at the origin of this particular- environment. But this 
remains only a theoretically ideal construct (like a 
laboratory situation in which all the variables are 
strictly controlled); this ideal construct is subject to 
so many pre-conditions (i.e. that the code be known to and 
shared by ever -ybody; that the beholder- acts only as 
receiver with no power- of his own to induce meaning; that 
everybody acts, re-acts, and behaves in a similar 
manner-,...) that it does not leave the realm of pure 
speculation. 
Garroni's insistence upon the formal value of language 
allows him, instead, to speak of the form of the content 
and the form of the expression without having to take into 
account the material object - i.e. the referent. The 
removal of the problem of the referent leads him to the 
conclusion that the possibility of a formativiy almost 
complete (which he calls "omni.- formativity ") is 
characteristic of, and relevant only in the case of 
linguistic systems, whereas the "nor,- omni- for-mativity" is 
characteristic of the non- linguistic systems (cinema, 
architecture,...). In other words, the correspondence 
between the form of the content and the form of the 
expression is unique in linguistic systems, whereas in 
non -linguistic systems, to one form of expression might 
correspond many forms of content, and vice -versa. This 
remark, in itself, would be enough to discredit any method 
which claims to be relevant to both systems. The notion of 
architectural sign is, itself, very ambiguous, because of 
the concrete character which transforms it into a material 
thing and renders it decomposable materially (and not only 
formally, as in the case of linguistic sign_): 
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"The models that we can build ", writes Garroni, "in 
architecture and which work in ar, effective way are i:ot 
composed of material eleme-rrts__ - but of homogeneous and 
formal elements, capable of interacting with elements of 
other different models" (64). 
In the place of the material motion of the architectural 
sign, Gar-roni suggests the introduction of the formal 
motion of "invariants "; one would, then, be able to 
construct static typologies (columns,...) and dynamic ones 
(structures,...) in order to arrive at precise 
classifications which, while being able to indicate the 
level of innovation of an architectural experience, would 
not pretend to be exhaustive. What this means is that 
there can be no semiological system capable of telling 
everything about design; one would find , at one's 
disposal, integrable models which allow for the 
heterogeneity of artistic experience,and whose homogeneity 
would be constitutive of the system itself, and not of the 
experience of the various subjects- As to the 
non-correspondence of the syntactic relationships ire 
language and architecture, Gar-r-oni suggested the 
establishment, within similar works of art, of a series of 
typological points of reference (i.e. invariants) for the 
purpose of clarifying the internal relationships between 
comparable elements without characterising the works of 
art as being fixed or codified invar-iants. 
Therefore, while one cannot deny the fact that perceived 
forms do communicate information of some kind, it is clear 
that the wide variety of systems of expectations in a 
given group, car- even at the level of the individual, 
renders the definition of a comprehensive code, 
universally applicable, impossible. 
Very little is advanced by the claims about the similarity 
between linguistic and architectural processes. As a 
matter of fact, the analysis of these two systems points 
to a fundamental difference, rather than to a similarity - 
Although certain semiotic considerations might have some 
degree of relevance to design, the varied character of the 
environmental "messages" renders their decipherment very 
problematic- More importantly, in studies such as that of 
Gar-r-oni, there is an outright rejection of the possibility 
of semiotics as a universal key, capable of bridging the 
gap between the different modes of expression (a kind of 
pansemiosis). Why the many semiological models have chosen 
to disregard these facts is not very clear- What is clear, 
however, is that, in order for these applications to be 
formulated, it was necessary that the variety of the 
systems of expectations, mentioned earlier, is ignored. It 
was necessary to assume the unicity of interpretative 
models and behavioural patterns, the very assumption that 
Giddens and others rightly criticised for its reductionist 
connotations. 
1.8/1. 
One of such applications is that of Norbert -Schultz who 
by combining Morris' semiotics and Gestaltist models, 
tried to give a structure to perception and architectural 
phenomena, thus providing a link between one's own 
experience of the world and its r- eality outside one's 
consciousness (6.5). Hy adding some considerations 
regarding the symbolic dimension of architecture, 
Norbert -Schultz asserts that the good designer (!) would 
have to take all those aspects into consiaer-ationu if the 
task of building is to be formulated correctly. As it 
stands, the work of the Norwegian architect corresponds to 
the highest ideals of social democracy: the total control 
over the environment. This is why he concluded that the 
present crisis in architecture and urban design is only 
the consequence of a default in "logic ", and not, as one 
would have thought, the result of a historical knot of 
contradictions and struggles. 
Umberto Eco, another imminent critical writer, starts by 
warning us against the notion of architectural code, 
saying that architecture can only speak of itself through 
the medium of codes which do not belong to it: 
"The fact that one could interpret architecture on the 
basis of a geometrical code does not Mean that 
architecture, as such, is founded upon a geometrical code" 
(66) . 
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But Eco allowed himself to be lured into the analogy with 
the natural languages when he accepted the existence of 
the architectural sign as: 
the presence of a signifier, the signified of which is 
the function that makes it possible" (F.7). 
In order - to account for- the symbolic value of 
architectural forms, Eco introduces the notion of 
"secondary functions" which are destined to change, become 
old, and reappear in the cour -se of history or according to 
fashion; thus the necessity of a historical 
interpretation, but one which is limited, in the case of 
Eco, to a history of uses, differing mentalities, and 
conceptions of space. 
One could also mention the series of studies by "Group 
107" which offer a model completely in line with that 
brand of semiol.ogical analysis based entirely on 
analogical thinking (68). The use that this group makes of 
Hjemslev's model completely ignores the formal character 
attributed to language and which , as Garroni insisted, 
constitutes its most important feature. "Group 107" 
formulates a series of classifications and syntactic 
liaisons in accordance with a principle that says: 
"The plan in architecture is a descriptive metalanguage of 
architecture" (69). 
One would have thought that the pian is a method of 
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transcription (in which case, the analogy is with 
writing). As a result, this catalogue of studies strike 
one as being of use to neither the plan, nor to criticism, 
and even less to the history of architecture. 
There is also the work of Philippe Boudon which, for one 
thing, is the perfect illustration of what should never be 
done with semiological concepts (70). His book "Figuration 
graphique en architecture" is a surrealistic mixture of 
all the linguistic vocabulary from Saussure, Martinet, 
Jackobson, Morris, Hjemslev, etc: sign, system, code, 
referent, metaphor, metonymy, they are all there (71). 
Through a series of analogies, Boudon allows the text to 
be blurred by all kinds of delirium, the last of which 
makes him spot , with a large amount of sketches and 
drawings, something quite extraordinary: the recurrence of 
curves and right angles (LC) in the works of Le Corbusier, 
the presence of N- shaped ribs in those of Nervi, and the 
two "As" in Alvar AAlto's projects- Foreseeing the 
sceptical reactions of the readers, and the objection that 
no rationally minded person would take this seriously, 
Boudon says: 
"One shall have to find aï, explanation for the ability of 
the mind to produce resemblance, to make things resemble 
each other by can intentionality which is similar to the 
imaging consciousness as defined by Sartre" (72) . 
The indifference shown by these models towards a precise 
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understanding of linguistic concepts led to a tragic 
confusion between signification and communication- While 
signification indicates the nature of the sign, and, as 
such, leads only to consideration of a semantic nature, 
communication measures and codifies the use and effects of 
signs. By dealing with both concepts at the same time, the 
semiological models in architecture fail to understand the 
basic problem of the real effects of signs on the public= 
These effects vary considerably from one group to another, 
depending on the system of expectations of each group; a 
system which is conditioned by specific beliefs, a 
specific place in the structure of power which involves 
certains interests that are not shared by the whole 
community, and also by the intentional element involved in 
all human action (73). As Renato de fusco noted, by 
ignoring these specifications, the semiological model 
could only provide an analysis which stresses the 
universal without a mention about the differences (74). 
If it is the case that, for the construction of scientific 
theories, logico- mathematical abstractions are necessasy, 
in the case of design criticism and theory, conceptual 
abstractions serve only to confuse the structures of 
language with those of behaviour which are in no way 
similar-- The most important lesson drawn from these 
experiments is that for a semiology which wants to do away 
with irrelevant questions, it is essential to realise that 
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the universe of words is different from that of things. It 
is the world of signs which symbolises and formalises, not 
that of the physical objects (75). 
One final model of semiological analysis which remains to 
be mentioned is that which adresses semiotics as an 
instrument for ideological criticism. The idea of 
Gandolsonas and Agrest was to establish a theory of design 
free from all ideological coloration, which, they believe, 
only semiotics can do (74). One must get rid, they say, of 
all the traditional conceptions of the signifier, and 
develop a theory which: 
"-must be carried out through a theoretical work which 
cannot be realised from within ideology, but from an 
outside free from it and in struggle with it" (77). 
The notion of ideological criticism using semiotics would 
be extremely attractive but for the unfortunate opposition 
that both writers posit between ideology and theory: 
"A theory which is at odds with ideology is necessarily 
non ideological, and, thereby, non- -integrated" (78). 
The assertion that theory can be opposed to ideology, that 
objective truth stands against false consciousness, is 
itself an ideological one. The very idea of a knowledge 
free from ideology, of are advanced theory of design 
erected to resist ideological attacks, is the result of a 
whole series of misunderstandings. It is important to 
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realise certain basic facts: 





it can easily be translated, 
in very advanced theories (like Bense's theory of 
the total integration of the world), or in regressive 
attitudes (like the will to return to an "Arcadian" past). 
b)- Ideological criticism is cruel and can offer no hope 
for an alternative. In the same way as one cannot talk 
about a class- political economy but only of a class 
criticism of political economy, what can be conceived of 
is not an ideologically -free theory, but only an 
ideological criticism of theory. 
c)- The historical struggle is not a struggle between 
ideology and science, but a struggle between alternative 
strategies which ar -e all ideologically inspired. 
What is more, in order to formulate a semiotics for- 
design, Gandolsonas and Agrest had to refer to the most 
ambiguous Saussur-ian concept of all, that of the 
"arbitrary ". With Saussure, the term was used to indicate 
that language, as a purely formal system, does not refer 
to any specific reality; it is in this sense that he spoke 
of the arbitrary nature of language. But within the formal 
system that language is, everything is necessary, 
especially the relationship between the two components of 
the sign (i.e. the signifier and the signified). 
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Gandolsonas and Agr-est, by misunderstanding the concept of 
the "arbitrary ", assumed that it refers to the two parts 
of the sign and used it to denounce the relationship 
between form and function which, they say, is not natural, 
but arbitrary. While it is true that this relationship 
between form and function is a comletely arbitrary one, 
this is not because, in language, signifier and signified 
are linked in an arbitrary manner. This is due to the 
difference between the omni- for-mativity of natural 
languages that Gar-roni spoke of (where signifier and 
signified are linked by a necessar -y and unique 
relationship), and the non-omni-formativity of the 
non -linguistic systems, such as architecture, in which a 
specific for -m of content corresponds to many possible 
forms of expressions (79). 
So, how can we assess the contribution of the various 
semiological experiments in architecture? To what extent 
have they helped to reveal the ideological structure of 
design discourses? 
To temper the brutal elements of existence, to absorb the 
heterogeneous, to give meaning to the senseless, to 
rationalise the incongruous, in short, to translate the 
"Other" into the language of the "Same": these are the 
principal functions of myth and ideology that semiological 
criticism claimed to be able to reveal- Semiology set out 
to pave the way for a critical study of the dominant 
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discourse in the West; a study whi ch would disinter- the 
conflicts which lie beneath the soothing solutions and the 
rational postures by which everything is meaningful. 
Shared languages, forms, universalising principles, 
unanimous communities ar -e all falsehoods: this is the 
working hypothesis which semiol_ogical criticism gave 
itself. 
By revealing the heterogeneity of the signified and lived 
experience, semiology was trying to make a political 
point: it was trying to demonstrate that the hold of 
institutions over individuals can be traced back to the 
ascendency of language in life; therefore, semiology set 
out to follow the advice given by Mall_ar-me when he 
suggested that to disturb language in its plenitude and to 
disturb signifying forms would amount to subverting the 
community (80). This is why some people commited to social 
changes, like Gandoisonas and Agrest, embarked on a study 
of architecture and the city in terms of an analysis which 
uses linguistic criticism as a weapon against what they 
perceived as an essentially oppressive system. 
Semiological analysis was, for them, the key for 
understanding the functioning of ideology in the 
manipulation of the environment and the perpetuation of 
the domination of the institutional forms of thinking over 
the individual. 
But if semiology may be able to turn the laws behind the 
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production of images back on themselves, the shedding of 
light over their implications must be the task of another - 
method of dissection. This is why, in the words of Julia 
Kristeva, semiological research remains: 
" _ _ _a discipline which  finds nothing at the bottom of 
research (no key to no mystery) but its own ideological 
gesture, so that it may take cognizance of it negate its 
own effort, and start all over again. By positing a 
precise knowledge as its final goal, at the end of its 
journey, it arrives at a theory which, being itself a 
signifying system, sends the semiotic system back to its 
starting point: back, that is, to the model of semiology 
-itself so that it can be criticised and overtures once 
again" (81) . 
The reference of this diffused tendency to experiment with 
languages can be found in the heroic years of the modern 
movement. But contemporary ways of manipulating linguistic 
materials tell us that "the war has ended ": the languages 
used in the 1920's and 1930's were, in this sense, 
"languages of combat ", fighting weapons; as it always 
happens, with contemporary architecture, these "combat 
languages" are transformed into "languages of pleasure" 
(8), into playful manipulations of images which try to 
distance themselves further and further from the soiling 
reality of struggle. As such, semiology, despite its 
complex relationship with the structural method, is, 
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today, an ideology; more exactly, an ideology of 
communication (8.3). The single and collective universe of 
development must, for semiology, be bound together by a 
band of communications capable of repairing any eventual 
break, of settling every strife, and of rendering 
productive contradiction itself. 
From this follows the categorical refusal of analyses 
couched in terms of the symbolic field or the domain of 
signifying structures, and the recourse, instead, to 
analyses in terms of the genealogy of the relations of 
force, strategic developments, and local tactics. One's 
point of reference should not, in my opinion, be the great 
model of language and signs, but that of wars and battles. 
The history which bears us and determines us has more 
common features with the form of war than with that of 
language: relations of power and not relations of meaning 
(84 ). History has no "meaning ", though this is not to say 
that it is absurd or totally inconher-er+t; on the contrary, 
it is intelligible down to its smallest details, but thi =_-, 
in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, 
strategies and tactics. Semiotics, as the structure of 
communication, cannot account for the intelligibility of 
conflicts, and semiological research is but a way of 
avoiding the violent character of reality by reducing it 
and presenting it in the calm and platonic form of 
language and dialogue. 
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What can one conclude from the theoretical experiments 
based on the empiricist alternative (85), and what meaning 
can or.e attribute to the studies on perception, sensorial 
mechanisms, and, more generally, on the articulation 
common to things and the organism? 
Either in the form of the ideology of "needs ", or that of 
"communication ", by transforming history into nature, 
these studies act as myths- It is Bar-thes who first spoke 
of myths as being against history: 
"Myths carry on their rr,ystif-i-cat-i-or,s by hiding the 
artificial, z- e. history, behind a fake naturalism" (86). 
Myth has the task of giving historical intention a natural 
justification, of making what is contingent appear natural 
and eternal- While the world enters language as a 
dialectical relationship between social actions and 
conflicts, it comes out of myth as a harmonious display of 
essences- In the process, a conjuring trick has taken 
place: it has turned reality inside out; it has emptied it 
of historical determination and filled it with nature - 
Myth does not deny things; on the contrary, its function 
is to talk about them- The problem is with the way in 
which it does so: it purifies them; it makes them look 
innocent; it gives them a natural and eternal 
justification; it provides them with a clarity which is 
not that of an explanation, but that of a statement of 
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fact, removing, thereby, any doubt as to their reality. In 
passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it 
abolishes the complexity of human actions; it gives them 
the simplicity of essence; it does away with any going 
back beyond that which is immediately visible; it 
organises a world which is without contradictions because 
it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in 
the evident; it establishes a blissful clarity by which 
things appear to men as something by themselves. As such, 
myth performs on the object an operation which deprives it 
of all history; in it, history disappears; through it, all 
that is left for men to do is to enjoy this beautiful 
object without asking where it might have come from. 
Nothing is produced, nothing is chosen, all is naturally 
giver. All that one can do is to possess these objects 
from which all the soiling traces of origin or choice have 
been removed. This miraculous evaporation of history 
corresponds to one concept common to all bourgeois myth=: 
the "irresponsibility" of man. 
As myths, empiricist discourses in architecture 
therefore, 
serve, 
to deviate attention from the conflicts 
involved in the production of the environment, and speak 
of the latter- not as the outcome of a painful process of 
production, but as an entity that is already there, a 
finished thing. Architectural discourse reduces this 
complex phenomenon to a homogeneous field in which there 
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is na time (except in purely c:=scr-iptive or apologetic 
histories of architectural and urban formations), and no 
contradictions; 
trans-historical 
this obvious giveness is expressed in 
or a- historical terms, i- e. users, 
community, environment, meaning, cosmos, etc...And it is 
only the autonomy of critical language and its clear - 
independence from theory and design which can allow 
architecture to be re- historicised by unearthing the 
conflicts that it tries so hard to hide. Only critical 
language can reveal why even the analyses which try 
vigorously to plan a systematic and objective reading of 
the world ar -e so easily turned into fashions and myths. 
199 
4' HISTORY AND DESIGN 
"Of course we need history, hut our need for if- 
different from that of the refined idler in the garden rtf 
knowledge, even if he looks down his nose at our hard and 
awkward circumstances and necessities' We need it, that 
is, for life and action'--Only insofar as history serves 
!fe, are we willing to serve history" (87)- 
If the empiricist alternative has, as I tried to 
demonstrate, ended up by turning architectural discourses 
into myths, the second alternative, that which thinks of 
knowledge as historically determined, aimed at introducing 
the possibility of qualifying the relationships between 
history and design. This theme by no means new: 
throughout the nineteenth century, the di=,i,-Ìline of 
architecture constantly ran up against the problem 
"historical awareness". What is new is the impetus given 
to historical analysis by the guilt complex which post-war 
architects inherited and nurtured after the condemnation 
of the modern movement. 
As with the empirically-founded experiments, the modern 
movement was found guilty of destroying the quality of 
architecture and, thereby, the quality of life. But while 
the empiricist rhetoric was directed against the 
"inhumane" production of modern architects and against 
200 
their- "failure" to respond to the perceptual needs and 
communal aspirations of man, in the case of the 
historicist alternative, the rhetoric was against the 
"anti- historicism" of the avant -gar -des and their- renewed 
attempts to break all ties with the past. From there, 
critics tried to salvage the concept of historicity and 
re-insert it within design products. Therefore, the first 
thing to be done, here, is to examine what historicism 
means and whether the modern movement can be accused of 
anti -historicism. 
Historicism was, since the 1950's, been somewhat uneasiltf 
associated with a kind of historical determinism, on the 
one hand, and with a kind of relativistic eclecticism, on 
the other-. While Karl Popper saw it as a sort of 
teleological theory history which had, for him, 
totalitarian implications (8R), Nicolas Pevsner was 
warning us against a return to the kind of eclecticism as 
practiced in the nineteenth century (89). Popper was, of 
course, referring to those idealising schemes of 
historical development which, following the tradition of 
Hegelian philosophy, saw history as the implacable 
instrument of human destiny. This historicism represented, 
for Popper, an inherent poverty, an operation which can 
only result in the flattening of the pluralistic nature of 
human existence. These two negative interpretations of 
historicism both refer to the sense of the word as it 
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first emerged in the vocabulary and which had in itself 
strongly negative connotations. 
However, as understood ir, the 1920's and 197.01s, 
historicism constitued the very essence of modernity and 
not the opposite, as often suggested. Opposed to the 
natural laws of the Renaissance and to the rationalism of 
the Enlightenment, modernist historicism held that the 
characteristics of each historical event were unique and 
peculiar- to it, that they ought to be understood not by 
means of a preconceived system of thought, b_eut solely 
through the standards of their own peculiar- time. Rather - 
than searching for a universal causation of all tae 
natural and human phenomena, modernist historicism 
stressed the importance of the interpretation of 
historical events on their own, ter-ms; style, land age, 
forms, customs and laws are all, in each period and place, 
hound to each other- as symptoms of a character- unique to 
that period- We ar -e, therefore, a long way from the 
restricted sense that Pevsner and Popper- gave to the word. 
The assumption that each age possessed its own style made 
possible the assimilation of each style to the values and 
ethical standards which are said to be character-isti c of a 
particular age- Each style became, in a way, the emblem of 
its society, a true and faithful reflection of the 
morality, ethos and historical meaning of events of that 
period. By declaring its rejection i_on of all the classical 
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styles and academist traditions, the mo3_'--er-n movement 
wanted to forge a new language consistent =aiti what _ r 
identified as the demands of a new epoch. The recognition 
of a specifically modern "Zeitgeist" was, in this sense; 
an essentially historicist act. Fr-orn this came the methods 
of the first historians of modern architecture, as they 
searched for the origins of ideas and forms and as they 
tried to follow the development and culmination in a phase 
of history which was itself called a movement (90)- 
The anti- historicist label put on the modern movement was, 
therefore, not the result of a critical appraisal of its 
products and philosophy; it was, rather -, an a- posteriori 
justification for the eclectic experiments of the last 
twenty years which were, then, rationalised and inscribed 
within a theoretical perspective which 
"anti- historicism" of the avant -gardes. 
assumes the 
The re- affirnation of historical awareness in design took 
three distinct forms: 
a)- Firstly, we have a model which calls upon history to 
smooth the way for issues whose outcome is preordained. 
This is a model which conceives of history as a value to 
be offered to the present; a reassuring quality is 
attributed to history, seen as a smooth and linear 
continuity which governs all events from the affirmation 
of the Enlightenment philosophy to our present day- In 
2{ 7. 
revolt against the very sources of modern art, the 
advocates of this tendency: 
"---put the masters of the historical avant-gordes in the 
dock; the new tasks are those left unresolved by the 
roaring twenties; the anti-historicism of the modern 
movement is seen as being contingent and surmountable and 
what is put forward is the hypothesis of u historu as a 
guide for a new kind of experience" <91>~ 
The relationship between design and history is now thought 
to be best expressed at the level of the metropolis- The 
dialectic between historical centres and new developments 
is posited at the core of the problem of the recovery of 
history' The rejection of the "Charter 
made possible the elaboration of a doctrine for the 
conservation and redevelopment of the historical centres, 
inspired by a kind of romantic anti-capitalist philosophy' 
Along this line, one could mention Leonardo Benevolo" 
interpretation of urban history as a vital necessity for 
European culture (93)' One could also mention the work of 
people like the Krier brothers, Maurice Culot and Bernard 
Huet (94) who, disenchanted with 'the consumed effects of 
modern utopias, dream of a bonded pre-industrial state in 
images of a city inhabited by its builders' Against the 
dissolution of the single architectural object in the 
indiscriminate landscape of the modern metropolis and its 
replacement by the more 
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generic concept of the 
"environment ", these analyses offer- the recovery of _ 
specific meaning of the town place. This is an 
architecture that does not want to be consumed, that wants 
to prevent the absent -minded perception characteristic of 
the modern metropolis (95) and that proposes to reveal the 
symbolic and historical meaning of urban spaces. 
bi- Secondly, one is presented with a model which rejects 
the possibility of history as a value to be offered to the 
present and which conceives of it only as an event. This 
model, which renounces to consider history as a source of 
prospects and values, does not reject it altogether but 
simply tries to find its right place in the thematic of 
the environment by widenina the issue to the evolution of 
urban forms. As Gr-egoiti put it 
"This task in which history and planning L r 1 could be 
defined as the search for the essence of architecture 
search that does not lead to the discovery of the objects 
in themselves, but to the realisation that them are 
changing ir, a certain direction.. In a way, one can 
consider such an essence bu conceiving of history itself 
as the project" (94) . 
Gr-egotti's work is the expression of a culture that has 
turned towards the past without a clear idea of how to use 
it. This agonising and inescapable condition is made 
explicit when he stated: 
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"We clash with the problem of history and we immediately 
say that one ought to be careful and wary of the illusion 
that it might provide us with the elements for deducing 
the forms of architecture, that it might show us some 
safety rules before we carry out our first moue_ Any real 
advancement is always discontinuous and disarticulated" 
(97), 
and a little further down: 
-history, then, presents itself as a curious instrument 
whose knowledge seems indispensable, but that once 
acquired, cannot be used; a sort of passage that one has 
to walk through but which teaches nothing about the art of 
walking" (98_ - 
This historical criticism leads to the somewhat 
par -adoxical situation in which the only way forward 
consists in perpetually putting in crisis, exposing and 
repudiating any attempt made to provide a method or a 
precise process by which to read history. The same paradox 
is stated by Guiseppe Samona in his analysis of the theme 
of rupture and continuity in the urban structure, a theme 
central to the preoccupations of the ongoing debate on 
architectural issues= 
"__.the reasons that would, in the name c't historical 
coherence, take away every discrimination between 
traditional and potential environments, in order to 
consider operative one environment in which man lives= 
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appear to us rather schematic; in the saine ;eau appear 
dangerous the opposite reasons that try to h-i-stort_-_-se the 
utopias of the ccr,cier,t environment, presenting it as a 
need to be satisfied after the defeat of the rationaList 
utopia" (99). 
In this second model, the acute awareness of history seems 
always mediated by a kind of metaphysical detachment from 
it. The rejection of the myth of the city as organism and 
the acceptance of its dynamics resulted in a conception of 
it as the repository of a fragmented collective memory 
continually re-interpreted and enriched by new 
interventions conditioned by the particular experience of 
each subject. 
One expression of this conception is found in the studies 
which rely on the notion of "typology" and its 
relationship with the urban morphology ;_100). These two 
variables (typology and morphology) are not chosen as a 
condition of abstract necessity but, rather. in order to 
map out the conceptual area of possible confrontation from 
which different sets of data can be fed in the course of 
time. Instead of the empty intentions to change, in one 
single sweep of replanning, the entire urban structure, 
the typological studies share a temporary suspension of 
judgments about the city in its global character, in favor 
of concentrating on limited sectors of the environment 
which are considered to be the most strategic aspects of 
the urban structure. The intervention on these strategic 
sectors would result, according to these studies, in a 
profound modification of the entire urban structure. 
c)- Finally, there is the purely eclectic use of history 
which, while being the least interesting in terms of i 
theoretical value, has nevertheless been the one which 
attracted the most attention by its enormous success fin 
terms of realised projects) and its rapide expansion 
throughout the world. This light- hearted r- e- introduction 
of history, after the initial phase of technological 
ideology, has been extremely damaging, as far as the 
interpretation of the modern movement was concerned. The 
backward leap that this model performed towards the 
revival of historically based images, quotations from 
historical styles and assimilations of conte:: -:tual 
incidents in literal ways has been the target of recurrent 
denunciations from critics who demonstrated a subtler 
attitude towards vis -a -vis history 
"The architects ", writes Zevi, "glutted with iethnologu and 
rational objectivism have turned again to tradition, have 
)mumbled about pre-existing environments, have modelled 
their buildings on ancient prototypes, but with disarming 
superficiality_ From all this derives the 
confusion that mixes together- !Veo- L-i-berty ' s so- called 
spontaneous bui ldi -ngs, =L?per;i-c i-c Z attemps at new 
environments and even badly modernised revivals This is 
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the price paid by the ,piddle generation for having 
embraced without discussion the anti-historicist ideology 
of the masters and, then, for having suddenly dropped it 
without any further elaboration" (101). 
If one cannot but agree with most aspects of the criticism 
against the "naive" use of history as that shown by groups 
such as Neo- Liberty (102) or the eclectic school, in 
general, one must add, at the same time, that this 
criticism does not account for the clear symptoms of 
distress implicit in these attempts- An outright rejection 
of eclecticism does not pay tribute to the positive 
contribution that it made as a symptom of the urgency of 
the newly but not clearly defined problems yet. 
As the eclectic use of history spread all over the world, 
what was a sign of distress (became the new programme of 
the architecture of the post -industrial era. As the direct 
emulation of classical and gothic motifs gradually covered 
the bare surface of modernism and as "Collage City ", the 
spatial translation of Popper's pluralism (103), replaced 
"Radiant City" (104), it became clear to everyone that the 
premises upon, which the eclectic manipulation of ne past 
is based are not any more soundly formulated than those of 
modernism. On the contrary, they rely on the very fiction 
formulated by the historians of modernism that the latter 
has somehow succeded in breaking out with the past; 
eclecticism requires the myth so dear to the avant- gardes 
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that a rupture, a discreet shift has been effected between 
the old eclectic world of the nineteenth century and the 
brave new one. Accordingly, the eclectic use of history 
sets out to heal this mythical break, to overcome that 
nebulous rupture; in search for ever-renewable images, it 
turns to the history of architecture, to its "rich" 
tradition of meanings and forms. 
While the myth of the modern movement is being sustained 
by the very fact that it is challenged, the ideology of 
eclecticism is no longer served the same theory of 
history, that history which once gave meaning to eclectic 
and modernist alike. The historical city acrd its 
historical architecture are still referred to, but without 
the coherent framework of ideology that endowed styles 
with overtones of particular- politics and morality, in the 
nineteenth century, or which gave sense to the modernist 
project. Instead, the dressing of the contemporary 
metropolis in clothes borrowed from the past conceals the 
naive misunderstanding involved in bestowing values that 
transcend history onto the academic reconstructions of 
stylistic codes- This implies a weakening of the present 
insofar as it falls into that excess which Nietzsche 
defines as "the antiquarian veneration of the past" (105), 
seen as an inventory of forms, as a sacred museum of 
available ar-chetypes- 
Folowing the contradictory experiments of the welfare 
state housing programmes, on the one hand, and the 
phantasmagoria of a make- believe "high- tech" culture, it 
became clear that what, in the twenties, appeared as a 
global project of democratisation has shrunk to the 
calculated strategies of creating circuses of "bread and 
spectacles ". This socio- economic strategy was parodied in 
the conspicuous consumption of culture which shapes 
contemporary eclecticism. As a matter of fact, this 
strategy was repeatedly being naturalised under the 
moralising pretext of a democratic plur-alism- The lack 
common conviction 
o r 
and the ethos of indiscriminate 
toleration are mistaken for democratic freedom and 
elevated to the status of moral values. 
What is more or less offered as the pr-ogr-amme is 
"ambiguity "; experimentation is understood as the research 
into odd and unusual connections, a research into 
abnormality- Starting from the guest of the "lost aura" of 
the work of art, it has grown into the exemplar of 
industrial "Kitsch"- 
Without any substantial meaning other than the cult o 
irony and the illusion of a make -believe culture, 
eclecticism is a production without discourse; 
simply a production of quotations, parentheses and 
brackets; a kind of disjointed and insiduous whisper that 
spells "advertisment"- Although it may achieve momentary 
titillation and, in some cases, a stylish irony, this mode 
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is by nature fragmentary and, as such, it probably 
contributes to a world that is still rootless and 
alienating. 
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THE BURDEN OF ANTHROPOEOGISM 
The emergence of man within the space of knowledge 
resulted, therefore, in the division of European thought 
into two distinct but complementary bodies of research= on 
the one hand, the empiricist who focuses on the space of 
the body and on finding a universal measure with which to 
interpret, know and transform the world; on the other 
hand, there are those who try to histor-icise their work by 
inscribing it within a historical continuum. As far as 
architectural discourses are concerned, these two lines of 
research share the same objectives: they both attempt to 
"desalie-tate habitable space ", thus the emergence of a 
discourse which falls into moralistic and totally 
unproductive judgments about the alienated condition of 
mart under the oppressive weight of technological culture 
and of the modern metropolis. 
But does not such a "desal ienated space" exist only 
poetically as in dreams, or as Heidegger warned us (106), 
it must be transformed into an attitude of disenchanted 
expectation? Is it not precisely this attitude that he 
described when he talked about the conditions of a mode of 
living that is impossible today, a mode which combines 
dwelling, building and thinking? There is a lot to be 
i 
learnt from the choice made by the most sensitive European 
intellectuals: he who keeps investigating, without 
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prejudice, the new means of reception and communication 
brought about by the new technological civilisation, 
rather than endlessly spreading tears over the alienation 
of man caused by the technological culture, is already 
starting the rescue of man. 
What rendered the dominant currents in design theory 
totally ineffectual is their constant refusal to consider 
the polyvalent nature of the urban phenomenon and their 
persistent efforts to read the same phenomenon in the 
light of a single linguistic key (be it political, 
economic, cultural, 
the cumulated effects 
or- semiological). As the product of 
of the interaction of opposing 
practices, as the battlefield for divergent strategies, 
only when interpreted as such does the modern metropolis 
reveal its own separate and unique phenomenological 
character; a character which cannot be reduced by 
artificial means (i.e. myths) to the level of a mere 
formal description. Hence the necessity for specific and 
varied techniques of analysis in order to define the 
precise role of the architectural practice and the 
multiple factors which conditions its production. Only by 
doing so would one be able to recover the very same 
structure into a unity and organicity, qualities sought 
after by all quarters. 
Such an under -taking, for it to have any chance of 
achieving results, requires the re- insertion of all the 
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past utopias into the present reality; it requires the 
unfolding of the historical conditions which brought their 
being in the first place. At the same time, it requires 
the unfolding of the historical meaning of the different 
proposals which have become part of the modern urban 
scene- This kind of reading would help to bring into light 
the original functions and ideologies which define and 
delimit, in the course of time, the role and meaning of 
the architectural practice, understood as 
"A {disci -p /litre historically conditioned and i-nsti-tuti-onal£tt 
functional to first the pre-capitalist mer-chant 
bourgeoisie and, tct-ter, to the new perspectives of 
capital ist civilisation" (107 ). 
One should also keep in mind the warning expressed by Marx 
in his analysis of the German ideology= 
"We must pau attention to this h-i- sforti, since the role of 
ideology boils down to either an erroneous conception of 
this history, or a complete abstraction from it" 
A history not as a great reservoir of codified values, but 
as a heteroclit collections of utopias, failures and 
betrayals. This is the histor -y which remains to be 
written; a history as a "design of crisis". There is no 
absolute guarantee of validity in such a design; one must 
learn, once and for all, not to a =_ -k history for. 
pacifications. This means that the emphasis must be on the 
specific relationships which, in the course of time, come 
to establish themselves between concrete labour and 
abstract labour- As such, the architectural production 
must be read on the basis of historiographical parameters 
relating to both intellectual work and the development of 
the modes and relations of production- Seen ir: this way, 
the architectural production will always be the result of 
an unresolved dialectic; the interrelationship between 
intellectual foresight, modes of production and modes of 
consumption ought to make the apparent synthesis of any 
given work explode. It is precisely where this synthesis 
is presented as a finished whole (where ideology. is most 
successful) that it it most necessary to expose the 
disunity, fragmentation and dissemination 
internal ur:ities 
of the work 
From these disintegrated elements, it 
will, then, be necessary to proceed to a separate 
analysis: consumer- relations, symbolic horizons, 
avant -gardes' hypotheses, linguistic structures, methods 
of restructuring production, advances in new technologies 
- all should, then, present themselves stripped of the 
ambiguity ingrained 
demonstrated by the work. 
in the synthesis originally 
It is clear that no single methodology, when applied to 
separate components, will be able to account for the 
totality of the work in all its different aspects= 
Instead, separate fields such as iconology, political 
economy, the history of thought, of religion, of science 
216 
and of popular- tradition, all of them will be able to make 
use of the individual fragments once, and only once, they 
have been historicised. The final histor-icisation of the 
multiple none- linguitic components of a work will have, in 
this way, two distinct results: firstly, that of breaking 
the magical circle of language by obliging it to reveal 
the foundations upon which it rests; secondly that of 
per -mitting the recovery of the function of language 
itself. 
To study a language and the manner in which it acts means, 
first and foremost, to examine its incidence in all the 
extra- linguistic spheres touched upon by the dissemination 
of the work. This is the only way in which one can talk 
about architectural language. In the analysis of artistic 
languages, attention must be diverted from t`ie area of 
immediate communication and directed towards that 
underlying meanings. 
of the 
In other words, i is necessary to 
measure the productivity of linguistic innovations and to 
subject the domain of symbolic forms to an analysis 
capable of calling into question, at all time, the 
historical legitimacy of the Western division of labour. 
The need for such a revamping of the criteria to be used 
in analysis calls, however, for a price to b á paid: it 
calls for the removal of all residue of anthropologism. 
The anthropological configuration of modern thought 
consists principally in the division of dogmatism into two 
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different levels, each lending support to the other and 
fixing its limits, at the same time the pr -e- critical 
analysis of what mar, is, in his essence, becomes the 
analytic of everything that can be presented to man's 
experience. To ask the question of whether mar, really 
exists (ir, the epistemological sense, of course) and to 
imagine, for a brief moment, what the world and thought 
would he, if he did not exist, is universally condemned as 
a heretical exercise and a mere indulgence in paradox. But 
this is to forget, quite conveniently, that there was a 
time, not so long ago, when the world, its order and human 
beings existed, but man did not (109). We do know, in any 
case, that all the efforts at thinking afresh are directed 
at destroying the ver-y foundations of anthr-opologism which 
has dominated our ways of comprehending the world for the 
last two centuries. Perhaps one should see the first 
attempts at the uprooting of the anthropological supremacy 
over thought - to which, no doubt, contemporary philosophy 
is dedicated - ir, the Nietzschian experience; it becomes 
easier to understand why Nietzsche's thought have had for 
us such a disturbing power from the moment it introduced, 
in the form of an imminent event: 
"The promise-threat, the notion that man would be no mere 
hut would be replaced by the superman" (110). 
By means of a philological criticism, Nietzsche 
rediscovered the point at which Man and God belong to one 
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another; he rediscovered the point at which the death of 
the latter corresponds to the disappearance of the former 
arid, finally, the point at which the promise of the 
superman signifies the imminence of the death of mane 
"it is no longer possible to think, in our days, other 
than in the void left by the disappearance of man, For, 
this void does not create a deficiency; it does not 
constitute a lacuna that must be filled_ it -i -s nothing 
more and nothing les- -s than the unfolding of a space in 
which it i s, once mo r e, possible t o think- An t h ropo l o; y 
constitutes, perhaps, the fundamental arrangement that has 
governed and controlled the path of philosophical thought 
since F:arlt - This arrangement is essential, since it is 
part of our history_ But it is disintegrating before our 
eyes, since we are beginning to recognise and denounce in 
it, in a critical mode, both a forgetfulness of the - 
opening that made it possible and a stubborn obstacle 
standing obstinately -i -n the way of an imminent form of 
thought" (111). 
But while the reality of this imminent event is 
increasingly felt and expressed in analysis, we remain, 
for our part (that is, in architectural discourse), still 
deeply entrenched in humanistic thought. Tf it is true 
that the application of structural methods to architecture 
has opened a breach in the supremacy of man and has helped 
architects to start considering the possibility that he 
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might not be at the centr -e of creation or at the summit 
and culmination of life, there still remains, in the 
structure of architectural discourses, an overwhelming 
tendency to think of design only in relation to man. 
Perhaps the task facing criticism in architecture is 
becoming a little clearer-. A daunting and time -consuming 
task of destruction; a negative task which consists in 
eliminating all traces of humanistic anthropology; a task 
of disturbing the tranquility of accepted unities and 
concepts which are never reflected upon; a task of 
removing the piles of stones that have accumulated before 
us- It is useless to lament a fait accompli: ideology has 
become reality, even if the romantic dream of the 
intellectuals who sought to guide the productive universe 
has logically remained within the superstructural sphere 
of utopia. It seems appropriate, at this stage, to 
remember that: 
" _ _ _Undi-chterisch Wohpet Der Mensch" 
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PART FOUR 
An alternative method 
1 - THE HISTORICAL SLEEP 
"Since 2-s not for us to create u plan for the future 
that will hold for all time, all the move surely what we, 
contemporaries, have to do is the uncompromising critical 
evaluation of all that exists" <1). 
For many years, now, 
history 
in the disciplines known as the 
of ideas, the history of science, the history of 
philosophy, the history of thought and the history of 
literature, a very important reversal has been taking 
place: attention is being turned away from the vast 
unities such as "periods" or centuries, to the phenomena 
of rupture and discontinuity- Beneath the great 
continuities of thought, beneath the homogeneous 
manifestations of a single mind or of a collective 
mentality, beneath the persistence of a particular- genre, 
a particular- form, discipline or theoretical activity, one 
is trying to detect the incidence of interruptions; 
interruptions whose 
There 
status and nature vary considerably. 
ar -e the "epistemological acts and thresholds" 
described by Bachelard (2): they suspend the continuous 
accumulation, of knowledge and force it to enter- a new 
time; they direct historical analysis away from the search 
for silent origins and the never-ending tracing back to 
the or=iginal precursors, towards the search for a new type 
of rationality and its various effects There are the 
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"displacements and transformations" of concepts in the 
analyses of Canguilhem (3): they show that the history of 
a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its 
progressive refinement, its continuously increasing 
rationality but, instead, that of the many theoretical 
contexts in which it developed and matured. There is also 
the distinction between the microscopic and macroscopic 
scales in the history of science, which we also owe to 
C-anguilheiin (4), in which events and their consequences are 
not arranged in the same way at both levels. There are the 
recurrent distributions which reveal several pasts, 
several forms of connections, sever-al networks of 
determination for one and the same science (5). There are 
the "ar-chi.tctur-al unities" 
concerned, not 
of systems which ar -e 
with the description of cultural 
traditions, influences and continuities, but with the 
internal coherence, axioms, deductive connections and 
compatibilities (6). Lastly, the most radical 
discontinuities are the breaks effected by a work of 
theoretical transformation "which estccbZ-ì-s ;es a science by 
detaching it from the ideology of its past by re-t:tca?-z-::g 
this past as ideological" (7)- 
To all these, one should add the literary analysis_- which 
takes, now, as its unity, not the spirit of a particular 
period, not "groups" or "schools", "generations" or- 
"movements" and not even the personality of the author in 
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the inter -play of his life and his creation, but the 
particular- structure of a givers work, book or text (8). It 
has become a principle not to regard the point at which we 
are standing at the present as the outcome of a 
teleological progression which it would be one's business 
to reconstruct historically: that kind of scepticism, 
regarding ourselves and what we are here and now, which 
prevents us from assuming that what we have now is better 
than, or more than what we had in the past. 
This shift in emphasis has several important consequences: 
Firstly, there is the surface- effect already mentioned, 
that of the proliferation of discontinuities throughout 
the spectrum of the history of ideas. The long series 
formed by the pr- ogress of consciousness, or the teleology 
of reason, or the evolution of human hought have all been 
broken up. This history has questioned the themes of 
convergence and culmination and has doubted the 
possibility of creating totalities. It has led, instead, 
to the individualisation of different series without being 
able to reduce them to a linear- process. Therefore, in the 
place of the continuous chronology of reason which 
progressively unfolds itself, we have different scales 
irreducible to a single and unique law or to the general 
model of a consciousness which acquires, progresses and 
remembers. The second consequence is that the notion of 
discontinuity has come to assume a major role in the 
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historical disciplines. For, in its classical forms, the 
discontinuous was both the given and that which cannot be 
admitted: it was the raw material of history which, 
through analysis, had to be re- arranged, reduced and 
eventually erased in order- to allow the continuous 
character- of events to emerge. Discontinuity was the 
stigma of temporal dislocation and the task of the 
classical historian was to remove it at all costs from 
history- It has, now, become one of the basic elements of 
historical analysis and its role is three -fold: firstly, 
it constitutes a deliberate operation on the part of the 
historian (and not a characteristic of the raw material 
that he has to work ors); secondly, it is the result of his 
description (and not something which has to be eventually 
eliminated); thirdly, it is the concept that the historian 
never ceases to specify (instead of neglecting it as a 
uniform armi independent blank between two positive 
figures). One of the most important feature of this new 
approach to historical analysis is probably this 
displacement of the discontinuous; its transference, from 
being simply the obstacle to be overcome and removed, to 
being the work itself; its integration into the discourse 
of the historian in which it no longer plays the role of 
an external condition that must be reduced, but that of a 
working concept; and, therefore, the inversion of signs by 
which it is no longer the negative of historical reading 
(that which indicates the limits of its power, its 
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"failure"), but its positive element which determines its 
objects and validates its analysis. 
There is still a third consequence which follows from this 
reversal: the theme and the possibility of a total history 
begins to disappear and we see, instead, the emergence of 
something very different which we might call a "general 
history ". The project of a total histor -y is one which 
seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilisation, 
the principle of a society, the significance common to all 
the phenomena of a period arid, finally, the laws that 
account for their cohesion. Such a project is necessarily 
linked to two or three hypotheses. It is assumed that 
between all the events that characterise a well -defined 
situation in space and time, between all the occur-ing 
phenomena, it must be possible to establish a system of 
homogeneous relations, a network of causality which would 
allow the derivation from each of these events of 
relations of analogy that would show how they symbolise 
one another or how they express one and the same thing: a 
guiding principle or a general spirit. It is also supposed 
at the outset that one and the same form of historicity 
operates upon economic structures, social institutions and 
customs, technological practices and political behaviour; 
this form of historicity subjects them all to the same 
type of transformation. Lastly, it is assumed that 
history, itself, may be articulated into great unities 
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which, contain within themselves their own principle of 
cohesion. These are the postulates that are, now, being 
challenged by the new type of historical analysis when it 
speaks of series, divisions, units, difference of levels, 
shifts and so forth. A description which wants to be total 
always draws all the phenomena it examines under one 
single centre - be it a principle, a meaning, a spirit, or 
a world -view. A general history deploys, instead, the 
space of their dispersion and multiply the centres. 
One is already beginning to suspect what kind of changes 
are being sought ir, the analysis of architectural 
discourses. The new path sought, here, requires the 
radical questioning of the traditional conception of 
historical analysis which is still profoundly impregnated 
with a teleological rationalism, inherited from the 
Enlightenment philosophy. One is beginning to suspect and 
even to prove, ir, some particular instances, that the 
history of reason is neither the history of a smooth and 
continuous development, nor the history of the progressive 
manifestation, of reason, already present in its origin, and 
which historical analysis would only help to make it 
emerge. One is beginning to suspect that this type of 
history and rationality is nothing but the effect of the 
retrospective illusion of a given historical result which 
thinks of its origin as the anticipation of its end. 
The real history of the development of human knowledge 
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appear -s to me as being subject to altogether different 
laws than this teleological wish of the religious triumph 
of reason- One is beginning to conceive of this history as 
a history of radical discontinuities; a history of 
profound re-arrangements which, while preserving the 
continuity of the existence of the various domains of 
knowledge (and not even in all cases), introduces by means 
of a rupture the reign of a new "logic" that literally 
displaces the previous one and tal-::es over, instead of 
being merely its improved version. 
One must add, at this stage, that this epistemological 
mutation of historical analysis is far from being 
completed; and as far architectural an urban analysis is 
co;,cer-ned, it has barely been registered or reflected 
upon- It is as if it was particularly difficult, in the 
history in which men retrace their o 41 ideas and knowledge 
about the environment that they produce and live in, to 
formulate a general history of discontinuity. It is as if, 
in the field where we have become used to looking for 
origins, to pushing further- and further the lines of 
antecedents, to reconstituting traditions and to having 
constant recourse to metaphors of life, we felt a 
particularly strong repugnance to conceive of differences 
and discontinuities or to dissociate the reassuring forms 
of the identical- 
There is, of course, a good reason for this: if the 
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history of architecture could remain the locus of 
uninterrupted continuities, if it could weave, around 
everything that man says and does, obscure syntheses which 
anticipate for him, prepare him and lead him towar -d his 
future, it would provide a privileged shelter- for the 
sovereignty of human consciousness. Continuous history is 
the indispensable correlative of the founding function of 
the subject: it is the guarantee that everything that has 
eluded him will eventually be restored to him, some time 
in the future; it is the promise that, one day, the 
subject will once again be able to appropriate, to bring 
back under- his sway, all those things that have been kept 
away from him by difference. Making historical analysis 
the discourse of the continuous, and making human 
consciousness the original and sole subject of all 
historical development, are the two sides of the same 
system of thought and the same structure of knowledge. In 
this system, time is conceived in terms of totalisations, 
and revolutions are no more than particular- moments of 
consciousness. 
In various forms, the theme of continuity has played a 
constant role since the nineteenth century: to preserve 
against all decentrings the supreme sovereignty of the 
subject and the twin figures of anthropology and humanism. 
The same conservative function can be seen at work in the 
theme of cultural totalities, in the theme of the search 
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for the origin of things and in that of a living and open 
history. One comes immediately in face of a general outcry 
and is accused of trying to murder- history as soon as one 
starts using, in a too obvious way, the categories of the 
discontinuous and of difference, the concepts of threshold 
and of transformation. One is immediately denounced as a 
traitor for attacking the inalienable rights of history 
and the foundations of any possible historicity. But one 
must not be deceived. What is being bewailed is not really 
the disappearance of history but, rather, the 
disappearance of that specific form of history which was 
secretely related to the synthetic activity of human 
consciousness. What is being bewailed is that ideological 
use of history by which one tries to restore to mar all 
for that has escaped and eluded him ar' fäCr-e than a century. 
All the treasures of bygone days are crammed into the 
fortress of this history: it was believed to be secure; it 
was sacr'alised; it was made the last resting place for all 
anthropological and humanist thought. But one can no 
longer affirm, in the present situation, that history is 
living and continuous; one can no longer seriously pretend 
that is is, for the subject, a place of rest, a place of 
certainty and reconciliation, a place of "tr-anquilised 
sleep" (9). 
It is Tafuri who identified the consequences of the 
accounts of history as a continuous process, with all the 
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implications that such accounts have had on architectural 
cul" ure: 
"Culture hr-:..; identified its owï, function as mediator in 
such ideological terms th t its cunning has reached the 
point where it imposes the forms of d- isputatio= and 
protests upon its ow products _ The higher the sru-h_ l-i- ma{- -or: 
of the conflicts on a formal plane, the more hidden the 
cultural and social structures- 
sublimation process" (10). 
expressed by that 
What, in my opinion, is the most urgent task facing 
contemporary design culture is the formulation of a mor -e 
effective type of analysis. An analysis starting from a 
redefinition of theoretical practice which would do away 
with the traditional categories of the mind, the subject's 
creative will and inventiveness, ans_ of representation. 
It is the total reliance on primary visual experience that 
holds the key to the understanding of the functioning of 
aesthetic discourses in architecture. While this visual 
predominance seems obvious and natural, It is, 
nevertheless, responsible for the structur -e as well as the 
content of these discourses: a mechanism which reduces the 
nature of the physical and social organisation to the 
visual properties and patterns of settlements. This 
dominance is also a function of the epistemological 
fallacy which posits the obviousness of perceptual 
experience and visible objects as the basis of knowledge 
and explanation (11). 
This mode of relating to the object determines the ways in 
which this object is perceived, received, cognised and 
finally translated into knowledge. This visual dominance 
gains even further momentum by the establishment of the 
appearance as the prominent aspect of reality, in fact, as 
the only valid one- As far as discourses are cone er -ned, 
this has several effects: 
a)- It tends to overshadow other equally (or- more, or 
less) important aspects of that reality; aspects which ar -e 
not immediately or, in some cases, not at all given to 
visual perception. 
b)- It artificially sets up and defines the object of 
understanding as only the visible aspect of objects, their 
immediate appearance, and not their complex nature as the 
products of a certain labour -. It renders, thereby, the 
knowledge of them even more problematic. 
c)- Finally arid, perhaps, more fundamentally, there is the 
prominence given at the outset to the appearance; . 
prominence which favours and encourages empirical and 
experimental modes of analysis to the detriment of the 
theoretical and discursive modes. 
This visual dominance is, in turn, further strenghtened by 
the theme of representation which denies the possibility 
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of are evaluation of architecture in its own ter -ups, as a 
production process, and allows it instead, ; to appear only 
as the expression of another- reality- This theme can only 
be overturned by identifying the individual concepts and 
mechanisms which operate in discourse and which are 
directly responsible for the prominence given 
visual. 
b - the 
For that purpose, it is inevitable that one comes face to 
face with the most influential and the most lasting 
philosophical edifice ever erected in human history: the 
Hegelian metahysics. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
almost all the interpretations of the development of 
architecture and artistic production, for that matter, 
have been achieved under the shadow of Hegelian thought. 
The history of architecture has always been, in this 
sense, the star -y of re-interpreting again and again the 
concepts of "representation" and "idea ", central to 
Hegel's philosophy of art, thereby, remaining firmly 
within the legacy of his thought (1). This is why a 
confrontation with Hegel is not only inevitable, but 
necessary. Let us briefly examine the nature of Hegel's 
contribution and the main features of his philosophy of 
art. 
Hegel's philosophy sets out, not only to explain the 
structure of the world and the scope of human knowledge, 
but also to provide a universal system of human society. 
It sets out to derive a- priori what at first seems the 
most arbitrary and contingent among all observable 
phenomena: the phenomenon of history. Beneath the 
superficial chaos of everyday social interactions, his 
philosophy claims to be able to see the workings of a 
spiritual necessity, a kind of permanent proof of the 
emergence of one moment of history from the one that 
preceded it and which moves from premise to conclusion 
with all the rigour of a mathematical theorem (13). The 
privileged place occupied by this philosophy in 
architectural discourses can be explained by its inherent 
consolatory value, if not by its actual truth. History 
tends, with Hegel, to be viewed under the aspect of 
necessity, and the simple fact that two moments are 
contemporaneous is often regarded as the demonstration of 
some real connection between them. 
For Hegel, art, as much as religion and philosophy, is a 
way in which the idea of God comes to consciousness. One 
could, therefor -e, compare his artistic idealisation of 
everyday forms (art as the medium which conveys images of 
human excellence) to the revision of the everyday 
categories which he demands from the philosopher-; for, 
both are intended to reveal the underlying unity of the 
superficially opposed realms of the spirit and of 
phenomenal reality. This apparent divergence is, according 
to Hegel, only one of form and not of content (1d-) . 
Philosophy, as an abstract medium of thought, can grasp 
the unity of the common or universal spirit with the 
phenomenal world; the medium of the visual arts limits 
this unity to the perceivable arid, thereby, to that 
perceivable manifestation of the "idea" which is the union 
of an individual spirit with its natural body. Against the 
category of the "imitation of mature ", Hegel offers the 
notion that the function of art is to represent the 
"idea ". The Classical and Renaissance world believed not 
only that the task of any artistic endeavour was to 
imitate nature, but also that excellence could only be 
achieved through a proper imitation of nature. By 
rejecting this, Hegel aimed, in his critique of the 
classical category of "mimesis ", at locating art and 
artistic activity within culture when he spoke of art as 
"-proceeding from an =ihsoiu.t+- idea", and assigne d as its 
end, 
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"the sensuous representation of : e z -t. 
Hegel used the term "idea" to convey, not only some 
abstract and platonic image that has lodged itself in the 
mind as a kind of constitutive a prior -i, but also to mark_ 
a mode and are awareness of concrete reality. Against the 
common sense conception of reality which sees it as 
consisting of a subjective factor and an objective factor 
independent from it, Hegel proposes the concept of the 
"idea" as the unity which, he says, exists at a deeper 
level between the two components of the dualistic picture 
of the real world (16). 
This metaphysical faith in the divine dignity of artistic 
activity, as the representation of the absolute idea, was 
expressed in very similar ways by Wirick:elmann, who is 
widely regarded as the founding father of art history as a 
dis[iplirie: 
"The task of .sKt is to represent the idea_ to direct 
perception in sensuous form_ _ _it follows, therefore, that 
the level of excellence of art in attaining a recal--_cis -ion 
adequate to the idea must depend on the grade of unity 
with which the idea and the form display them_ ell es as 
fused into one" (17). 
Two main points are made by Hegel concerning artistic 
activity in the language of the concrete universal: 
firstly, that the subject- matter- of are individual work is 
the fusion of nature and spirit in the free individual; 
secondly, that the history of art has a certain kind of 
coherence- There is also a third claim: the claim that 
whatever is conveyed by a work of art is conveyed in 
concrete or sensuous terms - shown, as it were instead of 
being stated. 
In the "Philosophy of history" (18), Hegel develops his 
concept of history which, he says, is based on the 
principle that every civilisation is characterised by its 
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own peculiar and distinctive spirit, its "Zeitgeist". This 
spirit is the overwhelming power that holds together 
everything and every individual in its spell. In his turn, 
the artist/designer, through the idea, appropriates the 
real world arid, by doing so, acquires a "world- view" or, 
as Hegel says, a "Weltanschauung". This world -view, lodged 
in the conscious or the unconscious constitution of the 
human mind, becomes the rnc'dus operandi of all social 
activity and production (19). As a result, the 
artist/designer, in the act of creating, is simply trying 
to represent this pervading spirit in sensuous form. 
This peculiar view of historical development has 
explicitely been offered as the basis for the critical 
evaluation of architecture as, for example, by Wofflin who 
wrote: 
"Architecture is an expression of its time insofar-- as it 
reflects the corporeal essence of man and his particular 
habits of deportment and movement; it does not matter 
whether they are light and playful or solemn and grace, or 
whether his attitude to life is agitated or calm, in 
word, architecture 
epoch" (20). 
expresses the "Leben=gefuhl" of an 
Underlying the various discourses in architecture and 
urban design, lie the categories of Hegelian art criticism 
and philosophy. This philosophy has acted as the guiding 
principle for all the interpretations of the development 
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of architecture, up to the present day- Even when this is 
carefully hidden, we are still driven to a large extent by 
the belief that architecture and art are but 
representations of a peculiar vision of the world by a 
society in which: 
The work of art can only be the expression of the God 
if-it takes and extracts without adulteration -the 
indwelling spirit of the nation" (21) 
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2- THE LEGACY OF HEGEL 
The theoretical debt that traditional criticism owes to 
the legacy of Hegel' philosophy is immerse. The use of the 
Hegelian model explains why historical criticism has, for- 
so long, been synonymous with the discourse of the 
continuous and of human consciousness; a discourse which 
rests on the promise that mar. will eventually achieve his 
wholeness and freedom, since: 
"Fv eedon is the highest destiny of the spry- -it" (22). 
But insofar as man's empirical condition in the world does 
not, at first, correspond to his essence, insofar- as 
freedom is only his destiny, it needs to be worked out. 
This is why Hegel claims that the entire course of history 
is but the expression of man's multifaceted efforts to 
realise this essential freedom; and much of Hegel's 
philosophy is but the attempt to reveal patterns within 
and among the ways in which man does this. Artistic 
activity, including architecture, fits exactly within this 
scheme, as one further- effort among others to realise this 
freedom. 
It is on the basis of the historicity of the "idea" that 
architectural culture founded its debate- But the 
recognition of the close link between architectural 
discourse and Hegel is not sufficient in itself. One has 
still to identify and describe the mass of notions that 
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sustain this relationship; these notions on which the idea 
of history as a continuous process is based; notions that 
each ir, its own peculiar way, diversify the theme of 
continuity and contribute to the structuring of 
architectural discourses as they appear today. 
Takte the notion of "tradition ": it is intended to give a 
special temporal status to a group of phenomena which are 
both successive and identical. This notion puts the past 
ir, or-der, not 
systematically. 
just chronologically, but also 
It separ -ates the positive from the 
negative, the orthodox from the heretical and that which 
is obligatory and relevant from the mass of irrelevant or 
merely interested opinions and data- In this way, it makes 
it possible to rethink the dispersion of history in the 
for -m of the "Same" and the "IdenticaZ", by eliminating the 
"Othe' " - It allows the reduction of the difference proper- 
to every beginning in or-der - to pursue, without 
discontinuity, the endless search for the origin of 
events. Tradition, enables one to isolate the new against 
the background of permanence and to transfer its merit to 
originality and genius, that is, to the decisions proper 
to the individual subject. 
Then,, there is the notion of "Zeitgeist ", or the "spirit 
of the age": this notion allows one to establish, between 
the simultaneous or successive phenomena of a given period 
in history, a community of meanings and symbolic links; it 
allows one to establish an inter-play of resemblance and 
reflection which, in turn, permits the sovereignty of a 
collective consciousness to emerge as the principle of 
unity and explanation- In such a theme, culture is always 
seen, in all its different aspects, as the reflection of 
the stages through which human history passes in its 
continuous evolution; a sort of play of mirrors where 
everything is animated by the image of a collective 
consciousness- Through the "spirit of the age ", one is 
able to show how the different texts or works, with which 
one is dealing, refer- to one another"; how they organise 
themselves into one single figure; how they converge with 
all the institutions and the different practices; arid, 
filially, how they carry within themselves the meanings 
common to a whole period= Each element is taken as the 
expression of the totality to which it belongs- In this 
way, one is able to substitute to the diversity of things 
said, a great and uniform text which has never been 
articulated before and which reveals, for the first time 
ever, what men really meant, not only in their words and 
texts, their discourses and writings, but also in the 
institutions, practices and techniques as well as in the 
objects that they produced- In relation to this implicit 
sovereign and communal meaning, statements always appear 
in super -abundant proliferation, since it is to that 
meaning alone that they all refer and to it alone that 
they awe their truth: a real plethora of signifying 
elements in relation to one single signified, the "spirit 
of the age ". At the same time, this concept, as 
represented in the v.ar-ious disciplinary fields of human 
activity, presupposes that the notion of expression itself 
is given a specific and relational meaning. Examples of 
the use of this notion are very easy to find in 
architectural texts. Take, for instance, Nicolas Pevsner 
who wrote: 
"It is the spirit of the age that pervades a period's 
social life, 
(23). 
religion, its scholarship and its art" 
This collective consciousness, expressed as the spirit of 
a collective archetype, against which all possible 
deviations or orthodoxies cari be measured, is 
"...always c _ear and yet obscure, always obvious and {.'Fi: 
hidden, everywhere and nowhere at the same titre" (24). 
There is also the notion of "influence" which provides a 
solid support for the facts of transmission and 
communication. "Influ_ence" is a notion which refers to an 
apparently causal process (but with neither rigorous 
delimitation nor theoretical definition) the phenomena of 
resemblance and repetition. A concept which links at a 
distance and through time - as if through the mediation of 
a medium of propagation - such defined unities as, for 
instance, individuals, oeuvres, notions or theories. What 
this concept has provided is a reason for any event, an 
explanatory principle which alludes to a cause and effect 
determination. This is how Fr- arik_l, for instance, saw the 
purpose of this notion in aesthetic criticism: 
"One of the tasks which particular lu preoccupies the at 
critic is to demonstrate the dependence of works of at on 
those that went before and the inf iu.ence of different 
regions or schools on one another-" (25). 
To he influenced means, in this way, to be catalogued, 
classified and serialised according to the common features 
that one might or might not share with others that have 
preceded one or that are contemporaneous with one. To be 
influenced means to be formally given a specific place in 
a chain of causal relationships and to be given historical 
intelligibility at the same time. Any work that d_e not 
fit within the specific place that one is given in this 
taxonomy would be discarded as not representative of one's 
oeuvre and as a simple "hiccup" in an otherwise smooth 
continuity. 
There is yet another dimension in which this notion of 
"influence" is used, this time not between individuals or 
schools, but between the ideas, beliefs and conceptions 
expressed in distinct disciplines. Are illustration of this 
type of influence was given by Panofsky in his explanation 
of the connections between Gothic architecture and 
scholasticism: 
"A connection i:Etwefl Gothic art and scholasticism -2-=- move 
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concrete that a mere paralellism and yet more general than 
those individual - influences which are inevitab lu exerted 
on painters, sculptors and architects by erudite advisers, 
In contrast to a mere paralellism, the connection which I 
have in mind is a genuine cause and effect relationship_ 
But in contrast to an -individual influence, this cause and 
effect relationship comes about by diffusion rather than 
by direct import, It comes about by the spreading of what 
might be called, for want of a better term, a mental 
habit... _Such mental habits are at work in all and every 
civilisation" (26). 
But the notions that must be suspended, above all, are 
those that emerge in the most immediate way: the notion of 
"ceuvr -e" and that of the "author- ". When one speaks of an 
author's oeuvre (that could be either- writings, buildings, 
paintings, etc...), it is because one imagines that this 
oeuvre is defined by a certain expressive function. Once 
the environment, for instance, is conceived only in its 
physical and formal dimension, it becomes possible to 
assign to it a unity defined by the boundaries of its 
physical existence and to assume that this unity has an 
immediate and homogeneous coherence, the same coherence 
that one seeks in the oeuvre of a writer. Conversely, the 
notion of the "oeuvre ", based on the assumption of a 
pr-e- giver, homogeneity and coherence, allows those who set 
out to analyse it to fix, as their task, the bringing to 
light of that coherence. Thus, the circle becomes closed. 
All the contradictions and antinomies ar -e silenced in 
order for a general thematic to emerge and be presented as 
the organising principle of the oeuvre- As a result, all 
the conflicts are avoided by the exclusion of the 
contradictions and the promotion of the consistencies to 
the role of principles. 
Closely related to this notion of "oeuvre" is that of the 
"author -" or "subject ". In the inter- prretation of an oeuvre, 
or.e is always assuming that there must be a level at which 
it emerges, in all its fragments, as the expression of the 
thoughts, experience, imagination, the unconscious 
workings of the subject or, indeed, the historical 
determinations which operated upon him while producing 
this oeuvre- These two notions explain the fact that 
r- epr-eser.tation and expression ar -e the modes that dominate 
architectural thinking: the coherence found in the 
object /oeuvre is always translated as the expressive 
projection of the actual author/designer, of his mood 
which, in turn, represents a certain "age ", a certain 
class, religion, etc... This is precisely what Panofsky 
meant when he wrote that: 
The intrinsic meaning or content z= apprehended by 
ascertaining those underlying principles which veuea.l the 
basic attitudes of a nation, a period, a class, [[ 
religious or philosophical persuasion, unconsciously 
qualified by one personality and condensed into one {4t?'a''K" 
(27). 
All these notions, that I have tried to describe above, 
show the kind of interpretative process at work in 
traditional historical analysis and to which the Hegelian 
philosophy has provided the ideological foundation. This 
idealist approach to critical analysis has as its sole 
objective the perpetual restoring of a consciousness 
(collective or individual) hidden behind the work; it 
always tries to make appear in the surface of the wor -k 
what has already been assumed at the ver -y start .  of the 
analysis- In it, the history of ideas become coupled with 
that of the expression, transcription and reflection of 
ideas into sensuous forms. Such are analysis is always the 
descrition of origins and effects, of conceptual _unities 
as manifested in iconographic or stylistic unities= I n 
short, it is an analysis conceptually absorbed within the 
typically Hegelian couple of Idea -Form, reinforcing the 
traditional dichotomy of form and content. 
One must question those ready -made syntheses, those 
groupings that one normally accepts without examination; 
those links and relations whose validity is recognised 
from the outset. One must oust those forms and obscure 
forces by which an event is linked to another because they 
happened at the same period or emanated from the same 
individual. Instead of according them unqualified and 
spontaneous value, one must accept, in the name of 
methodological rigour, that ti-, y concern only a population 
of dispersed events. 
One must show that these pre-existing forms of continuity 
do not come about of themselves, but that they are already 
the result of a previous construction, the rules of which 
must be known and the justifications of which must be 
closely scrutinised. One must indicate in what conditions 
and in view of which analysis, certain of them might be 
legitimate and one must point at those which cannot be 
accepted. What one must do, in fact, is to free the 
problem that they pose: to recognise that they ar -e not the 
locus on the basis of which other questions (concerning 
their internal structure, 
transformations, 
coherence, systema.acl y, 
etc) may be asked, but that they, 
themselves, pose a whole cluster of questions (what they 
are, how they can be defined, what type of laws do they 
obey, etc). In short, that they may not be what they seem 
to be at first sight and that they require a theory of 
them. 
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3' AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
If it was relatively easy to identify and describe, 
through the examination of the various discourses 
operating in architecture, the mechanisms by which the 
foundations for an anthropological anú humanist 
perspective are laid, the description of an alternative 
approach to critical analysis is a far less obvious task 
to perform. 
If the unities that we described in the previous chapter 
are suspended, if one agrees to free the dispersed events 
from all the groupings that purport to be natural and 
universal, how is one going to derive new ones? And 
perhaps more importantly, how can one make certain that, 
whatever new groupings are found, they will allow analysis 
to bypass and overcome the problems associated with the 
traditional notions? 
It is my belief, however, that once the immediate forms of 
continuity, which hide the ideological substance of 
architectural discourses, are suspended, it becomes 
possible to provide the outline for a serious alternative 
approach to the problem of design Practice' As soon as one 
is ready to set aside the notions of tradition` Zeitgeist, 
world-view, oeuvre and subject, an entire field is set 
free; a vast field, but one that can be described, 
nonetheless. 
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The fact that one believes in the necessity of devising 
new methods of description and analysis in architecture 
cannot, in my opinion, be subject to discussion. Although 
I entirely agree that the issue of the legitimacy or- 
non-legitimacy of a specific theoretical model is are 
important one and that, as such, one which must not be 
evaded, it is also a fact that the issue cannot be solved 
solely by trying to prove or disprove the epistemological 
logic of the model- The issue of the legitimacy of a 
theoretical model, in a field as that of the environment, 
is in the final instance a political issue- It sustains or- 
does not sustain its status of "truth" only on the basis 
of the value and pr- actical application that it has in 
promoting or not promoting the dominant ideology in a 
given historical situation= 
From the moment when one begins to think of the relation 
between a certain result and the conditions of its 
existence as a relation of production and not one of 
expression, one has freed himself from the conceptual 
categories for which Hegel has provided the philosophical 
model- Ire the method that I would like to describe, the 
relationships between the physical structure of the 
environment and the structure of social interactions are 
no longer expressed in terms of a causal determination, of 
form and content, representation and idea, subject and 
object, but in terms of a real process of production= 
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However-, with the rejection of the traditional notions, an 
immediate problem arises, namely that of the definition of 
the basis on which one can "per-iodise" or structure the 
historical development in design. If, indeed, concepts 
like periods, tradition and evolution can no longer 
provide a satisfactory basis for the formulation of 
knowledge in architecture, what other forms of regularity 
and other types of relations can be developed? 
The answer to this question lies in the identification of 
the very assumptions on the basis of which for -ms are 
J produced and developed (that is, conceived, deslorseds 
executed arid, finally, recognised as such in everyday 
life)- It is the discourse, itself, which becomes the 
prime object of the analysis; it is the field of this 
discourse, made up of the totality of all the effective 
statements (whether spoken, written or drawn) which will 
constitute the raw material of the analysis. The term 
"discourse ", as a practice, is intended here td convey 
something more than the fact that human communities exist 
socially through the medium of language, important though 
this aspect is (28). It is also intended to convey a lived 
world of material practices. The object of this search is, 
therefore, a theoretically structured approach to the 
"real world of real human beings" which is "not held ut a 
safe distance by the extreme forms of -ideali=st 
abstraction" (29)- Ire this way, one is led to the project 
of 
a)- A description of discursive events, in search for the 
unities which form within a particular discourse and which 
provide it with its internal coherence' 
b>- The specification of the relationship between this 
particular discourse and the non-discursive practices 
(i-e- political and economic), in search for the precise 
role that intellectual work plays at a specific moment and 
in a specific place within what could be called "the total 
system of social production". 
Two further related specifications must be made at this 
stage. Firstly, the description of discursive events° as 
intended here, is radically different from what a 
linguistic analysis might he In the case of a linguistic 
analysis, the basic question that has to be answered is 
always: according to what rules has a particular statement 
been made and, consequently, according to what rules could 
similar statements be made? In the description that I have 
in mind, the question is of a quite different nature, in 
that it is a matter of finding how it is that a particular 
statement has appeared in certain defined circumstances 
and not another' 
The second related specification is that such a project 
cannot be conducted outside a precisely defined 
spatio-temporal situation. It is not a project of the 
search for some metahistorical justification for the 
architectural practice. It is only the description of the 
conditions in which discourses ar -e produced at a certain 
time of history. This time -space thematic has, in the last 
ten years, become central to the constitution of social 
theory. This does not just mean that social theory must be 
historically and spatially specific. More importantly, as 
a reaction against the functionalist theories of social 
phenomena (30), many social scientists make the point that 
social theory must be about the time -space constitution of 
social structures, right from the start 31). Thus, for 
instance, Giddens says that 
"Social theory must acknowledge, as it has not done so 
pneu -i-ou_ i y, time-space intersections 2- 
involved in socia existence" (32). 
as essentially 
Such a viewpoint carries a certain number of important 
consequences. Social structure, for example, cannot be 
divorced from spatial and temporal structure; the two have 
to be theorised conjointly and not as the 
upon the other (33). As Bourdieu said: 
"Practices 
impact of one 
ave defined by the fact that their temporal 
structure, direction and vythn ave constitutive of 
meaning" (34). 
These =_-patio -temporal settings for the production of 
discourses ar -e what Giddens has labelled "locales ". Such 
locales have several effects. Firstly, they structure 
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people's life path in space and time They provide the 
main nodes through which a person's life path must flow. 
As Therbor-n put it: 
"Being in the world is both inclusive (being a member of a 
meaningful world) and positional (having a particular 
place in the world in relation to other members of it)" 
(35)- 
Secondly, these institutions can have effects on other 
people through the constraints that they place on their 
ability to interact- Thirdly, they provide the main arenas 
within which inter- action takes place; thus, they are the 
sites of all sorts of conflicts, the medium and the source 
of most practical and reflexive reason arid, generally, the 
major- context in which knowledge -experience about the 
world is gathered and common awareness is engendered. 
Fourthly, they provide the activity structure of the 
day -to -day routines that characterise most parts of most 
people's life- And fifthly, they are the major sites of 
the process of socialisation within which collective modes 
of behaviour are constantly being negociated and 
r-enetgo c iated and rules ar -e learned but also created (36). 
To say that discursive practices are dependent upon the 
dominant "locales" for their existence and importance is 
not to denigrate them or to reduce them to simply the 
effects of other- practices= Instead, it is simply to 
situate them within a historical pattern of determination. 
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In fact, without this pattern, the very qualities that 
make a discour -e what it is, are jettisoned: the 
intricacies of interactions, the specificity of particular 
times and places, the sense of context, etc... 
3.1 The description of the design problematic 
This description is interested, not in the thematic of the 
environment as it appears to us in its immediate form, but 
in the implicit rules which allow this thematic to be 
formulated, hierarchised and institutionalised - 
These formative rules are the constitutive elements of 
what might be called the "problematic" of design. This 
co:cept of problematic designates the particular unity of 
a theoretical formation and introduces us to a fact 
peculiar- to any discourse. As Althusser- explains it: 
"A discourse can only pose the problems on the terrain and 
within the horizon of a definite theoretical stvucture 
2-e. its problematic which constitutes its absolute and 
definite condition of possibility and the ahsrolute 
determination of the forms -Ln which all the problems must 
be posed at any particular moment" (37). 
Therefore, the problematic defines primarily a field, a 
system or a theme. It is a theoretical/conceptual 
structure; a determined and articulated system of 
concepts, instruments and modes of theoretical work whose 
unity is that of a complex structured whole which is 
reducible to neither its individual elements nor to some 
essence- In this sense, any analyis requires the setting 
up of a problematic. Its real starting point is a problem, 
however- ill -posed it might be. Yet, a problematic can well 
be ideological, moralistic, technical, or scientific. But 
this cannot be wholly determined on the sole basis of its 
internal consistency or the structure of its concepts. 
A notion very similar- to the problematic was used by 
Foucault in his attempt to characterise the particular 
framework which allows any discursive formation (and not 
only those discourses that are considered to be 
scientific) to draw the frontiers of the domain, within 
which it speaks of its individual objects (32). 
One of the many advantages of working at the level of the 
formative rules of discourse i=_ that one is no longer 
tempted by synthesizing operations of a purely 
psychological kind. One is no longer trying to rediscover 
the intentions of the subject, the form of his thoughts, 
what he really meant or, again, the unconscious activity 
that took place in his mind. One is simply concerned with 
the discourse itself and with the relationships that are 
established within it. 
However, it is necessary to explain further this concept 
of problematic in order to grasp the specific nature of 
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knowledge within it. According to Althusser, this concept: 
"opens the way to an understanding of the determination of 
the visible as visible and, corrvers e ly, of the invisible 
as invisible, as well as the determination of the link 
binding the visible to the invisible" (39). 
What this quote means is simply that, within a given 
problematic, the value of what had been deliberately 
ignored is equal to that which is explicitely stated in 
discourse. In an analysis of this kind, one must pay as 
much attention to the presence of statements, concepts or- 
problems, as to their absence- This is how Althusser 
explains the relationship, within the problematic, between 
the visible and the invisible: 
"Any object or problem, situated on the terKain and within 
the horizon of the problematic of a given th_- vetical 
discipline (i. e- within its definite structured field), _ 
visible- We must take these words in the literal sense... 
It is literally no longer the eye - the mind's eye - of c 
subject which sees what exists -i -n the field Of 
theoretical problematic; it is the field which sees -it =elf 
in the objects or problems it defines..: The same 
connection that defines the visible also defines the 
invisibiee it is the field of the problematic that defines 
and structures the invisible as the defined excluded; that 
-is, excluded from the field of visibility and excluded by 
the existence and peculiar structure of the field of the 
--, 7 
problematic. Here again, the invisible is no more a 
function of the subject's sighting than the visible is' 
The invisible is 
non-objects; 
the proólemotic's non-vision of its 
the invisible is the darkness, the blinded 
eye of the proó[emutir's se[f-reflection when it scans its 
non-objects, its non-prob[ems, without seeing them in 
order not to rook at them" <40>. 
This lenghty quote is, nevertheless, one of extreme 
importance, in that it clearly sets the limits within 
which any problem is posed in any particular discipline. 
It is also these categories of the visible and the 
invisible which define the criteria of validity for 
analysis' 
The necessity, in analysis, to take into account both that 
which is explicitely stated in discourse and that which is 
hidden is the direct consequence of the realisation that 
the emergence and functioning of any symbolic language is, 
in the first instance, structured by a certain number of 
"matter-of-fact" truths which constitute the fundamental 
a-prioris of a specific historical conjuncture. 
The 
the 
establishment of such a-prioris in the formulation of 
different languages, values or sciences is made 
possible only by ways of massive "omissions". In other 
words, in the formulation of a language, there is first 
and foremost a negation, a basic dismissal: the negation 
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of the fragmentation and muliple nature of reality; the 
negation of all that might jeopardise the coherence and 
homogeneity of this language. This is the most important 
conclusion that Freud arrived at in his work of 
"deciphering" which, he says, is essential to analysis: 
"In the distorsion of a text, there is something analogous 
to murder-. The difficulty does not consist in the 
perpetration of the act, but in the el-irn- i- rtat-iori of the 
trace=. It would be necessary to restore to the word 
"Enstel lung" the double meaning it has the right to, 
although the custom might be lost today. The word should 
not only mean "to modify the appearance of something", but 
also "to put elsewhere" of "move to another place ". This 
is why, in rrumevOus cases of the alteration of a text, we 
hold it necessary to find hidden somewhere, albs --it 
modified and torii from its context, what has been 
repressed (Das Unterdruckte) . But to recognise it is not 
always easy" (41). 
This outright condemnation of the positivist conception of 
a fact in Freud is also a main theme of Nietïsche's 
thought in the "Genealogy of science" (42), where he 
stated that all interpretation (i.e. disco- r-se ) is 
polemical: to back one interpretation is to declare war- on 
another-. Given that facts have no meaning in themselves, 
discourse can only find one by making them speak, so that 
each interpretation of a fact is always only the 
interpretation of an earlier interpretation disguised as a 
plain and positive fact. This conviction that facts are 
meaningless in themselves defines Nihilism as Nietzsche 
understood it when he proclaimed the disarray of 
positivism: no facts, only interpretations (47). 
History, as generally under- stood, implies in effect the 
accomplishment of works and the transmission of words 
endowed by meanings; its very possibility rests upon the 
decision that all gestures and words which afford no 
positive significance be rejected as unreason. This is 
history in the dialectical sense of the word: man is what 
he does and his praxis is what defines reality. But at the 
interior of this history, and of all history for that 
matter, "identity" presides. Within it, a single culture 
enables a number of human beings to _articulate a 
collective "we "- This "identity" is possible i _b  only by ways 1 
of a series of exclusions- If all cultures are finite or 
limited, this cannot be explained by the fact that no 
culture will ever succeed in universalising itself. In 
fact, it is because, ir, an initial decision (one might say 
a first division), each culture rejects a certain number 
of alternatives: oppositions of East and West, dream and 
reality, tragic and dialectical, etc. -. But all these 
oppositions are summed up in the greatest one of all: the 
opposition of reason and unreason. 
Within a single culture, or a single discipline, the same 
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kind of exclusions occur in the elaboration of each 
particular- discourse- This is why the opting for a 
particular- perspective is not so much a positive act as a 
negative one the act which consists in the exclusion of 
every other alternative, in the negation of the multiple 
and conflictual nature of reality in order to produce a 
synthetic and harmonious discourse- It is only through 
these exclusions that history is possible; it is only 
through them that it can be articulated. 
The dark area of a discourse or a discipline is not what 
an outdated empiricism wants us to believe: its residue 
what it leaves outside of it, or that which it cannot 
conceive of. It is, instead, what is most fragile, in this 
discourse, under the guises of strong evidence; it is the 
silences of this discourse- Ir, short, it is all that 
sounds hollow despite its apparent fullness. 
These omissions have also been the object of Thrift'_ 
attention in his study of the variability of the 
availability of knowledge which, he says, depends on the 
particular spatio -temporal setting (44)- He breaks up this 
category into five types of what he calls "interrelated 
unknowirigs" : 
a)- "unknown ", in terms of being totally unheard of at a 
particular time 
b)- "not understood ", in terms of not being within the 
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frame of meaning of a particular historical setting 
c)- in terms of being hidden from certain 
members of a society, a region, etc''' 
d>- in terms of being taken for granted as 
true or natural 
e)- in terms of being known only in a 
distorted fashion (45)^ 
But while, for Thrift, these types of "interrelated 
unk^owings" are to be ultimately understood as the result 
of a more or less deliberate action by an individual or 
group of individuals, the "omissions" of which I spoke 
earlier cannot be traced back to a specific subject 
(collective or individual). They rannot be described as 
the effect of some events extraneous to language' 
To study the problematic of architecture means, therefore, 
to look at its field of knowledge at any given moment of 
history: that is, the axioms that constitute it, the 
specific hierarchy and articulation of its concepts, the 
tensions that are introduced by contradictory survivals 
and the limits of the space which assures and defines its 
specificity as a field of knowledge- In this kind of 
project, one is always sent back to the setting of the 
relations that characterise the problematic itself. And 
what one discovers, at the end, is not a configuration or 
a form, but a defined set of rules which are immanent in 
the practice of design' It is these formative rules that 
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allow certain things to be said about architecture and 
many others to be excluded. 
The main question is, therefore that of describing these 
rules which, once assumed, give to certain tools and 
techniques a posture as theoretical instruments and a 
credibility in everyday life as problem- solving methods. 
And because the concept of the field of knowledge 
transcends that of a specific disciplinary field, the type 
of analysis that I propose would allow one to cross the 
boundaries of the institutionalised disciplines in order 
to find out the interferences between there. For instance, 
when dealing with the notion of the environment as 
of trying to rediscover its sources, 
one should examine the frequency and depth of the 
interferences between the natural sciences and the 
production of architectural discourses (46). One will note 
that architecture shared, in that specific historical 
conjuncture, with the natural sciences the same categories 
of classificatory reasoning. One will examine whether the 
problematic of the natural sciences has been displaced en 
L =ïvc (that is, whether architecture has borrowed all the 
structuring categories of natural science), or whether 
such categori cal interferences are fragmentary and 
episodic. One will also map the possible changes that the 
various categories or concepts undergo when displaced from 
one discourse to another- However, one must be careful not 
to describe the various relationships between disciplines 
in terms of "influences" which, as we have seen, remains a 
very ambiguous notion (47. Instead, they must be 
described in terms of the over-determination of one 
discourse upon the other. For instance, in the case above, 
the natural sciences would be said to function as the 
"overdeter'minirig" ideological region, since its categories 
seem to structure the problematic of almost all the other 
ideological regions in that givers conjuncture (philosophy, 
linguistics, architecture, etc...). 
But how does one set out to describe these formative 
rules? 
Let me, first, reiterate the fundamental pre -requisite 
which lies at the basis of the method that I am trying to 
describe: that analysis, as understood here (i.e. a 
process of acquisition of knowledge ?, is a production of 
meanings starting from the meaningful traces of events. 
Such a project is never definitive, but always 
provisional, since there is no way of knowing whether all 
the pieces of the puzzle are in one's possession. As such, 
analysis is 
reality. 
are instrument for the "deconstruction" of 
Deconstruction appears to be a word denoting a negative 
operation. This word was first introduced into the 
language of critical theory by Derrida who warned that it 
231 
must not to understood in a negative way <to demolish), 
but in the positive way (to circumscribe) (4R). Before 
Der-rida's introduction of the word, which has now become 
widely employed <:49j, it existed only among grammarians 
for whom it designated the analysis of sentence 
constructions which only come to light when disturbed by 
deconstruction. Similarly, the aim of a deconstruction of 
discursive formations would he to show how they are 
constructed. Deconstruction is, therefore, an attempt to 
establish a theory of discourses, especially of 
philosophical discourses. Such a programme is, without 
doubt, critical: the philosophical statement means only to 
make manifest the referent which it invoques, to show it 
or to allow it to exist; the philosophical statement means 
to be or, rather, claims to be governed by the thing 
itself, but its deconstruction destroys this illusion. 
Decontr-uction shows that it is not because it reflects the 
thing itself that the statement is constructed the way it 
is. The statement is only constructed in this way as.. a 
result of the constraints inherent in discourse. 
The illusion of discourse, as revealed by deconstruction, 
is to affirm the transition from an objective genitive 
(the thing) to the subjective genitive (consciousness) in 
the discourse of the thing that philosophy claims to be: 
the thing itself adresses you through the channels of 
philosophical propositions. An exactly similar situation 
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exists in architectural discourse which, through the 
emphasis on the visual modes of perception, appears to be 
speaking of the physical environment when, in fact, it is 
speaking of itself, of its rules, its concepts and limits. 
However, once this illusion is destroyed, this must not 
lead one to believe that one has reached a final "truth ", 
with all the illusion of power that this belief nurtures 
(50). By doing away with a knowledge that is immediately 
identified with a power, the constant struggle e fEe ;weeï? 
analysis and its object remains; and it is precisely this 
tension which is productive. This is why l spoke of 
analysis as a "project of crisis ". This project cannot be 
reduced to a hermeneutics, that is, a science of 
interpretation; its task is to cut away the barriers it 
itself erects in order to proceed and surpass itself. An 
instrument capable of and susceptible to being modified 
and consumed at the hands of the analyst; a deconstructive 
labour which would displace the Nietzschian "stones" (51); 
a labour which produces meanings by removing the ones 
given in an immediate way. 
At this stage, it is only legitimate to turn the argument 
in upon itself and ask: whether the languages codified by 
critical analysis are not also spoken through a series of 
censures, omissions and deliberate negations. Textual 
criticism, semiological criticism, iconological criticism, 
the sociology of art, are they not all so many techniques 
which only decipher by concealing the traces of murder? 
Ar -e they not more or less consciously perpetrated? In 
other- words, one could say that the language of criticism, 
the language which ought to be removing and breaking the 
"stones" that men erect in their discourses, is itself a 
"stone ". Is one riot, in fact, committing the same crime 
while pretending to be well aware of it? Obviously, since 
the project of criticism is always conducted from a 
historically concrete "prise de position ", its findings 
cannot avoid being themselves "stones". Analysis is always 
implicated in another- discourse from which it conducts its 
project. It seems to me, therefore, that the authentic 
problem of critical analysis, today, is to find a way in 
which one can put a critique into operation while trying, 
of the same time, to prevent it from becoming itself the 
instrument of yet another "great narrative". The problem 
is to design a critique capable of calling itsel- into 
question while putting simultaneously reality in a state 
of crisis. 
In short, a truly effective analysis is always 
provisional. It is one which recognises its own 
arbitrariness, assumes it in its language and sees itself 
only as are uncertain edifice. Such effectiveness can only 
be measured by the processes that analysis gives rise to; 
it is these processes which are able to determine the 
validity of the provisional construction, itself offered 
-.-' 4 i' 
as something to be re-interpreted, analysesl and, 
eventually, superseded. In the context of such a struggle 
against the contemplation of its own products, analysis 
must alway he prepared to take the risk of a temporary 
urifeasabi.lity. 
But to enter into pr-acti ce and become operative, such a 
project is forced to give itself boundaries, albeit 
partial and temporary ores. Analytical work is obliged to 
betray itself consciously: it is obliged to present 
itself, at least on the surface, as a finished work. The 
final page of a book is necessary, but it should be 
interpreted only as a pause. In any case, a pause is the 
more productive to the extent that it is programmed. 
3.2 Language and the extra- linguistic series 
I have mentioned, above, the double responsibility of the 
project of critical analysis (5 ): that of describing the 
process of the theoretical production, of discourses and 
that of the description of the structure of the modes of 
social production ln the particular historical conjuncture 
in which these discourses are produced. In this part, the 
second aspect of this double responsibility will he dealt 
with. 
If to study a language also means the study of its 
incidence on all the extra- linguistic series, one would 
have to resort to a set of factors external to the "text" 
itself and to its structure. In this sense, it is a matter 
of measuring the level of this incidence on all aspects of 
life not immediately associated with language. The purpose 
of such an analysis being, as I have said, the evaluation 
of the nature of the relationship between intellectual 
labour- and manual labour -. 
It must he clear, now, that no meaningful statement, let 
alone a theory or a discourse, can exist by itself. As a 
formation, discourse is a network of relations both 
internal and external; it is, in short, a practice. Just 
like other practices, it is constituted, modified and 
articulated within; in spite of/together with /against other 
practices. 
The analysis of the incidence of discourse on the 
non -discursive practices involves the identification of 
what exactly gives this discourse its status, its 
legitimacy, its function and its currency. Viewed in this 
way, discourse shows that it has lost its apparent 
uniqueness and autonomy. It becomes possible to see that, 
as any other practices, it is the centre of a whole set of 
relationships; that it is constituted at the point where 
the power of knowledge (le =G!L'o'2-?r) and information (ta 
cormai-ssarrce) is instituted at the very structure of the 
social relations of production; that it is governed by all 
the rules that the other practices are subjected to 
exclusion, prohibition, naturalisation, division, 
rejection, prosecution, praise, ritualisation, realisation 
and, finally, institutionalisation. 
There are many different ways in which one could link 
architectural discourses to the non-discursive formations 
(mainly the political and economic practices). One could 
present the economic and political athmosphere of a 
particular period by referring to the accepted texts of 
political and economic history, assuming in this way, an 
even development of the various levels of social 
practices. Alternatively, one could consider the themes, 
techniques and tools of a particular discourse as the 
reflection or expression of the political, economic and 
institutional events. The example of Hauser's sociologism 
is a good illustration of this way of relating politics, 
philosophy and art (53)^ There is yet another possible way 
of relating architectural discourses to the non-discursive 
practices: one could study the literature dealing with the 
politics and economy of a given period, tracing step by 
step the list of political disputes, parliamentary 
detatesr all the institutional codes and even the tastes 
of the patrons. In such a case, one would be assuming that 
there must exist a causal network of rlationships between 
institutional changes, economic processes and 
architectural discourses, and that this network determines 
the consciousness of the speaking subject, his world-view 
and his state of mini. 
What I have in mind for this particular problem, however, 
is are analysis of a quite different nature. In the attempt 
to grasp the nature of the relationships between language 
and the extra-linguistic series, one would not be trying 
to uncover- cultural continuities. It is not an attempt to 
decipher the expressive, analogical, or- symbolic pacts 
established between society and the physical environment 
in which it acts and reacts. Nor is it designed to isolate 
mechanisms of causality, that is, all the forces which 
influence and motivate the consciousness or the world -view 
as expressed in the built form. 
Instead, it is the project of looking at the extent to 
which and the manner in which the political, economic and 
other non- discursive practices intervene in the conditions 
of emergence and functioning of a specific problematic at 
a precise moment of history. The problem is to show how 
architecture, as a particular- domain with its own points 
of interest, its own field in the general space of 
knowledge, practiced by a number of professional bodies 
and taught in academic institutions, is articulated on 
practices which are external to it and which are, 
themselves, not of a discursive order. The problem is to 
reveal how those practices, in their respective 
institutional codifications, delimit the domain and the 
everyday recognition, of the problematic of design. 
A description of this sort is always deployed in the 
dimension of a general history, as defined earlier (54); 
it seeks to discover that complex domain of institutions, 
economic processes and social relations which bear the 
historicity of discourses. It tries to show that 
"autonomy" in discourse is not a characteristic that gives 
it a status of pure ideality and a complete historical 
independence. The autonomous dimension of architecture 
lies in the nature of the specific process of production 
by which only architectural discourses are produced and no 
others. 
To discover that language is only one way of organising 
reality, one must take advantage of the deep dissociation 
of this reality. However, to shift the inquiry from a 
"text" to a "context" is not sufficient in itself. the 
context squeezes together artistic languages, physical 
realities, behaviour -al patterns, urban and territorial 
transformations as well as politico -economic processes. 
But this context is also broken down by technical 
incidents, by tactical manoeuvres which intersect with 
grand strategies, by subterrenean ideologies which are, 
nevertheless, operative and by the reactions to the 
different techniques of domination, each of which 
possessing its own untranslatable language. It i s not by 
chance that Simmel acknowledges, in his essay on fashion, 
that: 
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"The way in which it is given to us to understand the 
phenomena of life makes us notice a plurality of forces ut 
every point of our existence; we feel that each of them 
aspires to overcome the real phenomenon, limits its 
infinity in relation to the others and transforms it into 
pure tension and desire" <55>^ 
And he adds a little further down: 
_Precisely because the desire to go OP with the given, 
to be equal to the others and to do exactly what the 
others do is the implacable enemy of the desire to proceed 
to new and specific forms of life, and because each of 
these two principles ertends by itself to infinity, social 
life appear to be the battlefield where every inch of the 
territory is contested and social institutions seem like 
those brief reconciliations during which the antagonism of 
the principles, continuing to act, has assumed the outward 
form of reconciliation" (56)~ 
Setting out in search for a fullness and absolute 
coherence in the interactions of the diverse techniques of 
domination which operate through the entire body of social 
life is what discourses in architecture try to do in their 
acceptance of the masks with which the past presents 
itself to us (the outward forms of reconciliation of which 
Simmel spoke); and it is the task of critical language to 
remove these masks and to show that power - like the 
institutions in which it takes bodily forms 
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- speaks in 
many different dialects. Critical analysis, thus, becomes 
the analysis of the confrontation of these different 
dialects. After disintegrating the apparent unity of 
reality, as expressed in discourse, analysis must, then, 
go elsewhere. It must make the individual fragments 
collide with one another and put on trial the limits that 
it has imposed itself. As a labour, analysis can have no 
end, as Freud duly recognised (57): it is infinite by 
nature; it is an inter -minable process; inter -minable 
because of its characteristics and of the objectives it is 
obliged to set itself. A complex and entangled field of 
conflicting meanings surrounds each architectural event; 
in this field, the history of design as a production of 
meanings is always one which offers no perennial value. 
To those who might object to the putting of architecture 
back into the area of the Western division of labour- and 
see it as a regression into a kind of primitive mar -xism, I 
would like to paint out that the method proposed, here, 
does in no way neglect what constitutes the specific 
character of this practice. On the contrary, this 
character can only be emphasized by a reading which would 
identify, on the basis of verifiable parameters, the real 
import of planning decisions within the dynamic of the 
production transformations that they either set in motion, 
retard or attempt to prevent. This approach follows, in 
one way or another, the observations that Benjamin made 
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when in his essay "The author as producer ", he gave 
secondary importance to that which the work says about the 
relations of production, while giving primary attention to 
the function of the same work within these relations of 
production. The need for such a revamping of analytical 
criteria is, in any case, implicit in the central theme of 
historical analysis: I am referring to the privileged 
position that the historical role of ideology occupies in 
criticism, since: 
"The peculiarity of art is to ieake _.- see the ideoloay 
from w h-i- c h it is born, in i w h-i- c h it bathes, from which i- t 
detaches itself as art and to which it alludes in its 
works" (59). 
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4. DESIGN AND IDEOLOGY 
Although taken for granted, the role of ideological 
superstructures remains, in the writing of history, a 
domain relatively unexplored (60). There remains, in fact; 
a vast and open field for the analysis of the historical 
interpretations of ideology's concrete interventions in 
the real world. It is also a matter of great urgency that 
the ambiguous notion of "superstructure" not to be left to 
itself: it must be prevented, that is, from multiplying ad 
infinitum in the absorbing game of mirrors that it 
presupposes as its own specification. 
The parameters proper to an analysis of the laws 
permitting the functioning of architectural discourses as 
ideological phenomena would be able to reveal the 
intricate routes that lead to utopia. It must be quickly 
added that the notion of architectural discourse as an 
ideological phenomenon is not intended to convey the idea 
that, as an instrument at the disposal of the ruling 
classes, it is used to maintain a situation of status quo 
in the power structure of society. This functionalist 
understanding of ideology is, to say the least, primitive 
(41). 
One of the main advantages of turning to the notion of 
ideology, as a way of apprehending the process of 
production of aesthetic discourses, is that it is the only 
approach which inscribes this process within the body of 
the global system of social processes and, thereby, 
bypassing the unsustainable myth of the complete autonomy 
of artistic languages. The other- advantage of this kind of 
criticism is that it can shed light on the reasons why 
architecture has, for such a long time, refused to 
re-examine the formalist aesthetics of the Renaissance 
idealism, ever, when faced with the problems of the modern 
metropolis and the avant -gardes' hypotheses. But before 
that, one has, first, to specify the nature of this 
phenomenon of ideology. 
Despite the fact that it is one of the most fundamental 
questions as far as theories of social formations are 
concerned, ideology has, all too often, been assumed to be 
a matter of common knowledge. The same word stood for 
science as well as for the opposite of science, for false 
consciousness as well as for that which is written, said 
and thought; it stood for all those things that should be 
put right as well as for those that one must be prepared 
to die for. 
Ire its classical sense, the term was first used by Destutt 
de Tracy and his followers, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, to refer to the science of ideas, 
1,-1 L!f. is, the 
study of the origin of our ideas about the world in sense 
experience (62). De Tracy and his followers (appropriately 
known as the "ideologues ") attributed to ideology the 
power to demonstrate the relationship between truth and a 
well-ordered world. But it is Marx who brought the concept 
to the forefront by referring to it in a systematic 
attempt to demonstrate the rationality of the existing 
distribution of wealth and social utility of the order in 
which the wealthy holds positions of power. For Marx, 
ideology always assumes the character of an apology for 
institutionalised inequality (63)- But since it is a 
static understanding of changing circumstances, it is, 
according to Marx, destined to the dustbin of history~ 
Since then~ many theories relating ideology to the 
individual subject started emerging in sociology and 
psychology; and because of the definiion given to it by 
Marx, all those theories invariably carry the meaning of 
ideology as a misrepresentation of reality- It has become 
defined as a largely unconsciously acquired structure, a 
pattern of thought and action engraved in the individual's 
mind by a certain culture~ It is not a particular 
philosophy or faith that one can elect or reject at one's 
own will, but rather a state of mind which has the social 
function of maintaining the overall structure of society 
by inducing its members to accept in their consciousness 
the place and role assigned to them by the same structure. 
At the same time, it acts as an obstacle to real 
knowledge' 
This conspirational view of ideology as functional to the 
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existing structure of social domination is far from being 
acceptable since it totally disregards its specificity as 
a relatively autonomous instance of social formation and 
not a docile instrument in the hands of the dominant 
social group. 
While there certainly is a dimension in which the 
ideological substance reveals a distict distortion of the 
apprehension of the real world, it is always accompanied 
by an allusion to this reality. One definition of ideology 
which takes account of both the illusion and the allusion 
elements was given by Althusser when he wrote: 
"Every ideological representation is, in a way, a 
of reality We understand too that this 
ideology gives men some kind of recognition of their 
world, wh[e, at the same, reading them to a 
misupppeciution of the same wor[d. Ideolng?j, considered 
from the point of view of reality, onlu an o[[usioo 
to peu[ity which is always accompanied by an iltusion; a 
comprehension accompanied by u misapprehension" (64)~ 
What this definition primarily refers to is the 
discrepancy between lived experience and knowledge which 
the post-war existentialists thought of as being 
necessarily identical. Ideology, Althusser says, is the 
expression of the lived relations of men to their existing 
conditions of existence, given that the expression of this 
relationship is never synonymous with the knowledge of it 
and always includes ari element of the imaginary. In the 
mode of theoretical production of ideology, the 
formulation of a problem is only the expression of the 
conditions allowing a solution imposed by non- theoretical 
instances and exigencies (i.e. moral, religious, political 
interests, et _ ...) to emerge. 
Therefore, under- stood as the representation of the 
imaginary relationship of individuals _ their real 
conditions of existence, ideology implies that men 
represent, not their real conditions of existence, but 
their relation to these conditions as represented to them 
in ideology. 
The production of illusions by means of ideological 
representations in the course of language is, in the words 
of Sklovsky, similar to Knight's moves in a game c cif 
chess. Like the movement of the Knight, the semantic 
structure of the discursive process swerves away from the 
real, sets in motion a process of alienation and organises 
itself in a perpetual "sur-reality" It i= this 
swerving that a work carries out with respect to the real 
which contains the ideological substance of architectural 
discourses, evert if the forms that it takes are not always 
clearly articulated. This is because ideology never acts 
as a pure force. It not only spoils and is spoiled by 
praxis, but it also intertwines with other ideologies. One 
could say that ideologies act in group and that they 
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expand in a capillary fashion in the construction 
reality. Within the overall structure of discourse, 
certain, practices may have "ideological" or "hegemonic" 
effects which are not, however -, necessarily functional to 
the continuation of the existing dominant order and which 
may not have had their origins in that order (44). One 
must also bear ir, mind that between the ideologies 
incorporated 
current modes 
into a work's signifying elements and the 
of ideological production, there always 
exists a margin of ambiguity which is ver -y difficult to 
measure. 
The ideologies invoqued in favor of, or underlying, the 
practice of architecture break down into many facets 
inviting a detailed critical operation. Ir, opposition, to a 
purely documentary ideology which shapes itself upon, the 
existing order -, at least three other types of ideology 
present themselves to the history of architecture: 
a)- FS progressive ideology, typical of the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, which advances a 
theory of a worldwide embracing of the real. This is the 
avant- gar-des' ideology which refuses any kind of mediatior, 
with the real and which, in the final instance, found 
itself fighting the mediation of consensus (consensus came 
to regard this type of approach as pure propaganda). 
b:3- A regressive ideology, that is, a utopia of nostalgia 
expressed in its most accurate way by the different forms 
of anti-urban thought and by the various attempts to 
oppose the new commercial reality of the modern metropolis 
with proposals tending to recuperate the myths of an 
anarchistic and communal origin. 
c)- Finally, an ideology which specifically calls for the 
reforms of the primary institutions necessary to 
territorial, urban and building management and which 
anticipates, not only veritable structural reforms, but 
also new modes of production and a different order to the 
division of labour' This ideology was best illustrated by 
the American progressive tradition in the work of Olmsted, 
Henry Wright and, generally, all the Park Movement (67)- 
It must be stressed that the above classification is not 
based on abstractions but on specific historical examples' 
The other point is that ideologies always exert influence 
in relation to each other, often overlapping each other 
and, in some cases, they even reverse themselves 
completely as they run their historical time- A typical 
case is that of the anti-urban ideology which, through the 
work of Geddes and Unwin <68> and their confluence in the 
conservationist and regionalist trends in the America of 
the twenties" takes an unforeseen course with the 
establishment of the modern techniques of territorial 
planning (69)~ The other example which can be mentioned is 
that of a single body of works - that of Le Corbusier 
which can be assessed according to number of different 
criteria, presenting itself at once as one chapter of the 
entire development of the avant-garde and as an instrument 
for institutional reforms. 
It is clear that the validity of such a criticism is most 
evident in the modern and contemporary period where it may 
be applied to the multiple and changing meanings 
attributed to the expression "intellectual work" which, as 
a result of the transformations in the building industry, 
are irreducible to one single denominator' 
The only way to show the ideological element in 
architectural discourse is to make, first, a clear 
distinction between two histories which, while being 
related to each other, are by no means identical: one has 
to re-assess the relationship between, on the one hand, 
the history of city planning and, on the other hand, the 
parallel history of the ideologies and programmes of the 
modern period. In order to do that, one has to understand 
why such two different histories have come to be confused 
in the first place as well as why one discourse is given 
precedence over all the others and is taken as the 
representative of the entire body of realisations of a 
given period' 
The "beyond architecture" which transcends the forms 
themselves and which is the paradigm of modern attitudes 
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in design (in fact, it is the objective towards which they 
tend by definition) should not be confused with the 
reality of urban dynamics. The productivity of ideology 
can only be measured by its concrete results in the 
history of political economy as manifested within urban 
history. This is the only way in which one can assess the 
"success" or "failure" of architectural discourses in 
their ideological role as mediators between the bourgeois 
ethics and the necessities of the universe of capitalist 
economy. 
The history of contemporary city planning and design does 
not coincide at all with that of the avant-gardes' 
hypotheses. In fact, as several recent inquiries have 
established (70), the tradition of city planning rests on 
foundations that have nothing, or very little, to do with 
the avant-gardes; it rests, instead, on such factors as 
the "medicalisation of the city" so typical of 
physiocratic thought; it rests on the late eighteenth 
century taxonomy of service spaces and on the theories of 
Baumeister- ; it rests on the applications of the American 
Park Movement and, finally, on the English and French 
tradition of regionalism~ The confusion between these two 
histories is largely due to the misunderstanding which 
consists in a conflation of the two historical levels 
which reads into the text two massive illusions: firstly, 
an illusion of "realisation" whereby it is supposed that 
the programmes elaborated in certain discourses are 
integrally transposed to the domain of actual practices 
and techniques' Secondly, an illusion of "effectivity" 
whereby certain technical methods of social domination are 
thought of as being actually implemented and enforced upon 
the social body as a whole' What is necessary, therefore, 
is an analysis which serves to reveal, not the perfect 
correspondence between the two orders of discursive 
practice and actual practice, but the manner in which they 
fail to correspond and the positive significance that can 
attach to such discrepancies; an analysis which will show 
that the coherence of history does not derive from the 
revelation of a programme hut from the logic of opposing 
strategies and conflicting techniques. 
Even in the few cases where this non-correspondence has 
been registered, the way in which it has been most 
commonly treated left many options unexplored~ Up to now 
this non-correspondence has always been put on the account 
of the gulf existing between the intentions of a subject 
and the results of his actual intervention~ As Hirshman 
remarked in a recent paper: 
"...Discoueries of the symmetrically opposite kind are 
both possible and valuable- On the one hand, there is no 
doubt that human actions and social decisions tend to have 
consequences that are entirely unintended at the outset- 
On the other hand, these actions and decisions are often 
taken because they are earnestly and fully expected to 
have certain effects that, then, wholly fail to 
materialise. The latter phenomenon, white being the 
structural obverse of the former, is tikely to be one of 
its causes; the illusory expectations that ore associated 
with certain social decisions at the time of adoption may 
keep their real future effects from view Moreover, once 
these desired effects fail to happen and refuse to come 
into the world, the fact that they were originally counted 
on is [ikely to be, not only forgotten, hut actively 
repressed" (71)~ 
The empirical non-correspondence between the discursive 
level and that of historical effects can be analysed in 
terms other than those of the sociological inference of a 
hidden hand which orchestrates the unexpected- It can be 
analysed without lapsing into the interpretation of 
history as the realisation of some articulate programme. 
And just because non-realised programmes tend to be 
dropped from the official records, it becomes all the more 
important to investigate what have been the mode of their 
real but unprogrammed effects. This is why, as far as the 
ideological role of architectural discourses is concerned, 
it is often found more productive to start with fragments 
and unrealised ideas with the purpose of putting them back 
into their context. 
If the effects of a particular programme transcend the 
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criterion of whether its intentions are fulfilled or not, 
this is largely because a programme is always something 
more than a formulation of wishes and intentions. Every 
programme either articulates or presupposes a certain 
knowledge of the field of reality upon which it is to 
intervene and/or it is calculated to bring into being~ The 
common axiom of programmes is that an effective power is 
and must be a power which knows the object upon which it 
is exercised. 
The history of architectural ideas (or architecture as 
ideology) has run closely to that of rational thinking in 
economic organisation, although the relationships between 
these two histories did not follow a smooth linear path; 
and the area in which the ideological link between 
architecture and economic rationality is most open to 
analysis lies in its dependence upon the city' The modern 
metropolis, the veritable cradle and paradigm of the 
capitalist social order, is also the pre-requisite for 
architecture and the ultimate scope for its striving for 
form (72)^ It is very important to understand the 
centrality of this theme in contemporary architectural 
debates- The theme of the city as the stage chosen by 
history to play the drama of the birth of modern man is 
complemented by the view that the intellectual elite has 
been called upon to play the role of disclosing and 
facilitating the forces of history 
- a view that has 
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helped to shape the concept of "avant-garde" in artistic 
circles and gave rise to the problematic of the 
relationship between economic structures, "ways of life", 
attitudes, cultural objects and spiritual phenomena' The 
problematic of the avant-garde's ideology and 
socio-economic rationality brings one naturally to the 
analysis of that tradition of European thought known as 
"negative thinking". 
Let us see briefly what this concept of negativity 
entails' With the emergence of concrete philosophy (in 
opposition to idealism), consciousness became no longer 
described as a sequence of representations accompanied by 
the Kantian "/ think"; consciousness came to be seen, no 
longer as the representation of oneself, but as the 
representation of the self as it is confronted by the real 
world' This new status of consciousness is what has come 
to be known as "negativity"~ 
The question of the negative is very central to, and 
characteristic of, the development of European thought 
during the period which spans from the late nineteenth 
century up to the emergence of fascism. In the last twenty 
five years, following the conditions and contradictions of 
the social and political practices culminating in the 
upheaval of 1968, this concept regained once more all its 
truth and vitality. Negativity testifies to the capacity 
of the mind to de-pose what is in actuality, or what it 
has judged to be the case, in order to posit in its place 
what is not (the possible, the future, the desirable, 
etc -. -). This newly acquired freedom to de -pose points to 
the fact that the given is seen more profoundly as a 
"posited". 
Since no innovation in the outside world can take place 
without an action that introduces it, and since all action 
is by necessity opposition (a struggle which does violence 
to nature), it follows that opposition, or negation, or 
contradiction, is responsible for the introduction of the 
new into the world- Thus, negativity is understood as the 
very essence of freedom. The productive power of negation 
is said to be liberating; this is the conclusion that 
Kojeve arrived at in his analysis of the Hegelian 
metaphysics: 
. .. But if freedom is ontologically negativity, it is 
because freedom can be and exist oniy as negatiorr. Now, in 
order to negate, there must be first something to negate: 
an existing given... Freedom does not consist in a choice 
between two givens. It is the negation of the given which 
is oneself (as animai or incarnated tradition) and of the 
given which one is not (the natural and social order): 
this is what freedom is. The freedom which consists in the 
realisation and manifestation, as a dialectical Or 
negating action, is thereby essentially a creation- For, 
to negate the given without ending in nothingness is to 
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produce something that did not yet exist; now, this is 
precisely what is called creation" (73). 
Therefore, negativity, as the exclusive attribute of man, 
is what makes history possible, since nature has no 
history in the sense that a natural process is defined by 
the fact of things remaining the same at the end (in ter-ms 
of structural stability) as they were at the beginning, 
all else being equal. Nothing really happens during a 
natural process- Nothing is lost in transit and nothing is 
created. The ability to maintain a relation with 
nothingness, characteristic of human action, is what 
introduces innovation into the world- After an authentic 
action, it should be possible to say: nothing will ever be 
the same again. The property of action is that it 
introduces a "nothing" between the initial state and the 
final state of affairs. The result can be said of having 
been created, produced ex n- ihilo- Consequently, as soon as 
he takes action, the protagonist is manifesting his will, 
not to being (i -e- to conserve his being), but to not 
being (i -e- his spleen with his being as he is, his desire 
to be another). In relation to negativity, "being" takes 
two different meanings: 
a)- A natural being: in this case, to be means to remain 
the same or to preserve identity- In this natural 
portion, 
cyclical. 
things are as they are and "becoming" is 
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b>- A historical or historicity: in this case, to 
be is defined by negativity. The being of the protagonist 
consists in not remaining the same, in the will to 
difference. In the historical or human portion, nothing 
remains as it is, no identity is preserved. Here, 
negativity rules or` if one prefers, difference. To act in 
history means to work at not being what one is. The 
protagonist is insofar as he acts and he acts insofar as 
he is always being different. 
It is here that ideology comes into play, since in order 
to assert his freedom, the subject has to posit, in the 
place of the concrete reality, a virtual state or an 
illusion (the future, the desirable, etc''') which, as we 
have seen, is what characterises ideology. The 
avant-gardes' attitudes entailed an essential component of 
this "negative thought" which represented, in the first 
decades of our century, the most advanced moments in 
architectural ideology (74). This concept proved very 
useful as a means of classifying the different currents of 
the avant-garde movements: on the one hand, Dadaism, 
Surrealism and Expressionism and, on the other hand, 
Cubism, Constructivism, De Stijl, Bauhaus and all the 
other groups belonging to the category of the constructive 
avant-garde. 
This schematic classification is, however, slightly 
misleading in a way because if, for the first category, 
negativity as a philosophy directing the work is 
explicitely stated, it is also present in the second 
category, albeit in a much more complex and better hidden 
fashion, though this fact does not make it any less 
radical than that of the first category. In other words, 
the presence of the negative element in the second 
category is somehow turned upside down with the resulting 
conversion of a condition of extreme contradiction into 
one of extreme coristructivity: 
"This nesa value (negation) or even better, this new 
operative technique has a constant function i - n the 
transformation of the capitalist bourgeois crises into 
models of development. From 1920 to 1935, architecture was 
at the forefront in the battle of the dialectical 
convers -i -on from negative to positive" (75) . 
The conversion from negative to positive, which gives rise 
to "utopias ", was necessary if the avant- gar-des were to 
maintain their position as "planners of the future " - This 
conversion was thought to be possible through the attempts 
to "realise ideology ", that is, through the offering of a 
vision of the things to come, of a future reality free 
from all ancient values. But this attempt to construct 
utopia is philosophically unsustainable for the following 
reason: once denaturised by virtue of the negative 
definition of freedom (to be free = to be able to say no), 
man is in opposition to things~ Paradoxically, in these 
conditions, historical action is not possible, for what 
distinguishes action from futile agitation is that the 
former produces results, modifies the course of things and 
leaves behind a work. Now, either the work is on the side 
of freedom and, then, it must be stopped at the level of a 
project opposed to the world as it exists (i^e^ a utopia), 
or else it is real and takes place in the world, but then 
it passes to the region of a thing in-itself and, as such, 
is no longer human. This is why the attempt to convert the 
negative into the positive is destined to fail even before 
it starts. As soon as the avant-gardes attempted to 
realise their utopias, they lost control over them. 
Despite this philosophical impasse, the recourse to the 
value of the "negative" and its attempted insertion into 
the work itself by the classical avant-gardes was 
genuinely thought to be the way by which to release the 
potential energy lying dormant in the bourgeoisie; the 
energy that was kept inhibited by the moral edifice that 
society has erected for itself (76)~ The negative way of 
thinking became, from this point of view, a liberation 
from traditional values as well as the premise for action. 
As Tafuri wrote: 
"For the avant-garde movements, the destruction of values 
offered a wholly new type of rationality which was capable 
of coming face to face with the negative in onÍer to make 
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the negative itself the release valve of an unlimited 
potential for development" (77). 
And he adds, a little further down: 
"By now, ideology is given once and for att in the form of 
a dialectic that is founded on the negative, that makes 
the contradictions the propelling factor of development, 
that recognises the reality of the system starting from 
the presence of the contradiction" (7e). 
The negative way of thinking has become the instrument 
used against the stagnation of European culture, against 
its ancient values in the face of the increasing change in 
the economic structure of capitalist Europe. Ideology had 
to be turned into utopia, into rational models of the 
future in order to control it and to eliminate the risks 
that it might bring with it: 
"In order to survive, ideology had to negate - itself as 
such, break its own crystallised forms and throw itself 
entirely in the construction of the future" (79) . 
This is the task that the intellectual elite gave it =_ -elf 
in the first part of the twentieth century= the 
redimensioning of cultural work by directing it towards 
the realisation of ideology- This involved the conscious 
choice by the avant- gardes to compromise themselves with 
the world of production even if that meant the destruction 
of the aura- induced "cult- value" of the work in the 
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exchange process. That choice illustrates the dilemma of 
the intellectual, torn between the desire to participate 
fully in t`ie restructuring of society and the desire to 
maintain a distance from the real world in order to ensure 
the sacredness of intellectual work. 
In the last twenty years, with the gradual isolation of 
cultural phenomena to the outermost margins of 
productivity as well as with the increasing suspicion 
towards the great narrative of the rational development of 
Western society, the ideological role of architectural 
discourses reverted back to a completely regressive one; 
that is, from being are ideology acting as the expression 
of the promised complete victory by man over nature, it 
has now taken the form of a utopia of nostalgia expressed 
in anti -urban models or in the attempt to oppose the new 
commercial reality of the metropolis with proposals 
tending to recuperate the myths of a harmonious and 
communal origin (80). 
The analysis of architecture from the standpoint of its 
ideological function as producing a distortion of the 
reality of urban phenomena does raise, however, a mai or 
epistemological problem, namely, that of how to conceive 
of such a "distortion" without falling into the 
inconsistency of postulating a non -distorted model of this 
reality, a non- ideological standpoint from which to 
denounce such distor-sions. It is true that whenever a 
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given discourse is branded as ideological, it is always 
implicitely put in virtual opposition to something else 
which is supposed to count as true- It is the status of 
this "truth" which will be examined in the next part. 
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S. THE STATUS OF TRUTH 
The epistemological difficulty of an analysis from the 
point of view of ideology concerns the following question: 
what is it that gives foundation to one's claim that 
anything can be known at all about global fr-ames of mind 
such as utopias or ideologies? For this assumption to make 
any sense, it has to refer to an epistemological position 
outside the global frame in question. But if all knowledge 
is always bound to one global frame or another, one can 
only speak "about" and "from within" an actual frame by 
referring to another- which can only be "virtual " - Thus, 
the two sides of the problem correspond to each other: 
"distorted" statements and statements about "distortions" 
partake of the same epistemological nature. 
This problem is, in the final instance, that of the status 
of "truth" itself. The only way to approach it is to 
concentrate, not on the contents of discourses, but on 
their r- elations to a certain mode of interpreting the 
world which, in turn, is ultimately r-elated to a social 
structure which constitutes its situation. It is not the 
specific content of ideas which matters first; it is their 
value as symptoms of the integrity of the mental structure 
from which they emerged. As Mannheim noted: 
"The rad -ius of the diffusion of a certain thought -,model 
must be explained according to the pe+=u -isav affinity it 
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has to the social situation of given groups and their 
manner of -interpreting the world" (81)- 
As such, the use of the term "ideology" does not have any 
moral or denunciatory interest. Instead, it implies an 
"activist" conception of knowledge, that is, a conception 
which discounts whatever in knowledge cannot be reduced to 
social action- According to this notion, the only 
criterion to make manifest the distortion of reality in 
ideologies is the principle that: 
"Reality discloses itself only in actual practice" (82)- 
The emphasis here is on the word "actual ", since any form 
of consciousness which exceeds the conditions of the 
immediately given present (either because it carries into 
it conditions of the past, or because it transcends it 
towards the future) is necessarily affected by ideology. 
The activist conception of knowledge entails, therefore, a 
radical approach to the status of truth. It shows that the 
opposition between truth and error, science and fable is 
crude and superficial- This opposition is the superstition 
that science must combat in order to institute itself: 
"Knowledge without illusion is an illusion through and 
through i.rr which everything is lost including knowledge. A 
theorem of it might be sketched like this; there ii.s no 
myth more innocent than that of a knowledge innocent of 
myth. I can think of no other, so imbued are myths with 
knowledge and knowledge with dreams and -illusions" (83)- 
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The consequence of this is that the concept of reason must 
itself be reformed once and for all It is not the case 
that, for the Greeks, "Logos" triumphed over "Mythos" 
(like good sense over delirium) with a victorious 
epistemological break. It is true that reason rehearses 
order and asserts that the real is rational; from the 
standpoint of this rationality, the universe rehearsed by 
myth is that of disorder-. But it must now be realised that 
order is only one instance of disorder, only one 
particular type of it. The real is not rational, although 
rationality for its part is real (but only as an 
exception). Myth shows us that the rational is miraculous 
and that the odds against rationality are at least as 
great as those that were against the apparition of life on 
Earth. 
Since Nietzsche, the question of truth has been completely 
transfor -med. It is no longer the question of "What is the 
surest path to truth ?" which matters, but that of "What is 
the hazardous career that truth has followed?". That was 
Niersche's fundamental question (as well as Husserl's in 
his book, "The crisis of European science ") (84)- Science, 
the constraint to truth, the obligation of truth and the 
ritualised procedures for its production have traversed 
the entire body of Western society for millenia as to 
become the general laws for all civilisations. What is the 
history of this will to truth? What are its effects? These 
are the questions that philosophy faces now. 
The substitution of the criteria of truth and objectivity 
by that of the immediate absorption and adjustment into 
successful "actual practices" has its counterpart in a 
radically immanent conception of action which effectively 
precludes the anticipatory and representative function of 
projects. If certain k:nowledges of "man" are able to serve 
a technological function, it is precisely due to their 
ability to define a certain field of empirical truth. It 
is this feature of discourses that gives point to the 
insistence on the positive and productive character of 
modern apparatuses of power and to the contention that 
their- effectivity rests on the installation of a certain 
"regime" of truth (85). If reason does not enter as a 
criterion, the assessement of the status of truth can only 
be made in terms of the functioning of the mechanisms of 
power in the elaboration of discourses. Not that this is 
entirely new. Nietzsche has revealed to us that all the 
assumed purposes, functions and causes which were claimed 
by historians and philosophers as being at the origin of 
the things they spoke of are, in actual fact, no more than 
words impressed more or less lightly upon events. The 
truth of history, says Nietzsche, is reduced to linguistic 
forms which hides the will to power in all its various 
manifestations (86)- 
It has been a tradition for humanism to assume that once 
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someone gains power, he ceases to know. Humanists assert 
that power- makes men mad and those who govern blind; only 
those who manage to keep their distance from it are said 
to be able to discover the truth- Ire fact, humanism is 
tragically mistaken in drawing the line between truth 
(i.e. knowledge) and power. They are fully integrated with 
one another. The exercise of power- provides the conditions 
of emergence of new objects of knowledge and the 
accumulation of new bodies of information. This exercise 
of power is not are abstract and voluntary act, but is 
inseparable from the modes of appropriation specific to 
each social formation. 
The traditional question formulated by philosophy has, 
therefore, been completely reversed. While the old 
formulation was "how the discourses of truth or , quite 
simply, philosophy is able- to f -ix timits to the rights of 
power ? ", the problem has, now, been turned upside down 
the question is to identify the rules of right which are 
implemented by the relations of power in the production of 
discourses of truth- What is meant is basically this in 
societies as they exist today, there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, char- acterise and 
constitute the social body. These relations of power 
cannot, in turn, be 
implemented without the 
established, consolidated or 
production, accumulation, 
circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be 
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no exercise of power without a certain economy of 
discourses of truth which operates through and on the 
basis of this association. We are subjected to the 
production of truth through power and we cannot exercise 
power except through the production of truth~ The 
relationship between power, right and truth is organised 
in a highly specific fashion; and if one was to 
characterise, not its mechanism, but its intensity and 
continuity, one would say that we are forced to produce 
the truth that society demands and of which it has need in 
order to function; we must speak the truth; we are 
constrained and condemned to discover the truth. Power 
never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition and its 
registration of truth; it institutionalises, 
professinnalises and rewards its pursuit' In the last 
analysis, one could say that we must produce truth as we 
must produce wealth~ We are judged, condemned, classified, 
determined in our undertakings and destined to a certain 
mode of living or dying as a function of the true 
discourses which are the bearers of specific effects of 
power. 
The interest in the workings of power must, however' be 
specified' The problem of space, although an important 
aspect of the manifestation of power relations, is not the 
issue here- Despite the fact that architecture, because of 
its direct involvement in the manipulation 
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of space, 
offer -s a privileged instance for the understanding of the 
operative mechanisms of power, this theme is _ L the = 4 
object of this study. The historical connections between 
space and power as they emerged in the design of 
educational (87), medical (88), penal (89) and economic 
(90) institutions are of second impor -tance to the present 
discussion. Nor is it my intention to offer a general 
theory of power- and of its relationships with the law and 
the state (91). As far as this study is concerned, only 
the nature of the connections between the theoretical 
production of discourses in a given period and the 
specific regime of truth which operates in the same period 
are of inter-est. The problem is that of showing how this 
regime of truth is capable of sustaining the role and 
place given ta intellectual work in any social formation. 
Therefore, the issue is gist that of arriving at an 
a- pr-ior-i moral or intellectual evaluation of the features 
of society produced by such for -ms of power, but only to 
render possible the analysis of the process of discursive 
for-mations. 
The thing to remember here is, therefore, that truth is 
not the reward of free spir-its, nor is it the child of 
protracted solitude. It is not the privilege accorded to 
those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth 
is but a thing of this world. It is produced only by 
virtue of multiple forms of constraints and it induces 
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regular effects of power-. Each social formation has its 
own regime of truth, its own general politics of truth= 
that is the type of discourses which it accepts and makes 
function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the 
means by which it is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures according value ici the acquisition of truth; 
finally the status of those who are charged with saying 
what counts as true. Truth is to be exclusively understood 
as a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution and circulation of statements; it 
is not a metaphysical principle based on some essence. 
The most important consequence of the alteration of the 
status of truth has been that of the changing role of the 
intellectual. For a long period now, the intellectual 
spoke and has always been acknowledged the right of 
speaking in the capacity of master - of truth and justice. 
He was heard, or purported to make himself heard, as the 
spokesman of the universal. To be an intellectual meant 
something like being the consciousness /conscience of us 
all; it meant being the guardian of all that we represent 
in essence. 
Some years have now passed since the intellectual was 
called upon to play this role again- A new mode of 
connection between theory and practice came to be 
established. In most cases, the intellectuals have now got 
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used to working, not in the modality of the "universal ", 
the "exemplary" or the "true and just for all ", but within 
specific sectors at the precise points where their own 
conditions of life and work situate them (housing, 
hospital, laboratory, university, family, etc --.). This 
has undoubtedly given them a more immediate and concrete 
awareness of struggles at the local levels; and they have 
met there with problems that are specific, non -universal 
and often different from those of other people- This is 
what one might call the "specific" intellectual as opposed 
to the universal and all -embracing intellectual - 
This new configuration of intellectual work has a further 
political significance- It made possible, 
integrate, at least to re-articulate categories which were 
previously kept separate. The intellectual pc-- ear_ -' enre 
used to be the writer: as a universal consciousness, a 
free subject, he was always counterposed to those who were 
merely competent instances - the technicians, the 
teachers, the doctors, the magitrates, etc. -. But as soon 
as arose the time when each individual's specific activity 
began to be used as the basis for social action, then the 
threshold of writing disappeared- It has become possible 
to develop lateral connections across different forms of 
knowledge. This process explains why, even when the writer 
tends to disappear as the figurehead, the university and 
the academic emerge, if not as the principal elements, at 
322 
least as exchangers and privileged points of intersection. 
What has been called the "crisis of the universities" 
should nat be interpreted as a loss of power or as the 
incapacity to be influencing, but on the contrary, as a 
multiplication and re- infor-cemer,t of their power-effects 
as centres in a polymorphous ensemble of intellectuals who 
virtually all pass through and relate to the academic 
system. 
Therefore, it seems to me that the most important 
development in the intellectual's new position is that he 
has exchanged his characteristic of bearer of universal 
values for that of a person occupying a place, the 
specificity of which is linked to the general structure 
and functioning of an apparatus of truth in a given social 
formation- In other words, the contemporary intellectual 
has a three -fold specificity: that of his class -position; 
that of his conditions of work and life linked to his 
position as intellectual worker; and finally, that of the 
politics of truth as it exists today in Western society. 
It is this last factor which gives his position the 
opportunity to take on a general significance- It i=_- also 
with this factor that his local and specific struggle can 
have effects and implications which go beyond the purely 
sectorial or professional interests. The possibility of 
operating at the general level of that regime of truth, so 
essential to the functioning of society, is what defines 
the intellectual as "producer -" (92). 
There is a battle for truth or, rather, a battle around 
truth (again, truth refers here to the set of rules 
according to which the "true" is separated from the 
"false" and specific effects of power are attached to the 
true). It must be understood that it is not a matter of a 
battle on behalf of the truth, but that of a battle about 
the status of truth and the political, economic and social 
role it assumes. This battle is about maintaining or 
changing the set of rules instrumental in the elaboration 
of discourses. Once one does away with the false 
opposition of science and false consciousness and replaces 
it with a problematic in terms of truth and power, the 
question of the gradual professionalisation of the 
intellectual and the division of labour in terms of 
intellectual work and manual work takes on an entirely new 
meaning. 
Now, the specific intellectual encounters certain problems 
and faces certain dangers- There is, first, the danger of 
remaining at the level of coniur,ctur-al struggles, pressing 
in this case demands restricted to particular sectors. 
Then, there is the risk of letting himself be manipulated 
by the political parties or groups which control these 
local struggles. But above all, there is the risk of being 
unable to develop these struggles for want of a global 
strategy. 
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The essential responsibility of the intellectual, today, 
is not to stand as society's consciousness and the 
guardian of truth; nor- is it to ensure that his scientific 
practice is accompanied by a correct ideology (i.e. one 
that corresponds to the accepted moral and ethical 
standards of his time). the responsibility which faces him 
is that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting . 
new politics of truth, a new definition of the rules by 
which the true is separated from the false. To sum up, the 
problem is not that of changing people's consciousness or 
that which is in their head, but the political, economic 
and institutional regime of production of truth. It is not 
that of error, illusion, alienated consciousness or 
distorted mentalities; the problem is truth itself. 
The redefinition of the objectives and attributes of 
intellectual work is a symptom which suggests a general 
redistribution of social roles. The projects, tactics and 
goals to be adopted are now a matter for those who do the 
fighting- What the intellectual can do is to provide 
instruments of analysis which, at the present time, is the 
essential task of historical r-es_ar-ch- What is effectively 
needed is a ramified and penetrative perception of the 
present situation; a perception which would make it 
possible to locate lines of weakness and strong points. In 
other words, a topological survey of the battlefield: this 
is the new task of the intellectual - But as for saying 
"here is what we must do", certainly not 
Consequently, the role of theory seems to be just this: 
not to formulate a global and systematic model which holds 
everything in place, but to analyse the specificity of the 
mechanisms by which true discourses are produced and 
accepted as such, to locate the connections and extensions 
and tu build little by little a strategic knowledge. This 
notion of theory as a toolkit means two things 
a)- that the theory to be constructed is not a system but 
an instrument, a logic of the specificity of power 
relations and of the struggle around them~ 
b)- that the investigation can only be carried out step by 
step on the basis of a reflection on given situations (a 
reflection which, by necessity, must be historical). 
It is certainly not an easy task to integrate this type of 
analysis which emphasizes the theoretical contribution of 
critical language and a type of architectural practice 
which faces the pressing problems of urban decay. The 
abandonment by architecture of any pretention of ever 
playing a predominant part in the organisation of the 
future does not mean that it should turn, now, to assuming 
a new role of persuasion, trying to convince the public 
through symbolic metaphors that the contradictions, 
imbalances and chaos typical of contemporary urban 
environments contain within themselves unlimited 
possibilities and are unexplored richness, as the eclectic 
experiments of the last decade were trying to do. 
Nor is it a matter of laying aside the questions of 
language and experiment in order to operate solely in the 
field of the administration of the territory and the 
building trade. Rather, it is a question of architects 
understanding that this reality of social processes is not 
are impurity to be eliminated or a compromise to be avoided 
at all costs, but that it is the basic material of the 
designer's work. No one is claiming that contemporary 
architectural practice is simply a technique submerged in 
the administrative organisation; in fact, it is from its 
proposals for change and its inventions that the 
administration draws the elements essential to its own 
vitality. 
Therefore, it is not just a matter of transferring those 
standards of quality and meaning that are proper to 
architectural language into the world of production (a 
task characteristic of the ideology of work). instead, it 
is one of being aware that language lives in the world of 
production, in any case. This relationship with the world 
of production constitutes an indispensable layer of 
solidity for architecture- It is only by the courageous 
acceptance of its limits that architectural language can 
claim the autonomous character of its intervention- The 
uttermost consistency in the pursuit of the laws of 
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autonomous activity is that which brings it close to the 
state of something that can be produced and made 
consciously and not one that renders it into a taboo or a 
fetish- As Mallarme once stated: 
"Work_ of literature are something not inspired hut made 
out of worsts" (93). 
NOTES 
1. THE HISTORICAL SLEEP 
(1) K. Marx, extract from a letter to H. Ruge 
(September-, 1843), published in "Correspondances ", 
Editions 10/18 (Par-is, 1971), p23. 
(2) G. Bachelard, "La formation de l'esprit 
scientifique ", Editions Vrin (Paris, 193R). On 
Bachelard, reference can be made to G.G. Granger, 
"Pensee, logique, language- Hommage a castor, 
Bachelard ", P.U.F. (Paris, 1957) and in particular to 
G. Canguilhem's study, "Sur une epi_terol.ogi-e 
concordataire ", reedited by the author in "Etudes 
d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences ", Editions 
Vrin (Paris, 196E!). 
(3) G. Canguilhem, "Le normal et le pathologique", 
P.U.F. 3rd edition (Par-is, 1966) and by the same 
author, "Etudes d'histoire et de philosophie des 
sciences", op. cit. 
(4) Ibid op. cit. 
(5) M. Serres has studies this phenomenon in 
"L`i.r,terfereiice ", Editions Minuit (Par -is, 1972). 
(6) Ibid op. cit. 
1129 
(7) L. Althusser -, "For Marx", New Left Books (London, 
1977), p168. 
(8) As, for instance, Barthes' literary criticism which 
takes as the prime object of analysis the structure and 
language of the particular- work under study. See R. 
Barthes, "Le degre zero de l'ec rtitur-e, suivi des 
nouveaux essais critiques", Editions Seuil (paris, 
1972) and also by the same author, "Critique et 
verite ", Editions Seuil (Paris, 1944). 
(9) The expression is recurrent in Foucault's writings. 
(10) M. Tafuri, "Architecture and utopia. Design and 
capitalist development", M.I.T. Press (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1979), p3. 
(11) This point has already been discussed in relation 
to the empiricist epistemology, pp75 -96. 
(12) In fact, for a very long time and up to the most 
recent years, the multiple expressions of the desire to 
find a "common language ", an organicity in life, all 
converge on Hegel. This was confirmed by Sollers who, 
at the colloquy on George Bataille organised by Tel 
Quel at Cerisy -la -Salle in 1972, could still declare 
that the shift in emphasis, of which I have been 
speaking, was to be understood as the effects of the 
explosion of the Hegelian system. See P. Sollers, 
330 
"Ratai.11e ", Editions 10/18 (Paris, 1973), p36. Refer 
also to Foucau_lt's inaugural address at the College de 
France in 1970 when he declared that: "..,_whether 
through logic or epistemology, whether through tiara or 
Nietzsche, our entire epoch struggles to disengage 
itself from Hegel ", and P. Klossowski who explained the 
transition from Hegel to Nietzsche in "Nietzsche et le 
cercle uicieux ", Editions Mercure de France (Paris, 
1969), p32. For a discussion of Hegel's influence on a 
succession of major art historians, see E.H. E:ombrich, 
"In search of culture history ", Oxford University Press 
(Oxford, 1969). Gombrich maintains that this influence 
has been largely pernicious. 
(13) This search for a higher order of organisation that 
would transcend the apparent chaos of everyday life has 
never- really ceased. Numerous attempts have been made 
since Hegel, the most recent one being the much 
publicised study of I. Prirogrine & I. Stengers, "Order 
out of chaos: mans new dialogue with nature , Bantam 
Books (New York, 1984)- 
(14) See " Hegel's aesthetics ", a text put together by 
Hegel's contemporary, H.G. Hotho, from Hegel's own 
notes for the lectures he gave ira Berlin in the 1820's 
and from the students' notes on those lectures. 
Reimpression by F. Bassenge (Frankfurt Pam Main, 1965), 
pp1«-157. 
331 
(15) G.W.F. Hegel, "Vorlesungen uber die Aesthetik", 
published in "Orr cit religion and philosophy ", 
translated by J. Sibree, Harper Books (New York, 1970), 
pp22 -127. On the category of the imitation of nature in 
classical art, see W. Tatarkiewicz, "History of 
_.esthetic_ ", Editions Mouton (The Hague, 1970) and also 
A. Blunt, "Artistic theory in Italy", Oxford University 
Press (Oxford, 1956). 
(16) G.W.F. Hegel, "Logic" Part I of "The Encyclopedia 
of the philosophical sciences ", translated by W. 
Wallace & A.V. Miller, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 
1971), para. 214. 
(17) J.J. Winckelmann, "History of art in Antiquity ", 
first published in 1764, reimpr-ession by Oxford 
University Press (Oxford, 196 3), p37. 
(18) G.W.F. Hegel, "The philosophy of h-i-story", 
translated by J. Sibree, Harper Books (New York, 1956). 
(19) Ibid op. cit., Part II and III. 
(20) H. Wofflin, "Renaissance and Baroque ", translated 
by K. Simon, Cornell University Press (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1966), p66. 
(21) G.W.F. Hegel, "Introduction to the Berlin 
aesthetics lectures", translated by T.M. Knox, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford, 1979), p57. 
2. THE LEGACY OF HEGEL 
(22) cf. "!lrgel's aesthetics", op. cit. p97. 
(23) N. Pevsner, "An outline of European architecture ", 
Penguin Books (1974), p14. 
(24) L. Althusser- & E. Balibar, "Lire le Capital ", 
FM /Petite Collection Maspero (Paris, 1973), p168. 
(25) P. Fr -ankl, "Gothic architecture ", Penguin Books 
(1962), pxvi. 
(26) E. Panofsky, "Gothic architecture and 
scholasticism ", Wimmer lecture (1948), The Archabbey 
Press (Latrobe, Penn., 1951), pp21 -22. 
(27) E. Panofsky, "Studies on iconology", Oxford 
University Press (Oxford, 1939), p7- 
2. AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
(28) This aspect was analysed by A. Pred in "Social 
reproduction and the time- geography of everyday life ", 
published in Geografisker Annaler N.63 Series B (1981), 
pp5 -22. See also A. Pred & R. Pred, "The New 
Naturalism. A critique of Order and Chaos ", published 
in Environment and Planning D: Space and Society Vol.3 
(1985), pp461-476. 
( 9) These phrases were borrowed from D. Selbourne's "On 
the methods of History Workshop ", published in History 
Workshop N -9, pplS0-161. 
(30) "Functionalism" is a term that can be applied to a 
number of first-order mistakes that characterise too 
much of current social science. These include: a) the 
attributing of needs to social systems; b) the 
assumption that social systems are functionally ordered 
and cohesive; c) the imputing of a teleology to social 
systems; d) the characterisation of effects as causes; 
e) the setting up of empirically unverifiable 
propositions via tautological statements. 
(31) Good critiques of functionalist theory can be found 
in A. Giddens, "Central pr,Fi1lerns in soci-ill theory", 
Macmillan (London, 1979) and by the same author, "A 
contemporary critique of h-i--tori-ca? ma?`er-:-i?r.i_rs: 
Macmillan (London, 1951). See also J. Urry, "The 
anatomies of capitalist societies. The economy, ciu -it 
society and state ", Macmillan (London, 1981) and N.J. 
Thrift, "On the determination of social action in space 
and time ", published in Environment and Planning Dr 
Space and Society Vol -1 (1983), pp 3 -57. 
(32) A. Giddens, "Central problems 
op- cit. p54. 
in social theory ", 
(33) This is what D. Gregory tried to do in "Soi-i-d 
geom try: notes on the recovery of spatial structure ", 
published in "A search for common ground ", Edited by P. 
Goulds & G. Olsson, Pion Publications (London 1982), 
pp 187 -219 . 
(34) P. Bourdieu, "Ciutiine of a theory of practice", 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1977), p9. 
(35) G. Therborn, "The ideology of power and the power 
of ideology ", New Left Books (London, 1980), p23- 
( 36) On that aspect, see P. Ricoeur-, "Hermeneutics and 
the social sciences. Essays on language, action and 
interpretation ", Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 
1981). 
(37) L. Althusser- & E. Balibar, "Lire le Capital ", op. 
cit. p24- 
(38) M. Foucault, "The archaeology of knowledge ", 
Tavistock Publications (London, 1972). 
(39) L. Althusser & E. Balibar, "Lire le Capital", op. 
cit. p26- 
(40) Ibid op- cit., pp27-28- 
(41) S. Freud, "Moise et le monothe-i-srne", N-F-P- 
Collection Idees (Paris, 1968), p59. J.M. Rey has 
related this work of decoding to what Nietzsche 
discovered in the formation of languages: 
"Philosophical language has not been able to be 
presented as autonomous or univocal except by way of a 
far larger omission, which is to say, a decisive 
dismissal of its production, its metaphorical tissue, 
its loans, its debts and the complex of its trauma- The 
effects of this massive omission are those that 
Nietzsche re- inscribes in his text through the practice 
of the double inscription, a re- doubling, re-effusion, 
a productive translation,, This work is entirely 
analogous to Freud's decoding operation ", J.M. Rey, "tl 
nomma della scrittura", published in l ver-ri N =39 -40 
(1972), P218. 
(42) On that point, see especially F. Nietzsche, "The 
gay science ", translated by R.J. Hollingdale, Vintage 
Books (New York, 1974)- See also R.J. Hollingdale, "A 
Nietzsche reader ", Penguin Books (1984), pp 15 -231 - 
(4.3) See M. Foucault, "Nietzsche ", published in "Les 
cahiers du Royaumont ", Editions Minuit (Paris, 1947), 
p189. 
(44) N.J. Thrift, "Limits to knowledge in social theory: 
towards a theory of human practice" (1979), available 
as a mimeograph from the department of human geography, 
Australian National University, Canberra. 
(45) This schema was very similar to that proposed by J. 
Habermas in "A reply to mg critics", published in 
"Habermas.. Critical debates", Edited by J.B. Thomson & 
D. Held, Macmillan (London, 1982), p264. 
(46) See, for instance, Le Comte de Puffon, "Disco-=s 
sur Za mani-ere de traiter t `histoire naturelle", 
published in "Oeuvres complete_ ", L'impr-imer-ie Royale 
(Paris, 1774), p31 and also J.F. Blondel n r- t-t?U-r= 
d'architecture" Vol -I, Imprimerie Cher Desaint (Paris, 
1771). 
(47) Go back: to pp145 -146. 
(4P) J. Derr-ida, "La uoi - x et le phencneene ", P.H.F. 
(Paris, 1967) and also by the same author, "L'ecr iture 
et to difference ", Editions Seuil (Paris, 1967). 
(49) On some of the studies on deconstruction, see J. 
Culler, "On deconstruction ", Cornell University Press 
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1982) and M. Ryan, "Marxism and 
deconstruction", The John Hopkins University Press 
(Baltimore, M.D., 1984)- 
(50) Go back to the discussion on the danger-s facing 
critical language in pli- 
(51) Refer to quote in p54. 
(5 2) Go to pl50- 
337 
(53) A. Hauser, "The social history of ay-t", translated 
by S. Cadman, Vintage Books (New York, 1951). 
(54) Go back to p137. 
(55) C. Simmel, "Zur Psychologie der Mode. Sc.z-i-olog-z=s=he 
studie", first published in Die Zeit (1895), 
republished in Arte e c-ivilta N.1' (1975) by D. 
Formaggio & L. Per-iacchi, p.19. 
(56) Ibid op. cit., pp19-20. 
(57) S. Freud, "Die endliche and die unendliche 
analyse ", published in "Ges -c ramelte werke XVI ", 
translated and republished asAnalyse terror -in e et 
R analyse interminable" in evue fsar:ca-ise de 
psychanalyse N -10 -11 (1938- 1939), pp3 -38- See also the 
commentary of it made by F. Pella in the introduction 
of "La critica freudiana ", Editions bompiani (Milano, 
1977), from p45. 
(58) W. Benjamin, "The author as producer ", published in 
"Understanding Brecht ", New Left Books (London, 1973), 
pp55 -103. 
(59) L. Althusser, "Lenin and philosophy", N.L.B. 
Editions (London, 1971), p54. 
4. DESIGN AND IDEOLOGY 
(60) This is true despite the number of recent studies 
in social theory, human geography, archaeology and the 
theory of history. Some of these are D. Lacapra, 
"Rethinking intellectual history: texts, contexts, 
language ", Cornell University Press (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1983); P. Saunders, "Social theory and the urban 
question", Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 
1981); J.G. Thomson, "Studies on the theories of 
ideology ", Polity Press, (Cambridge, 1984); G. 
Therborn, "The ideology of power and the power of 
ideology ", New Left Books (London, 1980); S.J. Tambiah, 
"Culture, thought and social action. An anthropological 
perspective", Harvard Press (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1985); D. Gregory, "Ideology, science and human 
geography ", Hutchinson (London, 1978); 'r__. Vristiansen, 
"Ideology and material culture: an archaeological 
perspective ", published in "Marxist perspective in 
archaeology ", Edited by M. Spriggs, Cambridge 
University Press (cambridge, 1984), pp72-100; D.J. 
Meltzer -, "Ideology and material culture ", published in 
"Modern material culture, the archaeology of us ", 
Edited by R. Goulds & M. Schiffer, Academy Press (New 
York, 1981), pp113 -125; and finally, M. Miller a- C. 
Tilley, "Ideology, power and prehistory ", Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge, 1984). 
(61) Ori the discussion on the functionalist conception 
779 
of ideology, refer to the preliminary chapter of this 
study, X'p2-15- 
(62) Destutt de Tracy, "Elements d'ideotogie" Vol -I & II 
(Paris, 1799) and Condillac, "Essai sur l'origine des 
connaissances humaines ", published in "Oeuvres" (Paris, 
1798). I do not know of any re-impression of these 
studies, the first editions of which are kept in the 
Biliotheque Nationale in Paris- See also D.J. Manning, 
"The form of ideology ", George Allen & Unwin 
publications (London, 1980) - 
(63) Marx & F. Engels, "The German ideology ", 
Lawrence & Wishart Publications (London, 1965). 
(64) L. Althusser, "Essays on ide_=togy", Verso 
Publications (London,1971), p105. 
(65) V. Sklovsky, "Ulla, Utta Marziani", in "Chad 
konja ", (Moscow -Berlin, 1926), pp36 -58- See also M. 
Tafuri, A. Asor Rosa & al., "Socialismo, ci-tta, 
architettura ", Edizioni Officina (Roma, 1972)- 
(66) On that particular point, see J. Ltrry, "The 
anatomies of capitalist societies, The economy, civil 
society and the state ", op- cit. 
(67) See J. Fabos, G.T. Milde tt V.M. Weinmayer, 
"Frederick Law Olmsted ", University of Massachussets 
Press (Boston, 1968); L.W. Roper, "Biography of F.L. 
540 
Olmsted ", The John Hopkins University Press (Baltimore, 
M.D., 1973); D. Fein, "F.L. Olmsted and the American 
environmental tradition ", Br-aziller Books (New York, 
1972); H. Wright, "The interrelation of housing and 
transit ", published in American city N.10 (1914), 
pp12-28. On the birth of the Park Movement, see L. 
Marx, "The machine in the garden; technology and the 
pastoral ideal in America ", Galaxy Books (New York, 
1967) and R. Nash, "The American cult of the 
primitive ", published in American quarterly N.18 
(1966) , p,p43 -64. 
(68) See P. Geddes, "Cities in evolution ", Editions Benn 
(London, 1968); K. Paddy, "A person; an 
introduction to the ideas and life of Patrick Geddes ", 
Editions Gollancz (London, 1975); P. Boardman, "Worlds 
of Patrick Geddes, biologist, town -planner, 
re- educator, peace-warrior", Routledge and Kegan Paul 
(London, 1978); P. Mairet, "Pioneer of sociology; the 
life and letters of Patrick Geddes ", Lund Humphries 
(London, 1957); M. Stalley, "Patrick Geddes: spokesman 
for man and the environment ", Rutgers University Press 
(New Brunswick, 1972) . On Unwire, see R. Unwire, "Town 
planning in practice: an -introduction to the art of 
des- igning cities and suburbs ", Editions Unwin (London, 
1909) and W.L. Creese, "The legacy of Raymond Unwin: a 
human pattern for planning ", M.I.T. Press (Cambridge, 
341 
Mass., 1967) . 
(69) On this transformation, see R. Ludove, "Community 
planning in the 1920's: the contribution of the RPAA ", 
University of Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh, 1963); M. 
Scott, "American piau:ning since 1090", University of 
California Press (Berkeley, CA., 1969); and F. Dal Co, 
"From the park to the region - The progressive ideology 
and the reform of the city ", published in "The American 
city from the civil war to the New Deal", Granada 
Publications (London, 1980), pp143 -261. 
(70) See F. Beguin, "L'ordre physique des formes 
(1700- 1310) ", published in Architecture N.403 (1977), 
pp30 -35; J.P. Devaise, J.P. Ooubert & al, "Medec-i -ne, 
climat et epidemie a la fin du. XVIIIe siede", Editions 
Mouton (The Hague, 1970); B. Fortier, "Logiques de 
i'equ- ipement. Motes pour une histoire du projet ", 
published in Architecture, Mouvement, Cont-i-nuite N.45 
(1978), pp 8O -85; J- Gaillard, "Assistance et urbanisme 
dans le Paris du Second Empire ", published in "Paris la 
cille (1552- 1570) ", Editions Honore Champion (Paris, 
1977); H. Rosenau, "Social purpose in architecture: 
Paris and London compared, 1760- 1000 ", Editions Thames 
and Hudson (London, 1970); G. Teyssot, "Ci-tta seru-i-ci. 
La produzione dei batiments civils in Francia ", 
published in Casabella N.424 (1977), pp56 -45. 
342 
(71) A-G. Hirshman, "The passions and the interests: 
political arguments for capitalism before its tr-i-V:rrr-rh", 
Princeton University Press (1977), p131- 
(72) Weber arrived at the same conclusion, early this 
century. On that point, see M. Weber, "The city", 
Translated by D. Martingale & G. Newwirth, The Free 
Press (New York, 1958); see also M. Weber, "It zetodo 
delle scienze storico-sociali", 
(Torino, 1958). 
Editions Einaudi 
(73) A- Kojeve, "Introduction to the reading of Hegel", 
Basic Books (New York, 1969), p492- 
(74) The cleanest approach to the problem of negative 
thought is probably that which Cacciari took in his 
essay, "Note suiffa dialectic, del neÿat-iuo=". In it, he 
analyses Simmel's argument on the relationship between 
the development of a "metropolitan" way of life and 
that of rationality. See M. Cacciar -i, "Note sully 
dialectica del naegatiìo nrel t ` epoca della rae,etropoli: 
(saggie sue Georg Sirnrrel) ", published in Angelus Nouus 
N-21 (1971), pp10 -136- See also, from the same author, 
"Sulla genesi del pensiero negotito,", published in 
Contropíano N -1 (1969), pp175 -157- 
(75) M. Tafuri, "Theories and History of architecture", 
Granada Books (London, 1980), note to the second 
edition. 
343 
(76) This is why both Weber- and Nietzsche concentrated 
on the criticism of "values" in their respective 
attemps to free the social system from them. On the 
comparison between these two writers see M. Cacciari, 
"Sully genes-i del pensiero negatiuo ", op. cit., p183. 
(77) M. Tafuri, "Architecture and utopia. Design e.crrd 
capitalist úeuetop7ne77t", M.I.T. Press (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1979), p56. 
(78) Ibid op. cit., p60 
(79) Ibid op. cit., p50. 
(80) On the distinction between progressive and 
regressive ideology, see K. Manheim, "Ideology and 
utopia ", Routledge to Kegan Paul (London, 1936), 
paperback edition in 1960. 
(81) Ibid op. cit., p247. This point does not, of 
course, apply to knowledge which is independent of 
men's position in history. The example of mathematics 
is an obvious example. 
(82) Ibid op. cit., p87. 
(81) M. Serres, "La traduction", E i4iJ- s Minuit (Paris, 
1982), p259. 
(84) E. Husserl, "The crisis of European science and 
3411 
transcendental phenomenology ", Translated by D. Carr, 
Evanston Northwestern University Press (1970)- See also 
J. Derrida, "Edmund Nusserrl `s origin of geometry ", 
Great Eastern Book Co. (New York, 1978) . 
(85) See M. Foucault, "The history of sexuality. An 
introduction ", Penguin Books (1981) and G. Canguilhem, 
"Le normal et le pathologique ", P.U.F. (Paris, 1946). 
(86) F. Nietzsche, "Beyond good and evil ", Penguin Books 
(1984) and by the same writer, "Thus spoke 
Zarathustra ", Penguin Books (1986). See also R.J. 
Holl_.igdale, "A Nietzsche reader", Penguin Books 
(1984) , pp215-231. 
(87) On the history of the primary schools, see A. 
C?ue rr- i en, "Genealogie des eÿui-pemerzts. cs. I l ec:: s _ 
equipements de normalisation: t'ecote p--r--im17-Ff e ,. , 
published ir, Recherches N.23 (1976), pp12 -' 8; M. 
Seaborne, "The English school, its architecture and 
organisation" Vol. I & II, Routledge & Kegan Paul 
(London, 1977). 
(88) On the medical institutions, see P. Mardaga Ed., 
"Les machines a guerir ", Collection Architecture + 
Archives, (Bruxelles, 1979); A. Forty, "The modern 
hospital in England and France. The social and medical 
uses of architecture ", published in "Buildings and 
society ", edited by A. King, Routledge cR Kegan Paul 
345 
(London, 1980), pp61 -93; A.T. Scull, "A convenient 
place to get rid of inconvenient people ", published in 
"Buildings and society ", edited by A. King, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul (London, 19 :0), pp37 -60; A.T. Scull, 
"Museums of madness and the social organisation of 
insanity in 19th Century England ", Penguin Books 
(1982); M. Foucault, "The birth of the clinique ", 
Tavistock Publications (London, 1971); E. Goffian,, 
"Asylums ", Penguin Books (1984); G. Bleandonu & G. Le 
Gaufey, "Naissance des asiles d'alienes ", published in 
Annales E.S.C. (Jan -Feb, 1975); B. Fortier, "Logiques 
de i'equipement. Notes pour une histoire du projet ", 
published in Architecture, Mouvement, Continuite N -45 
(1978), pp3O -35; F. Beguin, "L'ordre physique des 
formes ", published in Architecture N.403 (1977), 
pp 30 -L 5 . 
(89) See J. Bowr-ing, "The works of Jeremy Bentham ", Tait 
(Edinburgh, 1843); H. Tomlinson, "Design and reform. 
The separate system in the nineteenth century prison ", 
published in "Buildings and society ", edited by A. 
King, Routledge & Kegan Paul (London, 1930), pp94 -119; 
R. Evans, "Bentham's panopticone an incident in the 
social h- istory of architecture ", published in AAQ 
Vol.3, N.2 (1971), pp2i -37; R. Evans, "The fabrication 
of virtue, English prison architecture 1795-183g", 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1931); B- 
346 
"Prisons and panopticons ", published in 
Social policy and administration N.18 (1984), pp48 -88; 
M. Foucault, "L'impossible prison: recherches sur le 
systeme peni.tenti.ai.re au XIXe siecle ", Editions Seuil 
(Paris, 1980); P. O'Brien, "The promise of punishment: 
prisons in 19th Century France ", Princeton University 
Press (1982). 
(90) On the genealogy of workhouses, see M.A. Crowther, 
"The workhouse system, 1834 -1929. The history of an 
English social institution ", Methuen Publications 
(London, 1983).. 
(91) On those aspects, see N. Poulantzas, "State, power 
and socialism ", New Left Books (London, 1978); J. Urry, 
"The anatomies of capitalist societies; the economy, 
civil society and the state ", Macmillan (London, 1981); 
M. Ignatieff, "State, civil society and total 
institutions: a critique of recent social histories of 
punishment ", published in Crime and justice N.3 (1981), 
pp153 -192; F. Driver, "Power, space and the body: a 
critical assessement of Fou.cault's Discipline and 
Punish ", published in Environment and Planning D: Space 
and Society Vol.3 N.4 (1985), pp425 -4d.6; B. Hindess, 
"Power, interests and the outcome of struggles ", 
published in Sociology N.16 (1982), pp498 -511; A. 
Giddens, "From Marx to Nietzsche? Neo- conservatism, 
Foucault and problems in contemporary political 
347 
thppvy"^ published in "PKofiYes and criMxpweq in snriaX 
theory", Macmillan (London, 1982)» pp215-270. 
(92) W. Benjaminv "The author as producer", published in 
"Understanding Brecht"` New Left Books (London, 1973), 
(93} S. Mallarme, "La musique et [es tettres", 
Collection Points (Paris, 1972), p138~ 
348. 
CONCLUSION IN THE FORM OF A PROBLEM 
There can be no finality in theory- No analysis can ever 
be brought to a close without betraying itself; where and 
when a particular inquiry must end is determined to a very 
large extent, not by the feeling that one has reached a 
final viewpoint from which one can affirm: "This is how it 
should be ", but by all the conjunctural factors which 
condition the work of the analyst- It is because of the 
particular limitations imposed by the conditions of its 
production that a text or a book must be brought to its 
conclusion. But this conclusion is to be interpreted only 
as a momentary end, a pause consciously and carefully 
determined. As such, it is the appropriate place from 
where to look back at the route travelled and discuss what 
may follow from it. 
First of all, the main motivation of this study was the 
possibility of opening up the channels of new areas of 
inquiry, new terms and new problematics. This incessant 
need to look for new channels should not, however, by 
interpreted as some fashionable trend which would wither 
away in the course of time as soon as it starts losing its 
power of captivating the imagination of those who use it; 
nor is it some obsessive mania which preys on particular 
individuals or groups. Instead, it is at the origin of all 
the obligations that a person has to endure during the 
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course of his life. It is this necessity which 
characterises the consciousness of the "historical" man 
whose deepest emotion is the insuperable mistrust of the 
course of things and the readiness to recognise at all 
times that everything can go wrong. This is what Benjamin 
was referring to when he spoke of the "destructive 
character" as reliability itself, that is, the only 
constant characteristic of man: 
"The destructive character sees nothing permanent. But for 
this very reason, he sees ways everywhere. Where others 
encounter watts or mountains, there too he sees a way..>__.. 
Because he sees a way everywhere, he always positions 
himself at the crossroads. No moment can know what the 
next will bring. What exists, he reduces to rubbles, not 
for the sake of the rubbles, but for that of the way 
Leading through" (1). 
The alternative method of analysis that I tried to outline 
is but the expression of this necessity, directed at 
architectural discourses. The aim was to show that, 
through the analysis of the processes that lead from the 
production of knowledge in architecture to its reception 
as such by the general public, it was possible to unearth 
the buried connections between architecture and the 
general epistemological structure of knowledge which makes 
the enunciation of certain problems possible while 
prohibiting that of others. 
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Because this analysis was based on the conviction that the 
specific contents in architectural discourses are 
primarily the reflection of the manner in which 
theoretical production operates in architecture, the 
inquiry had to be conducted on two fronts simultaneously. 
On the one hand, an analysis of the contents of 
discourses, with a view of demonstrating that the prupose 
and objectives that architecture gives itself are not as 
"natural" or obvious as they are made to appear, but that 
they are in fact the products of a previous construction; 
a construction which took place at the level of the 
epistemological structure operating through the entire 
body of society- For architecture to be able to speak of 
man's needs, for instance, it was necessary that it 
assumed a perspective which ignores the diversity and 
differences between real individuals or groups in order to 
let emerge an ideal model of what man is or should be, in 
short, man as an essence. To this abstract category of 
"man" (i.e. man = the essence of man), idealised needs and 
desires are made to correspond, resulting in the 
formulation of problems and solutions which owe their 
justification, not to any historically verifiable data, 
but only to the dominant ideological framework regulating 
the production of knowledge in the West: that of 
rationality as the guiding principle of all social 
organisation and production. 
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On the other hand, this study had to concentrate on the 
hidden mechanisms of discursive production by which the 
above substitution of the abstract notion of man to real 
individuals was able to take place. It is those mechanisms 
which are responsible for the persistence of the nostalgic 
themes of a harmonious environment built for harmonious 
communities made of rational mere whose pr- oblems are solved 
through the peaceful means of reason and dialogue. 
By far the most important of these mechanisms is that 
which binds together distinct practices under one single 
generic name. At the discursive level, the magical 
alliance between criticism and design and their 
denomination under the all- encompassing term of 
"architecture" has meant that it has been impossible to 
operate a critique from outside the ideological structure 
of architectural discourses. It was therefore, only 
natural that the first task facing this analysis was to 
try and re- establish a distance between critical language 
and design language, both languages require a 
specialisation which leads to their incommunicability. The 
object of criticism is primarily to unveil the mechanisms 
of nostalgia; its purpose is to show that the synthetic 
appearance given to architecture by discourse serves the 
sole purpose of hiding the complex and multifaceted nature 
of the processes involved in the production of the 
environment under the conditions of contemporary urban 
L 
reality. The task of critical analysis is ta show that the 
reality of the contemporary metropolis is not the 
expression of a single "logos" or the physical 
manifestation of a communal will to form; it is instead., 
the product of a series of bitter struggles between 
conflicting interests and motivations. Only by bringing 
these contradictions and struggles into light can 
criticism account for the complex phenomenological nature 
of the metropolis. These contradictions must not longer be 
considered as the stigma of history which must be 
eliminated through analysis, in order to let a final 
coherence emerge; they are that which the critical analyst 
must emphasize and bring to the open. 
Once such a strategy is initiated, it becomes possible to 
deconstruct the peculiar globality of the terms used in 
architecture (such as "environment ", "city ", "human 
needs ", etc...). While they leave very little outside 
their all- embracing generality, it is precisely that 
generality which excludes many fundamental objects and 
relations. The demystification of this generality is 
certainly the most potential step of analysis. What is 
more, the deconstruction and disartic_ulation of these 
global terms does not lead, as one might think, to the 
deprivation of the field, but to the generation of new 
perspectives; perspectives which correspond to the 
individual fragments resulting from the explosion of these 
global. terms. Only by establishing the apparent unity of 
discourse as the prime object of critical examination 
could such a deconstruction suggest, not a void to be 
filled, but a clarity to be exploited. After- all by 
trying to dissolve the everythingness of terms such as 
"environment" or "city ", those "ever-ythings" to which they 
refer do not disappear. It is only those whose definition 
is dependent upon are undefinable and ubiquitous generality 
which disappear since this generality is no longer the 
unquestioned term of reference. 
While there is no such a thing as "architecture ", there 
are distinct architectural practices which are reducible 
to neither their physical products nor their 
self -image. These practices consist of complex objects and 
relations whose physical existence as well as theoretical 
conception are socially conditioned. Therefore, as a 
social practice, the production of knowledge in 
architecture cannot but be located within a specific 
space -time problematic which, by definition, prohibits the 
use of all abstractions or universalising principles as 
the justification for its products. The definition, 
classification, distribution and transformation of 
discourses are possible only because they are the result 
of a process of intellectual production 
conditioned. 
socially 
This conception of intellectual work, which insists on the 
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fundamental reciprocity between theoretical constructs and 
empirical materials, accentuates the importance of the 
"local" and the "contingent" in the enunciation of 
discourses. A re- arrangement of "theory" which entails a 
radical scepticism about the traditional project of 
totalisations and puts in its place the recovery of more 
particular truths dependent as much on general strategies 
as on local negociations of power. It is the task of 
criticism to build little by little a strategic knowledge 
out of a multitude of analyses of these local negociations 
of power in which universal essences and values have no 
place. 
The critical method outlined here can only be a tentative 
one, since it is in its actual applications on empirical 
situations that its worthiness can be assessed, according 
to the fruitfulness of the results that it may or may not 
produce- As such, it must not be taken as a blueprint, a 
finished statement or a definite model. At best, it 
represents a certain attitude or perspective and carries 
with it the explicit requirement of self -criticism, 
availability to modification and transformation. 
From it, one has to move to its application and testing on 
specific studies which take into account both the ideas 
formulated in discourse and their real effects on the 
local situations from which they emerge and to which 
they 
apply. It is through this constant moving back 
and forth 
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from towtg to rwnt@yt that will mfEnunt fnr the 
historicity of artistic language by pointing to the limits 
of its autonomy. The critical awareness of those limits is 
what puts architecture before its responsibilities; that 
is, warning it against the spreading of rhetorical 
messOes nr against self-referential circularity. 
NOTES 
(1) W. Benjamin, "The destructive character", published 
in "One-way street", New Left Books (London, 1979), 
p159~ 
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